dand@tekigm.UUCP (Dan C. Duval) (03/18/85)
From: mat\@hou4b.UUCP (Mark Terribile)
Subject: Re: poll
First of all, I'd like to recommend "Inside the Soviet Army" by Viktor
Suvorov (Macmillan, 1982). 'Viktor Suvorov' is a pseudonym used by a
former Soviet officer, trained to tanks but with command experience in
"All-Arms" (Soviet Mechanized Infantry) -- it reads like propoganda from
the Pentagon, but this is to be expected from a Soviet defector, who has
no love for the Soviet regime (assuming that the book is not indeed
Pentagon propaganda: read the book and decide for yourself.)
There is also a pair of books by General Sir John Hackett ("The Third
World War" and "The Third World War: The Untold Story"). These are
nearly fiction, since the scenarios described require that NATO suddenly
infuse huge amounts of money into convential forces, but give a description
of a scenario for attack by the USSR that NATO forces consider to be likely.
There are half-a-hundred other such books, but these are the easiest to
find and read if you are not a Red Army/NATO mavin.
>>I believe the Soviet conventional superiority ploy to be a myth. Military
>>power cannot be measured simply by counting weapons, a number of other
>>factors are CRUCIAL. ... Russia has thousands of miles of hostile boarders,
>>while the U.S. doesn't ... The Russian fleet must plow through narrow bottle-
>>necks to get to the open ocean and is divided into four widely separated
>>groups. Soviet 'allies' in Eastern Europe have repeatedly revolted and could
>>not be trusted in a major war.
For instance, Suvorov claims that during a Soviet attack on NATO, Soviet
and other Warsaw Pact troops will surrender by the millions. He also
claims that if NATO forces pull back from assaults by Red Army forces,
the penal battalions being driven into battle will find cover and turn
their weapons on the guard companies chasing the penal companies into the
NATO lines. If true, this suggests that the Soviets need their massive
superiority just to reach parity with NATO in the event of open conflict,
and that Soviet conventional superiority is indeed a myth.
However, as in World War II (WW2), the Soviets could pull units from
their other borders in wartime, as was done with the Siberian troops in
1941 -- political events of the moment will be a greater guide as to how
likely this would be that assuming Siberian divisions would stay in
Siberia; note how the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact surprised the world,
especially since Hitler did not believe the Japanese would live up to
it after Germany attacked.
>In a long, protracted war, the USSR's size and available natural resources
>(petroleum, almost every metal needed for production of almost every kind of
>machinery, etc) would work in her favor. In a short war, massive stockpiles
>of weapons, properly used, can win the day. And the population of the USSR
>can be formed into armies in a few months.
In a long war, the USSR will starve, especially if the population of the USSR
is formed into armies. The Soviets must count on a short war, probably
immediately after a harvest, so that they can get people back onto the farms
before the next planting.
The problem of planning a short war can be illustrated by the Wehrmacht in
1941, expecting the Red Army to collapse by the time the Wehrmacht reached
its first objective line, about halfway between the jumpoff line and Moskva.
Or Napoleon's plan to have a decisive battle with the Russian Army to defeat
Russia.
>As to alliances coming apart, I seriously doubt that the USSR ever
>plans on relying on any ``ally'' that she does not control.
Suvorov claims that the forces of East Germany (DDR), Poland, and
Czechoslavakia will be incorporated into the three Fronts that would be used
to attack West Germany (BRD). In this manner, they would essentially be
chased into battle by the reserve Front in Poland and the Group of Tank
Armies that will advance from Byelorussia and thus burn out on NATO
defenses, much as was done in WW2 with penal battalions. In other words,
the Red Army does not have to rely on these divisions being faithful to
Socialism/Communism, but only to their own self-interest ('Die on their
bayonets or die on ours; you pick, Comrade.') Therefore, these units
cannot just be dismissed as "the Soviets can't trust them enough to use
them".
>> ... when Hitler invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941 the Red Army outnumbered
>>the Wermacht in tanks, men, planes, and almost everything else. In some
>>cases by margins of 2 and 3 to one. Yet the Germans went through the
>>Russians like a hot knife through butter - almost reaching Moscow in a few
>>months.
>Yes, due to superior tactics employed by the German armies. Given the number
>of ``brushfire'' wars and the technology employed in them, it seems unlikely
>that either side will have the revolutionary abilities to use new weaponry
>that Rommel, Yammamoto, Patton, or Nimitz demonstrated. New technologies and
>tactics have been exercised in Viet Nam, in or around Isreal, at the
>Falklands, and in many other places as well.
By the time the Wehrmacht attacked in June, 1941, the "modern" weapons and
tactics had been tried out in the Spanish Civil War, Ethiopia, Poland,
the Low Countries, France, and China. The Red Army even got a chance to
practice in Spain, Finland, the Baltic States, and Rumania. There was no
lack of examples to warn the USSR, they just did not learn the correct
lessons from them.
>>Only recently has the Russian fleet recovered, but the cause of the defeat
>>still remains - an inescapable geographic distribution of the fleet into
>>small parts that can support each other only with great difficulty.
>This is how Japan was turned back at Midway -- a failure to concentrate.
>Remember, however, that our fleet -- and all of NATO's -- has global
>commitments. Remember that a modern Navy is an air force at sea. No surface
>fleet can survive, much less operate, under hostile air control. Remember
>that the USSRs air force outnumbers all of NATO's by about 2 to 1.
Unfortunately, both of these miss the point. The Soviet Navy is not
interested in assuming control of the sea -- this will be a natural
consequence of defeating NATO and the US. The Soviet Navy does not need
control of the sea, it need only accomplish two goals: protecting their
ballistic missile submarines, and denying the use of the sea to their
enemies as much as is possible. Thus, the Soviet Navy is geared to
destroying carriers and submarines, the most dangerous weapons against
the submarine force they intend to use to deny the use of the sea. The
Soviets do not want to decide the sea war in a massive battle where the
biggest and the best will win -- they want to surprise enemy ships at
the beginning of the war and destroy or damage enemy ships enough so that
the Red Army can complete its conquests without interference or reinforcement
from the sea. To this end, it doesn't matter how many groups the Soviet
Navy is divided into by geography as long as they can get to enemy ships.
Damaged carriers in both the Atlantic and Pacific is easily worth a mere
sinking in the Atlantic, because two carriers are out of combat, not just one.
>Yes, the factors are complex. But can we afford to rely on complex factors
>that no one can agree upon to overcome clear numerical superiority? As for
>qualitative superiority, the only hope I have is massivly decreased MTBF
>and maintenance requirements that newer weapons are supposed to have. In the
>Battle of Britian, where the 700+ strong RAF fighter command faced daily
>attack by an enemy with an air force 30 000 strong, reliability and a massive
>effort at emergency repair were vital to holding the thin line of resistance.
>At Midway, the herculean effort that put Yorktown back to sea in less than
>72 hours was vital. So were the damage control and repair efforts that put
>her back in the fight less than seven hours after she was hit -- by about the
>same destructive force that the Akagi took before she had to be scuttled.
>But how long will it take before all of our ``40 maintenance hours per flight
>hour'' aircraft are replaced? Before all of the original model Sidewinders
>and Sparrows that were only marginally effective are replaced by later models
>or by ASRAAM/AMRAAM series weapons? And will these even work? The USSR has
>had six or seven new fighters in the last decade or so. We've had three,
>going on four. Other NATO and allied nations and consortiums have had a few
>more, but how many of these can they afford to build? And how many will they
>build with socialists influential in government?
For the most part, I agree, but first a nit to pick. RAF fighter strength
was 871 on 6 July, 1940 and 1161 on 7 Sept, while the Germans facing them
had 893 on 1 July and 680 on 1 Sept. Total Luftwaffe strength in September,
1940 was 3,015 (Source: The Air War 1939-1945 by R J Overy, Stein and Day,
1981). The RAF was losing due to pilot loss until the Luftwaffe was shifted
from their successful attack on Fighter Command so as to bomb cities, and
the RAF started losing fewer pilots to German fighters that couldn't escort
the bombers all the way in. The Germans did not outnumber the RAF 40 to
1, anytime during the campaign.
Back to the meat. NATO does not need to profliferate more types of aircraft.
In the last ten years, the US has built the F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, and
F-20, while France, Britain, West Germany, Sweden, and Isreal have introduced
new types of their own. If anything, NATO needs to reduce the number of
types and increase the number of units -- more types means more spare parts
and thus fewer units on line due to failure to provide parts. Perhaps
somewhat less complex weapons are needed, but if going into combat, I
think I'd rather have all the ECM and ECCM equipment the F-15 carries
rather than the MIG-25, with all of its miniature vacuum tubes. Still,
I don't think NATO needs DIVAD as well as Roland, Tornado as well as
A-10 (or vice versa), Mirage-2000 as well as F-16, etc, etc. It might
also be a good idea to increase small-unit firepower with small cheap
weapons such as mortars and light rockets, the use of which does not
depend upon communications with Division (even if not effective against
armour, the explosions tend to keep enemy troops buttoned up and a bit
off balance while the ability to shoot with SOMETHING increases your
own troops morale.)
The Red Army is not a mighty Juggernaut that nothing can stand before,
but NATO can increase its defensive capability by using some cheaper
weapons. A less-capable weapon may not be as effective as an expensive
one, but there will be more of them to scatter up and down the line and
hopefully they will be a bit more reliable.
Dan C Duval
ISI Engineering
Tektronix, Inc.
tektronix!tekigm!dand