esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (01/25/85)
[] From: stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) >>> The axiom that Libertarians >>>believe in (even more basic than the non-initiation of force), is: >>> There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are >>> people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in >>> any objective way, than any other. >>> >>> Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for >>> one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their >>> (rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. >> Benito Mussolini drew some very different conclusions >> from that relativistic axiom: >> ... From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all >> ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that >> everybody has the right to create for himself his own >> ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy >> of which he is capable. > Certainly the free-for-all approach is consistent with the relativistic > axiom. Thanks for conceding my point! Unfortunately, what you give with one hand, you try to take away with the other: > The proponent of the free-for-all approach is in the dubious position of > claiming that: > - No philosophy has special significance. > - Nevertheless, MY philosophy SHOULD have special significance. > I suppose that if you are a true nihilist, this sort of reasoning > wouldn't bother you much. There is no conflict there; the first statement means "no philosophy has special significance *from a neutral point of view*" but the second means "my philosophy should *from my point of view* have special significance." And it is a corollary to the axiom that these "from ___ point of view" phrases are necessary. > To a libertarian, however, the relativistic > axiom suggests a principle, that goes something like: > Since my philosophy has no special significance, I should not do > things to promote it that I would not want other people to do in > promoting *their* philosophy. Bob Stewart ihldt!stewart Sounds like the Golden Rule in disguise to me. I have nothing against the Golden Rule but it is ludicrous to suggest that it has anything to do with your axiom. From: nrh@inmet.UUCP > Are you saying that Mussolini's logic was correct? It > sure doesn't seem so to me, particularly the bit about "enforcing" one's > ideology on others. Yes, his logic was valid: the axiom implies that everyone has a right to (i.e., it is permissible to; there is no compelling reason not to) do whatever he damn well pleases. Which for Mussolini meant enforcing his ideology. Now, that his logic was valid doesn't imply that his conclusion is sound -- maybe this shows there is something wrong with the axiom?(!) > Your quote from Mussolini begins: >> If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories >> and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, >> immortal truth ... then there is nothing more relativistic.... > I think it quite clear the the libertarian logic begins with a LACK of > contempt for the beliefs of others ... It's statements like that which make the net amusing. Does this lack of contempt extend to beliefs that claim their own absolute superiority and (on top of that) their impose-ability? No, and the next question is, if those beliefs are not "fixed categories" and "claims to objective, immortal truth," what are they? --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's.
nrh@inmet.UUCP (01/30/85)
>***** inmet:net.politics / wucs!esk / 5:33 pm Jan 24, 1985 > >From: nrh@inmet.UUCP >> Are you saying that Mussolini's logic was correct? It >> sure doesn't seem so to me, particularly the bit about "enforcing" one's >> ideology on others. > >Yes, his logic was valid: the axiom implies that everyone has a right to >(i.e., it is permissible to; there is no compelling reason not to) do >whatever he damn well pleases. Which for Mussolini meant enforcing his >ideology. Now, that his logic was valid doesn't imply that his conclusion >is sound -- maybe this shows there is something wrong with the axiom?(!) Here's your original quote: > If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories > and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, > immortal truth ... then there is nothing more relativistic > than Fascist attitudes and activity. ... From the fact > that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies > are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that > everybody has the right to create for himself his own > ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy > of which he is capable. The problem I see in the logic is this: There's no reason within relativism to infer that everyone has the ability to CHOOSE one's own set of values, and, in particular, no reason to include the value of evangelism (in the sense of seeking or forcing converts or enforcing one's set of values) among those values. All relativism really gives you (as I read my dictionary) is the comfort of knowing that one cannot know the "true" set of values, and that what is right for a person will vary with who that person is. It does not imply that what is right for a person will vary according to what they "damn well please", merely that one cannot know from the outside whether a second party is behaving rightly. Mussolini's notion that the lack of objective provability or knowability implies a basis for conscious choice is clearly untenable. Example: I like the color blue. Did I choose to? No. Could I choose to? Short of some method of brainwashing, I think not. The problem in the axiom lies in the use of the word "signifies". While I suspect the original statement was not in English, I think the point should be brought out: "signifies" may mean "mean", or may mean "be a sign of". In other words, it is ambiguous whether "contempt" in this quote is a hallmark of relativism, or a definition. If it is a definition, the logic is correct, but relevant neither to the original R.J. Stewart quote nor to the definition of relativism as my dictionary gives it, because neither of these implies contempt. On the other hand, if we are to read "signifies" as "has the hallmark of": "If relativism has the hallmark of contempt for fixed....", then the hallmark need not be universal, and there's no reason to extend Mussolini's idea of what relativism is like, possessing that hallmark, to cases where it does not, and was not implied to, possess that hallmark. >> Your quote from Mussolini begins: >>> If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories >>> and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, >>> immortal truth ... then there is nothing more relativistic.... >> I think it quite clear the the libertarian logic begins with a LACK of >> contempt for the beliefs of others ... > >It's statements like that which make the net amusing. Perhaps the statement is now clearer -- one may disagree, or even have contempt for the beliefs in absolutes, but this is no license to quash such beliefs -- the right to do so can not follow from relativism alone. >Does this lack of >contempt extend to beliefs that claim their own absolute superiority and (on >top of that) their impose-ability? No, and the next question is, You are confusing contempt with disagreement -- get it? One can disagree with something (devout Catholicism, say) without having "contempt" for it. Indeed, if one feels (as the original poster did) that he had no way to show that (e.g.) devout Catholicism was less provable than his own religion, that fact alone is enough to bias one away from "contempt". As it happens, I lack contempt for devout Catholicism, even though I disagree with it, and even though it is evangelical (in a low-key way, these days). >if those >beliefs are not "fixed categories" and "claims to objective, immortal truth," >what are they? Hardly an interesting question. What does it matter what the beliefs of others are based on if you ASSUME, as R. J. Stewart did, that there is no way to prove them better or worse then one's own beliefs. Hope this clears it up a little. I'd suggest moving it to net.philosophy, but I don't read it, and don't intend to start.