esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (01/25/85)
[] > = mwm@ucbtopaz (<mike) > > = faustus@ucbcad.UUCP (Wayne) > > What I have trouble with is why, out of all the possible "basic goods" > > people could want, libertarians seem to have a fixation for freedom > > from force. Whenever a philosophical position claims that one thing > > is an absolute good, to be followed to the exclusion of everything > > else, I think that this shows there is something fundamentally wrong > > with it. Exactly. > > What is wrong with saying, "coercion only in a few cases where > > the situation justifies it"? Or, "coercion only when the majority > > opinion is in favor of it"? Wayne > First, "the will of the majority." ... [Slavery in the US] was the will of > the majority, but was it good? Examples like this show that democracy is absolutely the worst system of government. Except for all the others. Including libertarianism. > Now, "only when the situation justifies it." We are now getting to the > heart of the matter. *How* do you decide that "the situation justifies it?" Reason and experience. (Ask a simple question ...) C > = carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes) Y > = Gary F. York R > = renner@uiucdcs (Scott Renner) C > Libertarians also seem to think that freedom is merely the absence of C > coercion. ... Y > Correct! My dictionary thinks so too. Mine doesn't. Carnes's doesn't. When the dictionaries disagree, we should take a look at ordinary usage. People commonly say that, for example, having easily available transportation (a car, for instance) increases their freedom. Are they misusing the word? You had better have good reason for saying so. Oh -- and "it doesn't fit my ideology" won't do. R > Abraham Lincoln couldn't buy a television set R > or ride a plane to Washington, and I can; was he less "free" than I? You mean, do such opportunities increase our freedom? Yes. If you were not coerced or manipulated by others, yet were constrained by poverty, illness, and technological and cultural backwardness -- how free would you be? C > Libertarians, beginners in the study of political philosophy, and anyone C > who believes that "the absence of coercion" is the only meaning that may C > legitimately be attached to the term *freedom* (or *liberty*, which I am C > treating as synonymous), may wish to read the essay "Two Concepts of C > Liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty (not that I am in C > complete agreement with Berlin). Berlin brilliantly delineates the C > concepts of "negative" and "positive" liberty and traces their history C > in political thought. It is the positive sense that I am bringing into C > the discussion and that is either ignored or dismissed by libertarian C > thought. But Carnes, don't you know that libertarians have found the One True Definition of freedom? How dare you suggest that it admits of multiple meanings? Blasphemy! Next thing, you'll be suggesting that we ask ourselves which kind of freedom is most worth wanting ... "One good horse-laugh is worth a thousand syllogisms" --send any replies to: ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 (not the sender's address)
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (01/25/85)
> C > = carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes) > Y > = Gary F. York > R > = renner@uiucdcs (Scott Renner) > > C > Libertarians also seem to think that freedom is merely the absence of > C > coercion. ... > > Y > Correct! My dictionary thinks so too. > > Mine doesn't. Carnes's doesn't. > > When the dictionaries disagree, we should take a look at ordinary usage. > People commonly say that, for example, having easily available transportation > (a car, for instance) increases their freedom. Are they misusing the word? > You had better have good reason for saying so. Oh -- and "it doesn't fit > my ideology" won't do. > > R > Abraham Lincoln couldn't buy a television set > R > or ride a plane to Washington, and I can; was he less "free" than I? > > You mean, do such opportunities increase our freedom? Yes. If you were not > coerced or manipulated by others, yet were constrained by poverty, illness, > and technological and cultural backwardness -- how free would you be? > > C > Libertarians, beginners in the study of political philosophy, and anyone > C > who believes that "the absence of coercion" is the only meaning that may > C > legitimately be attached to the term *freedom* (or *liberty*, which I am > C > treating as synonymous), may wish to read the essay "Two Concepts of > C > Liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty (not that I am in > C > complete agreement with Berlin). Berlin brilliantly delineates the > C > concepts of "negative" and "positive" liberty and traces their history > C > in political thought. It is the positive sense that I am bringing into > C > the discussion and that is either ignored or dismissed by libertarian > C > thought. > But it isn't really ignored by the Libertarians, it is a central point of most of their arguments even though they refuse to admit it. The major thing most Libertarians seem to rail about is paying taxes. Well, how much of a "restriction of freedom" is paying out some money? Paying taxes does not restrict your travel, your right to free speech, your right to set up your own press or any other civil liberty. It doesn't even restrict your right to spend the rest of your income on anything else you want. The only argument *against* paying taxes is that it *reduces one's income* and therefore reduces one's freedom to spend as much money as you might like on whatever. But if *reducing* one person's income *reduces* their freedom, then *increasing* another person's income correspondingly *must* increase their freedom. Logically then, if taxation merely represented a redistribution of income so that it is more equal then taxation is neutral with respect to any increase or decrease of freedom. The reduced income and consequent freedom to spend it taken from one person will be balanced by the *increased* income and freedom to spend it given to another person. *IF* we take freedom as the supreme value (which I do not) then taxation as redistribution is morally neutral a priori. Then arguments about whether taxation and redistribution may actually *increase* or *decrease* everybody's income are in the realm of economics, history and facts: *not* philosophically or logically apriori to an examination of the facts. It is certainly possible that taxation *may* decrease everybody's income. On the other hand it is also possible that taxation as redistribution may *increase* everybody's income (and consequent freedom to spend). On the other hand taxation for collective projects which benefit everybody may be coercive to the extent that some individuals are being forced to spend their income in ways they don't like. However, if such projects (such as public education!!) prove to increase *everybody's* income, including the most heavily taxed, then even those most heavily taxed may windup with *more* freedom because of their increase in income due to a more highly educated and skilled society. These are problems of facts and history: *not* apriori philosophy! tim sevener whuxl!orb
cliff@unmvax.UUCP (01/26/85)
> Examples like this show that democracy is absolutely the worst system of > government. > Except for all the others. > Including libertarianism. If you are such a fan of unrestrained democracy, why aren't you writing anything that supports it rather than the status quo? It seems there are quite a few people willing to say "I really like what we have just now--after all, *I* am well off." Isn't this why so many people say democracy is the best thing, yet what they really stand behind is the democratic republic set forth by the U.S. Constitution subject to all the restraints of the Bill of Rights and the other amendments? Sure, go ahead and say that democracy is great, when what you mean is what we have now is great... I would *love* to see democracy on the national level. When I lived in New Hampshire I could see democracy in action--the town meetings. One man--one vote is quite a powerful concept, as long as the vote is directly on a proposition, rather than on which of three or four crooks will make thousands of unrestrained decisions in the next few years... Is it any surprise that the state that still supports democracy has some of the most fiscally sound policies (e.g. no broad based state tax)? In addition to the town meetings, New Hampshire has one of the largest congressional bodies (possibly third behind the U.S. senate/house and British Parliament) even though it still has a small population. The result? it is hard for special interests to effectively control such an unwiedly body. I don't agree with Richard Carnes that we need socialism, but I do agree with him that the current set up is quite unfair and needs overhaul. --Cliff [Matthews] {purdue, cmcl2, ihnp4}!lanl!unmvax!cliff {csu-cs, pur-ee, convex, gatech, ucbvax}!unmvax!cliff 4744 Trumbull S.E. - Albuquerque NM 87108 - (505) 265-9143
cliff@unmvax.UUCP (01/27/85)
> But it isn't really ignored by the Libertarians, it is a central point of > most of their arguments even though they refuse to admit it. The major > thing most Libertarians seem to rail about is paying taxes. Bullsh*t! I rail about conscription! I rave about victimless crimes! I shout about censorship! Pretty clever article (summed up as: Libertarians only complain about taxes...taxes are only one loss of liberty...libertarians don't really care about liberty), too bad you couldn't have made it 99999 lines long; you would really have made a great point then. --Cliff [Matthews] {purdue, cmcl2, ihnp4}!lanl!unmvax!cliff {csu-cs, pur-ee, convex, gatech, ucbvax}!unmvax!cliff 4744 Trumbull S.E. - Albuquerque NM 87108 - (505) 265-9143
mwm@ucbtopaz.CC.Berkeley.ARPA (01/27/85)
> = Paul, of course >> = mwm@ucbtopaz (<mike) >> > = faustus@ucbcad.UUCP (Wayne) >> > What is wrong with saying, "coercion only in a few cases where >> > the situation justifies it"? Or, "coercion only when the majority >> > opinion is in favor of it"? Wayne >> First, "the will of the majority." ... [Slavery in the US] was the will of >> the majority, but was it good? >Examples like this show that democracy is absolutely the worst system of >government. >Except for all the others. >Including libertarianism. Paul, name one (just one) libertarian society that has done worse than a democracy. Then maybe I'll consider such blatant misquotes. >> Now, "only when the situation justifies it." We are now getting to the >> heart of the matter. *How* do you decide that "the situation justifies it?" >Reason and experience. (Ask a simple question ...) Oh, goodie! Reason and experience suggest that the will of the majority is *never* justification for using force to... Oh, you mean the reason and experience of the majority? But then they get to decide when they can use force, so they can use force anytime they want. Tyranny by committee is still tyranny. BTW, Paul, I've decided that you're right about the fascist view of relativism. Now, if only we could convince the ardent "will of the majority" people of the bogosity of that view. <mike
josh@topaz.ARPA (J Storrs Hall) (01/29/85)
> But it isn't really ignored by the Libertarians, it is a central point of > most of their arguments even though they refuse to admit it. The major > thing most Libertarians seem to rail about is paying taxes. > ... The only argument *against* paying taxes is that it > *reduces one's income* and therefore reduces one's freedom to spend > as much money as you might like on whatever. But if *reducing* one > person's income *reduces* their freedom, then *increasing* another > person's income correspondingly *must* increase their freedom. > tim sevener whuxl!orb I think this is a straw man. Libertarians don't value "freedom" in the abstract, general sense: They value freedom from coercion (specifically, government coercion). Otherwise they would agitate for all kinds of "free" services from the government like the socialists. Another problem with this analysis is that it presumes the utilitarian point of view, namely that one should strive to maximize some "good" over the sum of all society, a view that is abhorrent to libertarians (who prefer the concept of individual rights). Thus the argument is circular. --JoSH
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (01/30/85)
If Tim Sevener will mail me his address, I will mail him some books. Then, if he reads them, he can discover that libertarins are not a political organisation primarily concerned with ending taxation. On the other hand, if he didn't get that from reading Larry Cipriani's posting of the LP Party Platform, it is probably hopeless. But he wants to talk about wealth redistribution... Here goes again... You have some distribution in mind which you think is ``fair''. So do I. We compare notes and find that they aren't the same. Now we have a problem. There is no way that I am ever going to say that the solution to the problem is to get enough force together to make the dissenting members adopt my solution. If I cannot get you to agree to it, then I cannot -- and I must accept that either my arguments are weak, my presentation is lousy, or you are a fool -- but no matter what is the case, I do not get to get out my club and force you to do what I wish you would do voluntarily. Also, I do not get to organise myself and my freidns into a gang so as to hide the fact that I am using force against you...(Hey, I'm not holding a club...it just the way that it is...) What is it about your distribution scheme that makes it correct for you to force it upon me? Even if the problem is that I am a fool -- why does this change things? Arguemtns which boil down to ``cause I have the might to make it right'' do not work. If this really is the law of the land, then I should just shoot you tomorrow and save myself a lot of trouble. How can you resolve you desire to distribute things with a belief that there is something more to it than ``might makes right''? I tried for years. I couldn't do it. I would love to be able to, but until then I am studying tolerance for people who want things differently than I -- and hope that a good example will go a long way. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (01/31/85)
> From Laura Creighton: > Here goes again... > > You have some distribution in mind which you think is ``fair''. So do I. > We compare notes and find that they aren't the same. Now we have a problem. There are two questions involved in the distribution problem, as Wayne Faust properly pointed out: 1)whether a given distributive *method* is fair 2)whether a given distributive *result* is fair To an extent this boils down to questions of equality of opportunity and equality of results. There is really no question about what constitutes equality: it is equality, period. There is no *problem* involved here in theoretical terms: if one is dividing a pie equally then one is dividing a pie equally (equality of results),period. If a race goes from point A to point B for one person, it also goes from point A to point B for another person (equality of opportunity), period. What's the problem? In practical terms there are obvious problems in achieving such equality and the amount of effort which should be expended to do so. There are also problems in defining just what constitutes equality of results. Most people's sense of justice contains the notion that equality of results means that results will be equal for equal work or effort. It does not mean that results will be completely equal *regardless* of work or effort. On the other hand recognition that results should be roughly equal with respect to equal efforts does not imply the present enormous inequities in wealth or income distribution. Given that every person has 168 hours per week to work, and with sleep and eating a maximum of 100 hours a week to work, the maximum discrepecancy based on equality of results for amount work would be about 100 to 1. The present income distribution is many times more unequal than that. But there is a further problem here. This implies (as a poster properly pointed out) a static view of income and wealth. However the amount of income and wealth *can* be increased and has been greatly increased in the industrial age. If we take Rawle's principle of justice as the standard: "The society which I would prefer if I did not know what my position would be", then if *everyone's* income is increased because one person's income is increased *more* than everyone else's then *if* inequality increases *everyone's* income then such inequality can be justified. But this point must be proven for specific cases of inequality. At this point the problem becomes one of facts and economics, and not simply one of theory. Now let us ask if the present distribution of wealth and income is just on these terms. First off, I don't believe that the present system of inherited wealth can be considered anything close to "equality of opportunity". Nor have I seen evidence that such a system leads to more economic growth. Attempts to wipe out Public Schools will have even worse effects on equality of opportunity- the wealthy will go to fantastic schools, while the poor, whose primary problem right now is lack of education, will go to schools in worse conditions than at present. Not only will this lead to inequality of opportunity, it will also lead to a *decline* in economic growth. Earlier I pointed out that the economist Dennison found that increased education and skills were as responsible for economic growth as increased physical capital. Will this be *less* true in an increasingly technological age? Do the present vast inequalities of wealth and income make everyone better off in terms of actual results of this system? When we have people starving, unemployed and uneducated I do not think so. While I do think that reducing inequalitites to zero would stagnate or even regress the overall level of economic growth, I also think that there is some level of distribution that satisfies the needs of justice *and* the economy. Children who go hungry not only suffer pain, they also suffer brain damage from malnutrition which permanently affects their ability to work and have an equal opportunity. At the *very* minimum it would seem that justice demands that children be fed. But I also think that human beings in general should get some part of society's bounty to be fed. If they desire the other many consumer goods in our society then they should work for them. But it seems that some minimum should be provided to all. Dealing with the current inequalities of wealth and consequent political power is another problem which has no easy answers. I have many more thoughts on this but I have to stop here. tim sevener whuxl!orb p.s. sorry if I impugned your own commitment to help those less fortunate. Such voluntary action can only be commended!
hibbert@parcvax.UUCP (Chris Hibbert) (02/10/85)
Quotes are from Tim Sevener. > tim sevener whuxl!orb > Most people's sense of justice contains the notion [of] equality > of results [which] means that results will be equal for equal work > or effort. It does not mean that results will be completely equal > *regardless* of work or effort. I only agree with this principle when playing formal games (without chance) in which playing the same strategy against the same opponent should result in the same outcome. In the real world there are *no* equal outcomes and lots of external factors act to change the results. In any exchange between people, both parties must consent. If two makers of widgets both want to sell to you, it doesn't matter how similar their effort *or* *product*, you can only choose one to buy from. > If we take Rawle's principle of justice as the > standard: "The society which I would prefer if I did not know what my > position would be", then if *everyone's* income is increased because > one person's income is increased *more* than everyone else's then > *if* inequality increases *everyone's* income then such inequality > can be justified. But this point must be proven for specific cases > of inequality. At this point the problem becomes one of facts and > economics, and not simply one of theory. I think this translates to: Rawle's principle of justice implies (to sevener): if allowing incomes to differ (allowing some to rise more than others) causes *all* income to rise then such inequality can be justified. I would say instead: If the only way to make all incomes the same is to lower them all to the lowest level, then requiring such equality is wrong. In other words, allowing people to better themselves is acceptable as long as it doesn't worsen (absolutely not relatively) the condition of others. Sevener seems to be interested in making sure that noone should get an advantage unless that advantage helps everyone, rather than in ensuring that the advantage doesn't hurt anyone. > Now let us ask if the present distribution of wealth and income is > just on these terms. First off, I don't believe that the present > system of inherited wealth can be considered anything close to > "equality of opportunity". Nor have I seen evidence that such a > system leads to more economic growth. My major problem with the (unstated) analysis of inherited wealth represented here is explained by a simple change of point of view. Sevener and his ilk see inherited wealth as an unearned benefit that some get that gives them an unfair start in life. I look at it as an important part of the benefactor's right to do with her earned property as she sees fit. In order to get rid of this "unfair advantage" you have to restrict pepole from giving their wealth to some of the people they would like to help. (I admit that some wealthy people came by their riches immorally (usually by exploiting some government-granted monopoly powers). However, I've heard no suggestions for redressing this inequity that wouldn't also take rightly gained wealth from some. usually those who wish to take from the rich don't believe there is any rightfully earned wealth.) Chris Hibbert reply to: ucbvax!hplabs!parcvax!hibbert or hibbert.pa@xerox.arpa P.S. until 5 months ago I was grkermit!chris, it's good to be back to the net. I'm glad to see that Nat Howard (inmet!nrh) is still at it, and that JoSH has come over from ARPA to write some longer diatribes than are possible as the moderator of the poli-sci-digest.