ashby@uiucdcsp.UUCP (02/16/85)
Daniel Schneider asks: > What would be the reaction (and the re-reaction ad infinitum) > if the United States adopted a "no-nuke" policy, meaning > stopped spending the dollars on current developement and > deployment, slowly shrink (to zero) the active weapons, and > (gulp!) introduce diplomacy as a tool in negotiatons? Its > only hypothetical, so lets not argue over whether it should > or shouldn't be done; its the reactions which I'm intersted > in. Well, I am confident of the reaction in the Kremlin: smiles a mile wide. You can't be serious, can you? If the USA ever adopted such a unilateral no-nuke policy, my reaction would be 1) utter dismay, 2) overwhelming fear. I would be dismayed that our national leadership could ever become so shortsighted and stupid. But then I would be terrified -- terrified at the thought of an unchecked Soviet Union. Don't you realize that our possession of nuclear weapons (both strategic and tactical) is probably the only thing preventing the USSR from sweeping across Western Europe? Similarly, *our* possession of nukes is one of the reasons the Soviets didn't "drop one" on the Chinese during their 1969 border hostilities. As for diplomacy, your question implies that we are not pursuing negotiations with the Soviets. We are! However, anyone knows that you don't bargain from weakness; you bargain from a position of strength. Do you think the Soviets are going to willingly give up *material* advantages for assurances of American goodwill? Not a chance -- and neither would (or should) we! But enough for now. You asked for reactions, and mine is simple: dismay and fear. I pray that we never follow the course you prescribe, for it may be our last jouney as a nation.
renner@uiucdcs.UUCP (02/19/85)
> No arms control treaty has ever been negotiated that is not verifiable. > Period. The free press is not considered one of the national technical > means used to verify arms control treaties. Satellites and listening > devices turn out to be much more effective. > -- Mike Kelly (mjk@tty3b) The 1972 ABM treaty prohibits deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The Soviets are building a large phased-array radar system in Siberia -- very nice for tracking ICBMS; they say it's for their space program. They are building a system of surface-to-air missiles which may well have ABM capability; they say they are for defense against high-altitude bombers (of which we have none; the B-52 may have been designed that way, decades ago, but isn't equipped to fly that way now). Satellites and listening devices won't tell us what the radar system is really for. Someone would have to go and take a look. The Soviets won't let us do that. Therefore, there is no way we can verify Soviet compliance with this treaty. As far as I am concerned, the word "verifiable" should be taken to mean "on-site inspections by US military personnel." With so much at risk, why should we settle for less? What reason could the Soviets have to object, except that they plan to cheat? Scott Renner {ihnp4,pur-ee}!uiucdcs!renner
ashby@uiucdcsp.UUCP (02/21/85)
/* Written 10:38 am Feb 19, 1985 by orb@whuxl in uiucdcsp:net.politics */ From Tim Sevener: > I find it a curious irony that the very people who claim to be so "macho" > are really just wimps: afraid to take any risks in the interests of Peace. /* End of text from uiucdcsp:net.politics */ Well, I'll be. I never thought I'd see the day when I would be called a "wimp" for believing in a strong defense. Tim Sevener seems to equate machismo with risk-taking; he may well be correct. The nut who walks a dark alley at night may call himself macho, but most of us would call him stupid. I do not advocate chest-pounding bravado; I merely advocate prudence. And I feel it is prudent to distrust the Soviet Union, and to act accordingly. Sevener points to the Test Ban Treaty as a monument to Soviet good will. He conveniently ignores all the other treaties that the Soviets have ALREADY violated. In particular, he ignores the ABM treaty. With their *deployment* of the very large array antennae, they are currently violating this treaty. [Let me save you some typing: the US's research into the SDI (popularly called "Star Wars" by the dim-witted) does NOT violate this treaty; research is explicitly allowed.] Finally, I ask Tim to note that it was Reagan's resolute stance that brought the USSR back to the arms table. RR didn't cave in to their demands for a "moritorium" on the cruise and Pershings. They backed down. He didn't cave in to their demands for talks only on space weapons. They backed down. What happened as a result of Reagan's "inflexibility"? Well, surprise, suprise, the Soviets backed down from their inflexibility. And next month the two superpowers will discuss ALL aspects of the arms race. Is not this better than discussing just space weapons, as the Soviets had originally wanted? I think so. So, the next time you want to take a risk for peace, Tim, please don't throw all of us into jeopardy. We have been at peace with the USSR for over 30 years now. And maybe, just maybe, it is because they are "wimpy" enough to fear our nuclear arsenal. Steven Ashby Univ. of Illinois @ Urbana-Champaign
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (02/22/85)
>From: renner@uiucdcs.UUCP >As far as I am concerned, the word "verifiable" should be taken to mean >"on-site inspections by US military personnel." With so much at risk, why >should we settle for less? What reason could the Soviets have to object, >except that they plan to cheat? The arms control people I know (e.g. a staff aide to the House Military Affairs Committee) claim that on-site inspection is much overblown. There are few cases where it is really necessary. The on-site inspection case is more complex than Scott let on as well, since it's reciprocal -- some in the Pentagon are not that hot about having the Soviets poking around on *our* bases and installations and feel, on balance, an on-site inspection agreement isn't worth that risk. However, the Soviets have recently said they are willing to consider a treaty including on-site inspection. (I can probably dig up the reference, it was in the New York Times sometime in the last year.) The key is to negotiate that treaty -- and then ratify it. Scott talked about the radar station at Krasnoyarsk, which is alleged to be a component of a ABM system, which would be a violation of the ABM treaty. If that's so, there are ways for the Administration to resolve the issue, through the treaty compliance committee. But the Adminstration prefers to publish glossy booklets and offer leaks to newspapers. It's as if I claimed you had robbed me, but rather than take you to court, I just yelled about how you'd robbed me. If they're so sure it's a violation, why not do something about it? Mike Kelly
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (02/26/85)
>From: ashby@uiucdcsp.UUCP >Well, I'll be. I never thought I'd see the day when I would be called a >"wimp" for believing in a strong defense. Tim Sevener seems to equate >machismo with risk-taking; he may well be correct. The nut who walks >a dark alley at night may call himself macho, but most of us would call >him stupid. I do not advocate chest-pounding bravado; I merely advocate >prudence. And I feel it is prudent to distrust the Soviet Union ... There are risks in both directions. The basis of arms control is the prudent realization on both sides that an unrestrained arms buildup is a risk, and that this risk frequently outweighs the risk in making an agreement with a country you don't trust. Of course, improvement in verification technology and in various cooperative measures (such as well-defined counting rules incorporated into arms control treaties, which lay out the basis for deciding what is and isn't covered by the treaty) have helped reduce the risk of arms control treaties. To say "I'm for a strong defence because I'm prudent" is a non sequitur. No one opposes a strong defence; the question is how strong and what balance is struck between the risks of arms build-up and the risks of arms control. >[Tim Sevener] conveniently ignores all the other treaties that the >Soviets have ALREADY violated. In particular, he ignores the ABM treaty. >With their *deployment* of the very large array antennae, they are currently >violating this treaty. [Let me save you some typing: the US's research >into the SDI (popularly called "Star Wars" by the dim-witted) does NOT >violate this treaty; research is explicitly allowed.] "Soviet compliance performance under fourteen arms control agreements signed since 1959 has been good." - Joint statement by Department of Defense, State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff issued in 1980 What exactly are "all the other treaties that the Soviets have ALREADY violated?" If the one example cited here is representative -- the ABM treaty -- then these aren't really violations, but Reagan Administration allegations. There are clear procedures for settling these allegations, through the Standing Consultative Committee. The SCC has clarified previous ambiguous activity, and in some cases, halted it altogether. The problem is that, amidst wild charges of widespread Soviet violations -- and all of the previous charges were investigated by previous Administrations and found to be without merit -- it is difficult to address a truly serious charge. The construction in Siberia of the radar station is a serious matter and deserves consideration. But it is unlikely that it will get that amidst the poisoned atomsphere generated by all the unfounded allegations distributed by the Reagan Administration. It is important to remember that treaties are often ambiguously worded, and there are few clear violations -- that's why the SCC exists, to arbitrate charges. As Paul Warnke said, "We wanted a certain amount of wiggle room, and therefore gave them a certain amount of wiggle room." These headlines indicate what happens when this cycle gets started: "Study Says Soviet Broke Arms Pacts President to Release a Report That Accuses Moscow of 17 Violations Since '58" - New York Times, September 12, 1984 "Moscow Accuses U.S. Of Violating Arms Agreements Diplomatic Note to the State Department Charges Wide Range of American Offenses" - New York Times, January 30, 1984 >Finally, I ask Tim to note that it was Reagan's resolute stance that >brought the USSR back to the arms table. RR didn't cave in to their >demands for a "moritorium" on the cruise and Pershings. They backed down. >He didn't cave in to their demands for talks only on space weapons. They >backed down. What happened as a result of Reagan's "inflexibility"? Well, >surprise, suprise, the Soviets backed down from their inflexibility. The Geneva talks are a great opportunity, but judging from the general attitude in the Reagan Administration towards arms control, it will take a great deal of pressure to achieve any significant advance. One concept that has a lot of merit is the Negotiators' Pause, which is a proposal that both sides stop testing and deploying while the negotiations are ongoing. This recognizes that it is difficult to negotiate about a moving target. Furthermore, if you believe in bargaining chips, it lets you have bargaining chips without having to pay for the deployment -- you can continue research and development and threaten deployment. Mike Kelly
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (03/01/85)
> > The 1972 ABM treaty prohibits deployment of anti-ballistic missile > systems. The Soviets are building a large phased-array radar system in > Siberia -- very nice for tracking ICBMS; they say it's for their space > program. I find it interesting that just at the very moment that the US is preparing to negate the ABM treaty (via Star Wars) we suddenly find that the Soviets have violated the treaty. How convenient! Mabe they really are violating the treaty, but I for one find the coincidence suspicious.
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (03/01/85)
> So, the next time you want to take a risk for peace, Tim, please don't > throw all of us into jeopardy. We have been at peace with the USSR > for over 30 years now. And maybe, just maybe, it is because they are > "wimpy" enough to fear our nuclear arsenal. > > Steven Ashby > Univ. of Illinois @ Urbana-Champaign We have NEVER been at war with the Soviet Union, except for a small invasion by American troops around the end of the first world war. We have been allies (WWII), however.