carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (01/04/85)
Laura Creighton has related Robert Nozick's fable about Wilt Chamberlain. It is interesting and worth a closer look. First, let me tell a slightly different fable. A sports trainer spots a youth from a very poor family who has great talent for basketball. The trainer offers the youth a decent subsistence in return for selling himself into slavery for life. The youth agrees, considering this to be his best chance in life, and thenceforth the trainer makes $240,000 a year from his slave. There is nothing in Nozick, so far as I am aware, which implies that there is anything wrong with this arrangement. Here is what Nozick says about enslavement contracts: "The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would." [AS&U, p. 331] [Let me throw in another libertarian fable here, although it is not directly relevant: The Mayflower lands, and most of the Pilgrims remain on board to settle on a political constitution. One Pilgrim, however, sneaks ashore and claims Massachusetts. According to libertarian principles, the other Pilgrims will have to rent or buy land from the one who owns Massachusetts, or else move on to New Hampshire. Anything wrong with this scenario, libertarians?] Now let me retell Nozick's fable, making a small change which will not affect Nozick's argument. We start with one's favored distribution of wealth, D, having been actually realized in the society. Now consider a young lady, Brooke, whose chief achievement in life thus far is to be beautiful (this she has accomplished by a clever choice of genes). A million people a year pay her 25 cents each to see her face in magazines, so she makes $250,000 a year. Another young lady, Carol, studies modern dance and works at it six hours a day (while holding a job to support herself). Eventually she turns professional and makes $6,000 a year as a dancer. There is now a new distribution of wealth, E. Nozick asks, Is not this new distribution just? Each person who paid to see Brooke or Carol parted with his money voluntarily. If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled under D, didn't this include their being entitled to give it to Brooke rather than to Carol? Can anyone complain on grounds of justice? Well, yes, I think Carol can, who is not only talented but works far harder than Brooke, whose hardest work is applying her makeup. Nozick is asking us to believe that distributive justice has nothing to do with what individuals DESERVE. Individuals need not make money the old-fashioned way in Nozick's society, EARNING it by merit, in order for the outcome to be just. It is sufficient that the transfers have not involved coercion or fraud. Is this the position of (all, most, some) libertarians, or am I misstating it in some way? At any rate, it is evident why Nozick is concerned to demonstrate that market outcomes are just: Nozick's minimal state is not allowed to "correct" market outcomes by redistribution of wealth, even though, as Hayek admits, market outcomes depend to a great extent on luck. We thus see, not for the last time, how the defense of the minimal state is linked to the defense of capitalism. I will have more to say on Nozick's entitlement theory of justice; let this suffice for now. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) (01/04/85)
> [Let me throw in another libertarian fable here, although it is not directly > relevant: The Mayflower lands, and most of the Pilgrims remain on board to > settle on a political constitution. One Pilgrim, however, sneaks ashore and > claims Massachusetts. According to libertarian principles, the other > Pilgrims will have to rent or buy land from the one who owns Massachusetts, > or else move on to New Hampshire. Anything wrong with this scenario, > libertarians?] I'm not a libertarian, but there seems to be one major flaw in the scenario: Massachusetts was already occupied when the Pilgrims arrived. Now, if I recall my history correctly (and said history was correct to begin with!), the people who already lived in New England, as it came to be called, were willing to share the land with the new arrivals, but eventually the new arrivals and their descendants almost completely displaced the original owners of the land, and not always in a completely scrupulous manner (to say the least). So why should those who occupy the land now be allowed to keep it, since they obtained it, indirectly, from someone who had no right to it? Gary Samuelson ittvax!bunker!garys
bwm@ccice2.UUCP (Brad Miller) (01/09/85)
In article <272@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >Laura Creighton has related Robert Nozick's fable about Wilt Chamberlain. > >First, let me tell a slightly different fable. A sports trainer spots a >youth from a very poor family who has great talent for basketball. The >trainer offers the youth a decent subsistence in return for selling himself >into slavery for life. The youth agrees, considering this to be his best >chance in life, and thenceforth the trainer makes $240,000 a year from his >slave. There is nothing in Nozick, so far as I am aware, which implies that >there is anything wrong with this arrangement. Here is what Nozick says >about enslavement contracts: "The comparable question about an individual >is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I >believe that it would." [AS&U, p. 331] I don't think libertarians have any problem with individuals who sell themselves into slavery. They would have a problem with individuals being FORCED into slavery, however. >[Let me throw in another libertarian fable here, although it is not directly >relevant: The Mayflower lands, and most of the Pilgrims remain on board to >settle on a political constitution. One Pilgrim, however, sneaks ashore and >claims Massachusetts. According to libertarian principles, the other >Pilgrims will have to rent or buy land from the one who owns Massachusetts, >or else move on to New Hampshire. Anything wrong with this scenario, >libertarians?] Lets be serious. Even in a libertarian society, there are certain actions that must be perfomed in order to have a valid claim to property. Being the first one to step on it probably won't be sufficient. >... consider a >young lady, Brooke, whose chief achievement in life thus far is to be >beautiful (this she has accomplished by a clever choice of genes). A >million people a year pay her 25 cents each to see her face in magazines, so >she makes $250,000 a year. Another young lady, Carol, studies modern dance >and works at it six hours a day (while holding a job to support herself). >Eventually she turns professional and makes $6,000 a year as a dancer. >There is now a new distribution of wealth, E. Nozick asks, Is not this new >distribution just? Each person who paid to see Brooke or Carol parted with >his money voluntarily. If the people were entitled to dispose of the >resources to which they were entitled under D, didn't this include their >being entitled to give it to Brooke rather than to Carol? Can anyone >complain on grounds of justice? No. >Well, yes, I think Carol can, who is not only talented but works far harder >than Brooke, whose hardest work is applying her makeup. Nozick is asking us >to believe that distributive justice has nothing to do with what individuals >DESERVE. Individuals need not make money the old-fashioned way in Nozick's >society, EARNING it by merit, in order for the outcome to be just. It is >sufficient that the transfers have not involved coercion or fraud. Is this >the position of (all, most, some) libertarians, or am I misstating it in >some way? This is similar to the 'equal pay for equal work' advocates, where all poets will become rich and no Industrial Relations person will want a job.. :-) Market forces HAVE to set the prices of all commodities, including labor. Otherwise a large variety of jobs YOU may claim are 'overpaid' in relation to 'work done' will go undone. In all likelyhood a black market in the commodity would ensue, and the price would rise to the level (or higher) it would have been at in the open market anyway. In your above example, Brooke is SELLING PRODUCT. There is a demonstrable connection between adverts with Brooke appearing and an incerase in sales of the product. Carol can make no such claim. If she wants more money, she will have to commercialize herself. That is, she will have to LEVERAGE her talents, so she is benefiting others either directly or indirectly, and benefiting enough people to garner larger royalties. >At any rate, it is evident why Nozick is concerned to demonstrate that >market outcomes are just: Nozick's minimal state is not allowed to >"correct" market outcomes by redistribution of wealth, even though, as Hayek >admits, market outcomes depend to a great extent on luck. We thus see, not >for the last time, how the defense of the minimal state is linked to the >defense of capitalism. Ok, I have no problem with that statement. So what? Life is a bitch, and then you die -- and that's the good news. You aren't going to eliminate luck in peoples lives by any statist approach, the luck will just be who controls the state, and who dies under it. Brad Miller -- ...[rochester, cbrma, rlgvax, ritcv]!ccice5!ccice2!bwm
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (01/10/85)
> > [Let me throw in another libertarian fable here, although it is not directly > > relevant: The Mayflower lands, and most of the Pilgrims remain on board to > > settle on a political constitution. One Pilgrim, however, sneaks ashore and > > claims Massachusetts. According to libertarian principles, the other > > Pilgrims will have to rent or buy land from the one who owns Massachusetts, > > or else move on to New Hampshire. Anything wrong with this scenario, > > libertarians?] > > I'm not a libertarian, but there seems to be one major flaw in the > scenario: Massachusetts was already occupied when the Pilgrims > arrived. Now, if I recall my history correctly (and said history > was correct to begin with!), the people who already lived in New > England, as it came to be called, were willing to share the land > with the new arrivals, but eventually the new arrivals and their > descendants almost completely displaced the original owners of the > land, and not always in a completely scrupulous manner (to say the > least). > > So why should those who occupy the land now be allowed to keep it, > since they obtained it, indirectly, from someone who had no right > to it? > > Gary Samuelson > ittvax!bunker!garys the Indians had no concept that you could restrict another's liberty to use or roam the land by claiming something called "ownership". Why should ANYONE be able to claim they own the land? tim sevener whuxl!orb
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (01/10/85)
Reply to Richard Carnes: First, let me tell a slightly different fable. A sports trainer spots a youth from a very poor family who has great talent for basketball. The trainer offers the youth a decent subsistence in return for selling himself into slavery for life. The youth agrees, considering this to be his best chance in life, and thenceforth the trainer makes $240,000 a year from his slave. There is nothing in Nozick, so far as I am aware, which implies that there is anything wrong with this arrangement. Here is what Nozick says about enslavement contracts: "The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would." [AS&U, p. 331] This may be Nozick's view, but it is definitely not every libertarian view. There are several common libertarian attacks on Nozick's view about selling into slavery -- the first is that it can never be in anyone's best interest to sell himself into slavery and therefore any slave owner who has presented this claim as fact is guilty of fraud. A second is that all contracts should be breakable. (This is Murray Rothbard's argument.) There may be great penalties involved in breaking a contract, but they still must be breakable. Actually, Nozick goes wishy-washy on this particular issue: if a good is essential for the survival of someone, then noone (according to Nozick) can claim it as property. [I think that this is a flaw in his entitlements theory, though not the most serious one.] Is freedom essential for survival as a human being? This would make an interesting court case! The other flaw is that Nozick believes that it is possible to compensate people for coercion applied to them. Therfore, if the poor man could claim that coercion was used in getting him to sell himself into slavery, then he could demand that he be recompensated for the damage done to him. The tricky question is ``who decides what is just compensation''? Nozick isn't all that clear about this... [Let me throw in another libertarian fable here, although it is not directly relevant: The Mayflower lands, and most of the Pilgrims remain on board to settle on a political constitution. One Pilgrim, however, sneaks ashore and claims Massachusetts. According to libertarian principles, the other Pilgrims will have to rent or buy land from the one who owns Massachusetts, or else move on to New Hampshire. Anything wrong with this scenario, libertarians?] Yep. Nozick uses the Lockean ``mixing your labour with land'' to designate what is property. Putting up a fence isn't good enough. So, the One Pilgrim can get all the land he can reasonably use [Nozick is vague on what is reasonable] but that sure isn't going to be all of Massachusettes. Of course, the real thing that is wrong with this scenario is that the Indians were there first, and you aren't considering *their* property rights.... Now let me retell Nozick's fable, making a small change which will not affect Nozick's argument. We start with one's favored distribution of wealth, D, having been actually realized in the society. Now consider a young lady, Brooke, whose chief achievement in life thus far is to be beautiful (this she has accomplished by a clever choice of genes). A million people a year pay her 25 cents each to see her face in magazines, so she makes $250,000 a year. Another young lady, Carol, studies modern dance and works at it six hours a day (while holding a job to support herself). Eventually she turns professional and makes $6,000 a year as a dancer. There is now a new distribution of wealth, E. Nozick asks, Is not this new distribution just? Each person who paid to see Brooke or Carol parted with his money voluntarily. If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled under D, didn't this include their being entitled to give it to Brooke rather than to Carol? Can anyone complain on grounds of justice? Well, yes, I think Carol can, who is not only talented but works far harder than Brooke, whose hardest work is applying her makeup. Nozick is asking us to believe that distributive justice has nothing to do with what individuals DESERVE. Whoops! In using the word DESERVE you are making a huge judgement here. You assume that there is some way to measure what people deserve, which is distinct from ``what people are willing to pay for''. You seem to be connecting this to ``working hard''. The problem is that it is difficult to determine who is actually ``working harder''. Do ditch diggers work harder than physics professors? Now, ideally, the people you think deserve the most amount of money should get paid the most amount of money, right? Therefore, at D time Brooke could expect to get less money (in salary) than Carol. However, in handing over their money to Brooke rather than to Carol, thouse thousands of people are saying that they value what Brooke is doing more than what Carol is doing. Hmm. I think that this sucks. However, given that I want to change this, what I really want to change is the fact that people value the appearance of people so much. (if my only problem was that Carol didn't have enough money then I could either give her some of mine, or try to convince Brooke to give her some of hers.) I would rather that people sent their 25 cents to a charitable foundation for the arts then gave it to Brooke. [By the way, I have precisely the same problem with Wilt Chamberlein. I wish people didn't value sports, either.] Consciousness raising is tough work. I don't expect it to be easy, and I don't expect it to change much in my lifetime. However, taking money away from Brooke to give to Carol does nothing to fix the basic problem *that human beings are making bad choices when they pay so much money to watch Brooke*. It also doesn't change the fact that this is *my opinion* and, obviously, other people think that paying money to see either Wilt Chamberlein or Brooke is a good decision. I have the right to do my utmost to convince people that they are mistaken in this belief -- I do *not* have the right to coerce people into acting as I would have them act. Individuals need not make money the old-fashioned way in Nozick's society, EARNING it by merit, in order for the outcome to be just. It is sufficient that the transfers have not involved coercion or fraud. Is this the position of (all, most, some) libertarians, or am I misstating it in some way? You are mistating it. The problem that you have is that you are making a distinction between ``what a person earns by merit'' and ``what other people are willing to pay for it''. I think that this distinction is artificial. What you have is your own standard (what I would be willing to pay for it) and the unhappy knowledge that other people's standards are not your own. However, collectively, the decisions of these individuals fix the price on any good or service provided and this is a measure of what it is *worth*. If your complaint is that libertarians do not guarantee that people would be as enlightened as to pick your particular standard of values, well, yes, then this is so. However, how am I supposed to know that your values are superior to mine? By letting you convince me? This is entirely consistent with libertarianism. If the truth that Carol deserves more than Brooke is that obvious then after you have managed to enlighten a sufficiently large number of people then this adjustment will just happen (as people who now have chosen to adopt your values pay to see Carol whereas before they would have paid to see Brooke). If this truth is not so obvious, then what do you have which distinguishes you from any other person whose beliefs I disagree with? At any rate, it is evident why Nozick is concerned to demonstrate that market outcomes are just: Nozick's minimal state is not allowed to "correct" market outcomes by redistribution of wealth, even though, as Hayek admits, market outcomes depend to a great extent on luck. We thus see, not for the last time, how the defense of the minimal state is linked to the defense of capitalism. Actually, Nozick's entitlement theory has a great deal to say about redistribution of wealth, which Nozick thinks is sometimes justified. However, I think he is being inconsistent here. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery) (01/12/85)
>the Indians had no concept that you could restrict another's liberty >to use or roam the land by claiming something called "ownership". >Why should ANYONE be able to claim they own the land? > tim sevener whuxl!orb By that logic, Mr. Sevener, how can *you* claim to own the clothes that you are (presumably :-)) wearing? After all, that claim restricts the freedom of others to wear them... -- The above viewpoints are mine. They are unrelated to those of anyone else, including my cats and my employer. Ken Montgomery "Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs" ...!{ihnp4,allegra,seismo!ut-sally}!ut-ngp!kjm [Usenet, when working] kjm@ut-ngp.ARPA [for Arpanauts only]
nrh@inmet.UUCP (01/14/85)
>***** inmet:net.politics / gargoyle!carnes / 11:17 pm Jan 3, 1985 >Laura Creighton has related Robert Nozick's fable about Wilt Chamberlain. >It is interesting and worth a closer look. > >First, let me tell a slightly different fable. A sports trainer spots a >youth from a very poor family who has great talent for basketball. The >trainer offers the youth a decent subsistence in return for selling himself >into slavery for life. The youth agrees, considering this to be his best >chance in life, and thenceforth the trainer makes $240,000 a year from his >slave. Oddly, this can be prevented without recourse to force -- all we who dislike slavery need to do is to make sure that subsistence jobs for free men are available -- this is not difficult to do, and may well be automatic, in a free economy (example: Alexander Dumas used to hire several out-of-work friends to do makework for him: one was charged with finding Dumas once an hour and telling him the temperature of the Seine). Given such alternatives, one needn't contemplate slavery. >There is nothing in Nozick, so far as I am aware, which implies that >there is anything wrong with this arrangement. Here is what Nozick says >about enslavement contracts: "The comparable question about an individual >is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I >believe that it would." [AS&U, p. 331] Indeed. A thorny question, bound up with the concept of inalienable rights. Of course, it would not often arise in practice due to the bidding-down of the slavery term brought on by competition, (The coach next door offers him a 20 year contract, the one down the street offers him ten-years with a one-year cancellation clause), and by the odd fact that if not fraudulently offered "slavery" is not a very attractive choice for anybody with any talent, even if it just the ability to wash dishes. >[Let me throw in another libertarian fable here, although it is not directly >relevant: The Mayflower lands, and most of the Pilgrims remain on board to >settle on a political constitution. One Pilgrim, however, sneaks ashore and >claims Massachusetts. According to libertarian principles, the other >Pilgrims will have to rent or buy land from the one who owns Massachusetts, >or else move on to New Hampshire. Anything wrong with this scenario, >libertarians?] Sure! You only own land so long as you have some direct claim to it (for example, you're using it). I cannot plausibly claim to use all of Massachusetts, so I can't claim it all and charge people rent. This leaves aside the question of the original inhabitants (the Indians) who's previous claim would invalidate yours. >Now let me retell Nozick's fable, making a small change which will not >affect Nozick's argument. We start with one's favored distribution of >wealth, D, having been actually realized in the society. Now consider a >young lady, Brooke, whose chief achievement in life thus far is to be >beautiful (this she has accomplished by a clever choice of genes). A >million people a year pay her 25 cents each to see her face in magazines, so >she makes $250,000 a year. Another young lady, Carol, studies modern dance >and works at it six hours a day (while holding a job to support herself). >Eventually she turns professional and makes $6,000 a year as a dancer. >There is now a new distribution of wealth, E. Nozick asks, Is not this new >distribution just? Each person who paid to see Brooke or Carol parted with >his money voluntarily. If the people were entitled to dispose of the >resources to which they were entitled under D, didn't this include their >being entitled to give it to Brooke rather than to Carol? Can anyone >complain on grounds of justice? > >Well, yes, I think Carol can, who is not only talented but works far harder >than Brooke, whose hardest work is applying her makeup. Nozick is asking us >to believe that distributive justice has nothing to do with what individuals >DESERVE. Individuals need not make money the old-fashioned way in Nozick's >society, EARNING it by merit, in order for the outcome to be just. It is >sufficient that the transfers have not involved coercion or fraud. Is this >the position of (all, most, some) libertarians, or am I misstating it in >some way? You're not quite misstating it, but your example leaves a little to be desired because it focuses, wrongly, on how hard it is to make something as opposed to how much it is worth to others. Just for example, let us insert "Dora" into your example. Dora works 12 hours a day cutting string into aesthetically-pleasing (to her) lengths. Should Dora make less than Brooke, even though she works harder? Should Dora make less than Carol, who is not as talented (only Dora, in all the world, knows just what lengths to cut the string into)? In other words, the fair value of something is determined not just by how hard it is to make or how scarce the talent, but by how much people are willing to pay for it. As for people not making money the "old fashioned way", I think that the "old fashioned way" has always included some element of convincing other people that what you did was worth their while. >At any rate, it is evident why Nozick is concerned to demonstrate that >market outcomes are just: Nozick's minimal state is not allowed to >"correct" market outcomes by redistribution of wealth, even though, as Hayek >admits, market outcomes depend to a great extent on luck. And "luck" is an unjust way of doing it? I assume that you've never flipped a coin to determine who gets to watch their show on TV? Remember, if you wish to enforce some other means of doing things than what people voluntarily accept, you must be prepared to FORCE them to do things your way, so the question is not quite: is this system absolutely fair, but "is this system, including all its coercive measures, fairer than any other system, including ITS coercive measures." Whether any system can be absolutely just seems to me to depend on whether life itself is just. Do you know the answer to that question?
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (01/21/85)
> > Response to a response of Ken Montgomery: > >the Indians had no concept that you could restrict another's liberty > >to use or roam the land by claiming something called "ownership". > >Why should ANYONE be able to claim they own the land? > > tim sevener whuxl!orb > > By that logic, Mr. Sevener, how can *you* claim to own the > clothes that you are (presumably :-)) wearing? After all, > that claim restricts the freedom of others to wear them... > > Ken Montgomery "Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs" > ...!{ihnp4,allegra,seismo!ut-sally}!ut-ngp!kjm [Usenet, when working] > kjm@ut-ngp.ARPA [for Arpanauts only] That's right ,it certainly does. Which is why I agree with the European poster who pointed out that there was a critical difference between anarchism and libertarianism. That difference involves the acceptance of the right to private property under Libertarianism. An acceptance which takes the right of private property to its furthest extremes, so that it becomes above and beyond all other human rights to "life. liberty and the pursuit of happiness". Anarchism , if it were possible, would more truly enhance people's freedom. If you want my clothes I'll send them..... Another poster suggested reading Ursula LeGuin's "The Dispossessed". I would strongly urge Libertarians to read that book if they wish to carry their logic of freedom to a different extreme. Personally I think anarchism is unrealistic. But I certainly have more sympathy with its goals of freedom which imply everyone's freedom to use goods, than I do with Libertarianism's callous restriction of freedom to those with property. more on this subject later.... tim sevener whuxl!orb