schneider@vlnvax.DEC (02/11/85)
Summary: Polls like the pro/con nukes polls are difficult
because it is hard to word them without showing bias. Also
there were few respondants (probably because it will open
up a can of worms that has spilled all over the net a few
times before).
I'd like to see an informal sort of poll (no tallying) which
will show the range of opinion on the net and hopefully
inspire some original and introspective thought. My
hypothetical question is:
What would be the reaction (and the re-reaction ad infinitum)
if the United States adopted a "no-nuke" policy, meaning
stopped spending the dollars on current developement and
deployment, slowly shrink (to zero) the active weapons, and
(gulp!) introduce diplomacy as a tool in negotiatons? Its
only hypothetical, so lets not argue over whether it should
or shouldn't be done; its the reactions which I'm intersted
in.
Initially, I'd like to hear opinions regarding the Soviet's
policy, then perhaps the effect on the American economy, before
the reactions are discussed about those countries who may
feel betrayed by us or feel relieved.
At any rate, I think this is an opportunity to voice opinions
which won't (too quickly) turn into an "us vs. them"-type
argument.
Daniel Schneider
{...decvax}!decwrl!dec-rhea!dec-vlnvax!schneiderhu@sdcsvax.UUCP (T. C. Hu) (02/13/85)
Kudos to Daniel Schneider for a well-worded question.
[This is strictly fantasy. Any resemblence to anything real is
purely coincidental. CBS executives have been created for dramatic effect.]
If the United States were to abondon all nuclear weapons, initially,
everything would be wonderful. The Soviet Union would immediately
make a similar statement (We beat them in the PR game.), and the world
would applaud. The U.S. economy would boom as huge amounts of capital
are freed to do productive things. Everything would be peachy.
At some point, though, the economy would start to falter. Not enough
resources would reach our factories. We would find ourselves having a
hard time getting oil or strategic minerals. More and more countries
would adopt stances hostile to the U.S. (and pro-Soviet, since they
have a far superior conventional military presence that can pressure
little governments out of the way) (Diplomacy works wonders when you
have nothing to promise the country you want to bargain with. We won't
have the big stick to back us up anymore. We'll just have to beg for
compassion.). At some point, the failing economy would drive the U.S.
to war (as failing economies are wont to do) in order to "protect our
vital interests". The Soviets would protect their vital interests and
we would have a limited war in some place like South Africa. The war
will drag on for a long time: neither side will be able to produce a
major victory against the other. As the Soviet economy collapses under
the strain of a protracted war, the Soviet leaders will get desperate,
(surprise) unveil a handful of ICBMs (hiding things like that is much
easier in a totalitarian state without a free press to go sniveling
around dredging up dark secrets), and threaten to take out a couple of
U.S. cities unless the U.S. withdraws. The U.S. will have to withdraw,
its economy will collapse, and the people will riot (when they get
hungry enough). Someone (probably from the military) will stage a coup
(promising to restore the greatness of the U.S.A.), establish martial
law, and everything will be just beautiful. ("You are hereby accused
of crimes against the state. We must execute you in the name of truth,
justice, and the American way.")
Alan J. Hu
sdcsvax!humjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (02/17/85)
>From: hu@sdcsvax.UUCP (T. C. Hu) >... the Soviet leaders will get desperate, >(surprise) unveil a handful of ICBMs (hiding things like that is much >easier in a totalitarian state without a free press to go sniveling No arms control treaty has ever been negotiated that is not verifiable. Period. The free press is not considered one of the national technical means used to verify arms control treaties. Satellites and listening devices turn out to be much more effective. The idea that the Soviets could "hide" something like "a handful of ICBM's" is absurd. It is the rough equivalent of thinking you could walk through one of those airport metal detectors with a 20/20 shotgun nestled under your coat. Mike Kelly
js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (02/18/85)
> > >From: hu@sdcsvax.UUCP (T. C. Hu) > >... the Soviet leaders will get desperate, > >(surprise) unveil a handful of ICBMs (hiding things like that is much > >easier in a totalitarian state without a free press to go sniveling > > No arms control treaty has ever been negotiated that is not verifiable. > Period. The free press is not considered one of the national technical > means used to verify arms control treaties. Satellites and listening > devices turn out to be much more effective. You're going to 'listen' for hidden nuclear missiles? Suprise! They actually *don't* make ticking noises. Get serious! How could a thing like that be verified without extensive searching (over the whole world) by both sides, continuously? Test-ban treaties are easy to verify, of course, but that's not what we're talking about here. > > The idea that the Soviets could "hide" something like "a handful of ICBM's" > is absurd. It is the rough equivalent of thinking you could walk through > one of those airport metal detectors with a 20/20 shotgun nestled under > your coat. Maybe you could explain that analogy for me. Or have you developed a nuclear missile detector which we can pass Russia through periodically? Seriously, almost *everyone* would be for disarmament if we thought it could be mutual and verifiable. I wouldn't trust my *own* government to actually disarm, though, much less the USSR's. > Mike Kelly -- Jeff Sonntag ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j "Once more, into the breech!" -the human cannonball
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (02/23/85)
From: js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag)
-------------------------------------
You're going to 'listen' for hidden nuclear missiles? Suprise! They
actually *don't* make ticking noises. Get serious! How could a thing like
that be verified without extensive searching (over the whole world) by both
sides, continuously? Test-ban treaties are easy to verify, of course, but
that's not what we're talking about here.
Seriously, almost *everyone* would be for disarmament if we thought it could
be mutual and verifiable. I wouldn't trust my *own* government to actually
disarm, though, much less the USSR's.
-------------------------------------
First, our satellites *do* extensively search the world continuously.
Second, the means of verification would have to be built into the treaty.
That might require on-site inspection. Both sides are quite well aware of
the number, size and location of strategic missiles. The treaty would include
a mutually agreeable procedure for dismantling these.
The fact that cruise and other missiles are much more difficult to verify is
precisely why arms control becomes more urgent by the day.
Our ability to hide is constantly pushing ahead of our ability to detect. If
the new cruise missiles are deployed in large numbers, the problem becomes much
more difficult. As Henry Kissinger once said of his decision to MIRV our missiles
(a move the Soviets, of course, quickly copied), "I wish I'd thought out the
consequences of a MIRVed world." We wish you had, too, Henry. (The consequences
are destabilizing, since first strike becomes theoretically more attractive --
one missile can knock out several warheads.)
The point is that things that can't be verified aren't involved in the negotiations.
Verification is built-in.
And a comprehensive test-ban would be just fine, as a first step, because it would
mean an end to development of new technology within short order.
Mike Kellyrohn@randvax.UUCP (Laurinda Rohn) (02/26/85)
>> From: js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) >> ------------------------------------- >> You're going to 'listen' for hidden nuclear missiles? Suprise! They >> actually *don't* make ticking noises. Get serious! How could a thing like >> that be verified without extensive searching (over the whole world) by both >> sides, continuously? Test-ban treaties are easy to verify, of course, but >> that's not what we're talking about here. >> >> Seriously, almost *everyone* would be for disarmament if we thought it could >> be mutual and verifiable. I wouldn't trust my *own* government to actually >> disarm, though, much less the USSR's. >> ------------------------------------- > > from Mike Kelly > First, our satellites *do* extensively search the world continuously. Unfortunately, not all satellites can see through concrete buildings. Things which are small enough *can* be hidden. > Second, the means of verification would have to be built into the treaty. > That might require on-site inspection. Both sides are quite well aware of > the number, size and location of strategic missiles. Both sides know this because ICBMs are very difficult to hide. And said info was obtained *NOT* by on-site inspection but by recon satellites. The Soviets are quite reluctant to allow on-site inspections. > The fact that cruise and other missiles are much more difficult to verify is > precisely why arms control becomes more urgent by the day. While it becomes more urgent, it also becomes more difficult precisely because an agreement on limiting cruise missiles may not be verifiable by the means we currently use. The Tomahawk GLCM, for example, is about 6 meters long and about 52 cm in diameter. It wouldn't be hard to hide at all. > And a comprehensive test-ban would be just fine, as a first step, because it would > mean an end to development of new technology within short order. However, there are possibly unverifiable weapons, like cruise missiles, which have already been developed and tested (something about a lake in Finland....). Lauri rohn@rand-unix.ARPA ..decvax!randvax!rohn
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (03/01/85)
> > More and more countries > would adopt stances hostile to the U.S. (and pro-Soviet, since they > have a far superior conventional military presence that can pressure > little governments out of the way) I believe the Soviet conventional superiority ploy to be a myth. Military power cannot be measured simply by counting weapons, a number of other factors are CRUCIAL. Specifically, one should note that Russia has thousands of miles of hostile boarders, while the U.S. doesn't have a inch. The Russian fleet must plow through narrow bottlenecks to get to the open ocean and is divided into four widely separated groups. Soviet 'allies' in Eastern Europe have repeatedly revolted and could not be trusted in a major war. One should note that when Hitler invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941 the Red Army outnumbered the Wermacht in tanks, men, planes, and almost every- thing else. In some cases by margins of 2 and 3 to one. Yet the Germans went through the Russians like a hot knife through butter - almost reaching Moscow in a few months. When Japan attacked Russia in 1905, Russia's fleet heavily outnumbered that of the Japaneese. By the end of the war most of the Russian fleet was on the bottom while the Japaneese lost only a few ships. Only recently has the Russian fleet recovered, but the cause of the defeat still remains - an inescapable geographic distribution of the fleet into small parts that can support each other only with great difficulty. Also, never forget that Russia is essentially a land power while the US is primarily a naval power. This is important in any analysis of relative military strength.
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (03/01/85)
I think it may be possible to verify almost any arms agreement if we're willing to spend enough time, effort and money. How about tracking every truck, plane, and train in the Soviet Union continuously all the time and analyzing the results? It's feasible, if expensive, and it would certainly make cheating extremely difficult. How about manned space stations observing the U.S.S.R. every second of the day with the best instruments we can design and produce? The eye is a marvelous sensor and you get a brain for free. There was once a project along these lines ... the MOL (manned orbiting laboratory). I think it was Air Force.
edhall@randvax.UUCP (Ed Hall) (03/01/85)
Cruise missiles and various other things make complete verification
of all nuclear weapons impossible.
One approach I've seen proposed is a restriction on weapons-grade
materials (plutonium, U-235, tritium). It still takes a lot of heavy
(and messy) industry to produce these things, making verification
simpler. There are (at least) three problems with this approach,
although they don't completely invalidate it. (It was proposed, by the
way, in a Scientific American article a couple of years ago, and by some
of the more thoughtful freeze groups):
(1) Power-plant fuel processing can look an awful lot like weapons
material processing--and in the case of breeder reactors, they can
be one and the same. The fuel cycle for nuclear power plants would
have to be restricted, and breeders eliminated.
(2) Existing stockpiles can still be used, and old weapons can be
reprocessed into new ones. However, an upper bound is placed on
things.
(3) No bounds are placed on delivery systems. This goes along with
(2)--there would be nothing to prevent the USSR from using their
existing weapons and materials from their ICBM's and putting them on
cruise missiles, or depressed-trajectory SLBM's, or whatever (and
I'll give you one guess what they might do if we actually deployed a
ballistic-missile defense system...)
Not particularly water-tight, no? Alone, no one system can assure
verification, and there are some things that simply cannot be verified.
As much as I hate to say it, technology is making any ultimate form of
arms control impossible (even as it makes some parts of arms control
easier). We are stuck with deterence for the forseeable future; I think
arms control, and weapons planning in general, should be aimed at making
it a stable deterence.
-Ed Hall
decvax!randvax!edhall
Of course, the Rand Corporation doesn't even know I'm writing this,
so I have to take full responsibility for the opinions involved.medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (03/04/85)
> > I think it may be possible to verify almost any arms agreement if > we're willing to spend enough time, effort and money. How about > tracking every truck, plane, and train in the Soviet Union continuously > all the time and analyzing the results? It's feasible, if expensive, and > it would certainly make cheating extremely difficult. > > How about manned space stations observing the U.S.S.R. every second > of the day with the best instruments we can design and produce? The eye > is a marvelous sensor and you get a brain for free. There was > once a project along these lines ... the MOL (manned orbiting laboratory). > I think it was Air Force. Ok, so tell me how you verify I don't have a GLCM stored in my basement? I asked this questio before, and noone gave me a suitable means of detection outside of going into my basement and looking... Go for it Al! Milo
nyssa@abnji.UUCP (nyssa of traken) (03/05/85)
>Ok, so tell me how you verify I don't have a GLCM stored in my basement? >I asked this questio before, and noone gave me a suitable means of >detection outside of going into my basement and looking... Go >for it Al! How do you get your GLCM into your basement? When it goes in, it can be observed. If you build it there, how? You'd need some sort of factory. To build it in that factory, you'd need resources delivered. They can be seen. To build the factory, you'd also need resources. They, too, can be seen. Say you delivery your GLCM via a tunnel... well, that's alot of earth moving, where are you going to put it? If it is your normal basement, then the warhead's radiation can be observed. If you harden your basement, well, that's a bit suspicious. Ever heard of spies? You put a GLCM in your basement, and someone will know about it. Shortly after that, those that need to know will know. -- James C Armstrong, Jnr. { ihnp4 || allegra || mcnc || cbosgb } !abnji!jca "Emotion is a weakness!" "I don't think so" "It brought you back for your friend and it will cost you your life!"
mikevp@proper.UUCP (Mike Van Pelt) (03/11/85)
>Ed's point about restricting weapons-grade plutonium and its connection >to nuclear power is a very good point. Amory Lovins and others have >pointed out that one of the major problems with nuclear power is that >it is very easy for countries with nuclear power to rechannel spent >fuel to be used for developing nuclear weapons. > tim sevener whuxl!orb This isn't true. Nuclear power plants are very poor sources of weapons- grade plutonium, because the stuff stays in the reactor for the duration of the fuel cycle, typically about a year. The result is that you get quite a lot of Pu240 and Pu242, neither of which are fisionable, and which must be separated out before you can make a bomb. And if you have that capability, you can more easily separate U235 from U238-- bigger mass difference, and none of those ugly fission products to deal with. It is significant in this regard that India, when she decided to produce a nuclear weapon, did not attempt to use power plant plutonium. They built a special reactor to breed weapons grade plutonium. One can assume that with India's economic position, that they would have used readily available power plant plutonium if that had been at all feasable. Mike Van Pelt
mat@hou4b.UUCP (Mark Terribile) (03/11/85)
>> More and more countries would adopt stances hostile to the U.S. (and pro- >> Soviet, since they have a far superior conventional military presence that >> can pressure little governments out of the way) > >I believe the Soviet conventional superiority ploy to be a myth. Military >power cannot be measured simply by counting weapons, a number of other >factors are CRUCIAL. ... Russia has thousands of miles of hostile boarders, >while the U.S. doesn't ... The Russian fleet must plow through narrow bottle- >necks to get to the open ocean and is divided into four widely separated >groups. Soviet 'allies' in Eastern Europe have repeatedly revolted and could >not be trusted in a major war. In a long, protracted war, the USSR's size and available natural resources (petroleum, almost every metal needed for production of almost every kind of machinery, etc) would work in her favor. In a short war, massive stockpiles of weapons, properly used, can win the day. And the population of the USSR can be formed into armies in a few months. Given a large stockpile of war supplies and an essentially expendable army, the USSR could see herself in a very favorable position. This could lead to a willingness to use or threaten force. As to alliances coming apart, I seriously doubt that the USSR ever plans on relying on any ``ally'' that she does not control. When the British passed Stalin information (gleaned from Enigma decrypts -- see The ULTRA SECRET by FW Wintherbottom) about the forthcoming attack upon the USSR, Stalin did not believe them. After all, what did the British have to gain by genuinely warning him? > ... when Hitler invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941 the Red Army outnumbered >the Wermacht in tanks, men, planes, and almost everything else. In some cases >by margins of 2 and 3 to one. Yet the Germans went through the Russians like >a hot knife through butter - almost reaching Moscow in a few months. >When Japan attacked Russia in 1905, Russia's fleet heavily outnumbered >that of the Japaneese. By the end of the war most of the Russian fleet >was on the bottom while the Japanese lost only a few ships. Yes, due to superior tactics employed by the German armies. Given the number of ``brushfire'' wars and the technology employed in them, it seems unlikely that either side will have the revolutionary abilities to use new weaponry that Rommel, Yammamoto, Patton, or Nimitz demonstrated. New technologies and tactics have been exercised in Viet Nam, in or around Isreal, at the Falklands, and in many other places as well. >Only recently has the Russian fleet recovered, but the cause of the defeat >still remains - an inescapable geographic distribution of the fleet into small >parts that can support each other only with great difficulty. This is how Japan was turned back at Midway -- a failure to concentrate. Remember, however, that our fleet -- and all of NATO's -- has global commitments. Remember that a modern Navy is an air force at sea. No surface fleet can survive, much less operate, under hostile air control. Remember that the USSRs air force outnumbers all of NATO's by about 2 to 1. Consider that the USSR is not likely to make the mistakes that have cost her so dearly in the past ... and that we would be ill-advised to make it clear to the world that we count on those mistakes. Remember also the effectiveness of Soviet disinformation. They learned it from the British after WWII and have become the undisputed master of it. It's simple: make preposterous statements about your own good intentions and the other guy's bad intentions often enough and people will believe them in spite of clear evidence. Penetrate the other guy's intelligence service and you will know everything that he knows ... and more. Discredit those who speak against you, using both open deprecation and clandestine character assasination and soon there will be no credible speakers against you. (Read INTREPID'S LAST CASE) >Also, never forget that Russia is essentially a land power while the >US is primarily a naval power. This is important in any analysis of >relative military strength. Much of that land is hostile to invading forces. Look at what happened to Napoleon's army ... or Hitler's. Both were defeated as much by the Russian winter as by any military operation. Yes, the factors are complex. But can we afford to rely on complex factors that no one can agree upon to overcome clear numerical superiority? As for qualitative superiority, the only hope I have is massivly decreased MTBF and maintenance requirements that newer weapons are supposed to have. In the Battle of Britian, where the 700+ strong RAF fighter command faced daily attack by an enemy with an air force 30 000 strong, reliability and a massive effort at emergency repair were vital to holding the thin line of resistance. At Midway, the herculean effort that put Yorktown back to sea in less than 72 hours was vital. So were the damage control and repair efforts that put her back in the fight less than seven hours after she was hit -- by about the same destructive force that the Akagi took before she had to be scuttled. But how long will it take before all of our ``40 maintenance hours per flight hour'' aircraft are replaced? Before all of the original model Sidewinders and Sparrows that were only marginally effective are replaced by later models or by ASRAAM/AMRAAM series weapons? And will these even work? The USSR has had six or seven new fighters in the last decade or so. We've had three, going on four. Other NATO and allied nations and consortiums have had a few more, but how many of these can they afford to build? And how many will they build with socialists influential in government? Remember that when the USSR was Germany's ally in WWII, ``central committees'' of labor federations urged their members NOT to do any war-related work, but to strike and abandon any production or shipping that could be used to endanger Axis efforts. -- from Mole End Mark Terribile (scrape .. dig ) hou4b!mat ,.. .,, ,,, ..,***_*.
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (03/13/85)
>From: rohn@randvax.UUCP (Laurinda Rohn) > >Unfortunately, not all satellites can see through concrete buildings. >Things which are small enough *can* be hidden. > >Both sides know [the holdings of the other side] because ICBMs are >very difficult to hide. And said >info was obtained *NOT* by on-site inspection but by recon satellites. >The Soviets are quite reluctant to allow on-site inspections. My point was that treaties which are negotiated include the means of verification. Neither side is willing to negotiate a treaty that doesn't include whatever verification means are necessary. If, as you claim, cruise missiles absolutely cannot be verified, then they will not be covered by an arms control treaty. I think that these smaller weapons present a problem for verification, and that must be addressed. Hopefully, it can be solved. However, the fact that there are some areas that treaties cannot cover just now is not an argument against arms control. It simply restricts what types of weapons can be negotiated. Furthermore, verification needn't be 100% reliable to be effective. It may well be that the risks of some small violations going undetected is less than the risk of having no limitations whatever. The point is not to negotiate a treaty that is absolutely, positively verifiable, but to reduce the risk of nuclear holocaust. I personally think this whole on-site inspection argument is used as a red herring by some people who simply oppose arms control. The Soviets have clearly stated that they are willing to consider on-site inspection, but only for significant gains in disarmament. In other words, they aren't going to allow on-site inspection unless the treaty including it is a significant step forward. This, in Reagan's terms, is a "bargaining chip." I also pointed out in a previous submission that it is not only the Soviets who oppose on-site inspection. As you can well imagine, there are some in the U.S. military who aren't too crazy about having the Soviets march through our own installations. The issue, as Tim Severner very aptly raised it, is are you willing to take risks only in the form of a build-up? Are the risks inherent in building new weapons systems acceptable no matter what, while the risks of negotiating limits unacceptable? Mike Kelly
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (03/14/85)
There is a very good article in the latest Scientific American which discusses
the verifiability question and points out the various means which do
exist for both sides to verify arms agreements. In the first place of course
are our satellites which can literally read a license plate. These can be
very effective during daylight and clear conditions. But the article also
points out that during cloudy or dark conditions there are radar facilities
which do not have the resolution of visible light satellites but can
observe larger objects. There are also satellites which can observe the
infrared spectrum which complements the visible light and radio wave spectrums.
Also in terms of underground nuclear tests, these can be distinguished from
earthquakes and other normal seismic disturbances by concentrating on higher
frequency seismic waves which can only be generated by a point explosion
(such as a nuclear test) and which are not generated by earthquakes.
These seismic stations can observe any explosions over a kiloton.
As the article points out the smallest Soviet warhead is many times that
amount. So there would not be much gained if the Soviets were to violate
a total test ban by testing explosions of about a kiloton-to develop warheads
of that size would be much smaller than anything they already have.
The article also points out that verifying a total ban on a category of weapon
is much easier than verifying compliance with a numerical limit.
(which is one reason that people like Wm Colby, former director of the CIA under
Nixon, have said the Freeze would be *easier* to verify than other arms
agreements)
In the case of a total ban on all ballistic missile tests this article estimates
there is over a 90% probability of detecting even a single ballistic missile
test.
The hardest thing to estimate is the accuracy of weapons being tested. Althoughtheir trajectory can be plotted with great accuracy there is no way to know
where the missile was being aimed.
The article points out that Soviet encryption of telemetric data may obscure
some information about their tests( this has been a major "violation" pointed
to by Reagan and others), it is still possible to track these missile test
with great accuracy and gain much other information.
The article doesn't point out also that a joint report by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, State Dept., and Defense Dept. in 1981 examined the accusation of
encryption of telemetric data from Soviet missile tests and the US did not
make a big issue of it in the SCC (Standing Consultative Committee)
partly because it would reveal the degree to which the US could already
unscramble such encrypted data. Knowing the degree of American unscrambling
ability would have implications in other fields (diplomatic cables and so
forth) besides just missile tests and so past Administrations preferred not
to even present the issue.
The Reagan administration's primary reason to raise the issue is political.
I would suggest those interested in the problem of verifiability read this
article.
tim sevener whuxl!orbmedin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (03/17/85)
> If you build it there, how? You'd need some sort of factory. To build it > in that factory, you'd need resources delivered. They can be seen. To > build the factory, you'd also need resources. They, too, can be seen. > > Say you delivery your GLCM via a tunnel... well, that's alot of earth moving, > where are you going to put it? > > If it is your normal basement, then the warhead's radiation can be observed. > If you harden your basement, well, that's a bit suspicious. > > Ever heard of spies? > > You put a GLCM in your basement, and someone will know about it. Shortly > after that, those that need to know will know. > -- > James C Armstrong, Jnr. { ihnp4 || allegra || mcnc || cbosgb } !abnji!jca > > "Emotion is a weakness!" > "I don't think so" > "It brought you back for your friend and it will cost you your life!" Tracking what goes in is easier said than done. Maybe you could watch my basement all the time, but not everybody's. As for the argument of tracking its radiation, well a modicum of shielding will fix that, I don't need to harden my basement. And as for looking for it by looking for a factory, well, factories arent the only way to produce things. Remember the Iraqi reactor facility the Israeli's took out a couple years ago? They had a plant to manufacture weapons underneath the main plant. Now, with a little work, I could make bombs underneath nuclear reactors very surreptitiously. Its a losing fight, there are too many ways of getting around it. An even if we suspected them of it, what would we do, yell at them at the SCC? Big deal. I remember some arms control proponent talking about cruise missiles they other day. He was saying that if we don't sign a treaty banning cruise missiles now, we never could because they aren't erifiable. How's that for logic? I agree with Ed Hall, the era of verifiable treaties is over, what we need now is stability. Milo
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (03/18/85)
>From: medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) >And even if we suspected them of [violations], what would we do, yell at them >at the SCC? Big deal. Arms control is based on the notion that both sides agree to treaties that are in their interests. For some reason, there seems to be a notion afoot that agreeing to limit arms automatically implies a concession of weakness, that strength can come only from building more weapons. That is silly. If we can agree that negotiating limitations can be in both sides interests, then it follows that complying with negotiated treaties is in both sides interest. The argument here is that failing to abide by a negotiated treaty undermines future negotiations that presumably would be in the nation's interest. Thus, failing to abide by a treaty in the long run undermines your own national interest. This may sound rather theoretical, but it works quite well in practice. The evidence of this is statements by our own Defense and State Departments that Soviet compliance with arms treaties has been good. Now the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) is not an enforcement agency. It is a body set up by the treaty to allow arbitration of charges and countercharges. As Milo Medin probably knows quite well, treaties are complex documents, and there is often disagreement over what constitutes a violation. The SCC is the body that arbitrates such disagreements. Of course, it's decisions aren't binding -- how could they be? It has no nuclear weapons to brandish. But, if an SCC decision is not followed, a serious break in the treaty is precipitated and other sanctions probably follow. At the least, it would undermine support for arms control in this country, if it were a Soviet violation. Were it a U.S. violation, chances are the Kremlin would be much less likely to negotiate with us. So it is rather facile to imply that the SCC is nothing but a meaningless debating society. Its pronouncements carry real weight, and there are examples of cases where the SCC has caused the Soviets to end construction on projects deemed a violation. >I remember some arms control proponent talking about cruise missiles >they other day. He was saying that if we don't sign a treaty >banning cruise missiles now, we never could because they aren't >erifiable. How's that for logic? I guess that arms control proponent is me. My point was that it is much easier to control nuclear arms projects early in development than it is once they've reached the deployment stage. It may already be too late for GLCM's in this instance. However, SLCM's can still be caught in the testing stage and limits negotiated before deployment starts. Once deployment starts, the verification problems are much harder. I disagree that we are "beyond verification". If your requirement is 100% reliable verification, then we've always been beyond verification and arms control is impossible. I think most people who want 100% verifiablity actually want 0% arms control. Mike Kelly
rohn@randvax.UUCP (Laurinda Rohn) (03/18/85)
>from Mike Kelly > >From: rohn@randvax.UUCP (Laurinda Rohn) > > > >Unfortunately, not all satellites can see through concrete buildings. > >Things which are small enough *can* be hidden. > > > >Both sides know [the holdings of the other side] because ICBMs are > >very difficult to hide. And said > >info was obtained *NOT* by on-site inspection but by recon satellites. > >The Soviets are quite reluctant to allow on-site inspections. > > My point was that treaties which are negotiated include the means of > verification. Neither side is willing to negotiate a treaty that doesn't > include whatever verification means are necessary. If, as you claim, > cruise missiles absolutely cannot be verified, then they will not be covered > by an arms control treaty. Where did I claim that? I don't recall *ever* having said that cruise missiles "absolutely cannot be verified." I don't even think that's true! My point was that there are some issues involved with the verification of cruise missiles which need to be considered carefully. Lauri rohn@rand-unix.ARPA ..decvax!randvax!rohn
js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (03/18/85)
> I disagree that we are "beyond verification". If your requirement is 100% > reliable verification, then we've always been beyond verification and arms >control is impossible. I think most people who want 100% verifiablity actually > want 0% arms control. > Mike Kelly I'd agree with a slightly changed statement: I think most people who want 100% verifiability actually want 0% arms. In other words, Mike, I'd rather not have 90% verifiability and 10% of enough nuclear weapons to destroy the earth N times in the hands of governments who are 90% sure that the other guy is disarmed. As an example, suppose you were in a Mexican standoff with someone who you trusted not at all. Suppose a cardboard barrier prevented you from seeing whether they still had a gun trained on you or not. A precarious situation, no? Would you be happy to put your gun down without some way of being sure that they were also putting theirs down? Disarming without 100% verifiability entails a risk that one or both of the governments involved will seize the chance to blow the other away. What is the cost of a risk like this? How about: (value of most of our lives) * (1 - verifiability) * (1 - government trustworthiness). Notice that government trustworthiness decreases with the percieved strength of the other country. (in other words, one country is unlikely to try something if it thinks that the other country is strong enough to retaliate.) You seem to be of the opinion that 100% verifiability is impossible to even approximate. Why? If each country were allowed to send, say 2000 inspectors to the other country, and if the inspectors were changed regularly, and were given free access to whatever they wanted to inspect, wouldn't that, in conjunction with already existing spy satellites, give close to 100% verifiability? (before you say: 'ha. He's stupid to think that they'd ever allow *that*. If we want disarmament, we'll have to take a risk and not insist on 100% verifiability.', consider the mexican standoff again. If you said: 'Let's stop this foolishness and put our guns down. But first, remove your screen, so that I can see whether or not you are really putting yours down.' and they said: 'No way. You'll just have to trust me.' would *you* trust them? Would you trust them, if it was not just your life you were risking, but the lives of us all? Here's to the day when the sword of Damocles no longer hangs above our heads. May we find a way to remove it without dropping it. -- Jeff Sonntag ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j "I am what I am, and that's all that I am."-Popeye the sailor man.
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (03/20/85)
>From: js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) >Disarming without >100% verifiability entails a risk that one or both of the governments involved >will seize the chance to blow the other away. The reason that 100% verifiability isn't needed is that not every violation is significant. In most cases, minor violations may go undetected -- thus verifiability isn't 100% -- but these will not significantly alter the balance of power. Thus, the risks of these undetected violations are worth the overall restrictions placed by the treaty. It isn't true that any violation puts the other side at the risk of being "blown away" -- at least, not any more so than is already the case every second. > You seem to be of the opinion that 100% verifiability is impossible to >even approximate. Why? I don't believe in 100% anything. Maybe we can achieve it; we should strive for it. I'm simply pointing out that some of those who claim they want 100% verifiability use that as an excuse for simply opposing arms control. >If you said: 'Let's stop this foolishness and put our guns down. But first, >remove your screen, so that I can see whether or not you are really putting >yours down.' and they said: 'No way. You'll just have to trust me.' >would *you* trust them? Would you trust them, if it was not just your life >you were risking, but the lives of us all? One confusion here is that the U.S. is always willing to agree to any verification means necessary and wants to achieve zero nuclear weapons, while the Soviets are constructing roadblocks to this. It ain't neccesarily so. Both sides are responsible for putting up roadblocks. It seems clear to me that Reagan Administration policy in Geneva is to accept only proposals that weaken the Soviets while enhancing U.S. strength. That is not going to result in an agreement. You must realize that the highest officials in the arms control agencies now have spent most of their political careers *opposing* arms control! It is the proverbial fox-in-the-chicken-coop. Now these are smart political operators, and they realize they can't openly refuse to negotiate -- the U.S. public will not put up with it. So you're going to hear lots of arguments about "bargaining chips" (if you can't pass a weapons system on its own merits, simply trot out your arms control negotiators to swear that the Soviets will be convinced we're a bunch of wimps unless we spend this $1.5 billion or whatever) and "verification". All the hoopola about Soviet violations last year was intended to poison the atmosphere for arms control. There are legitimate concerns about verification, and I share them. I live in the U.S.,too, and I don't want to see us in any danger. I simply think that there are risks associated with building weapons and risks associated with not building weapons. In most cases, I'd rather take the latter risks unless it seems inordinate. Mike Kelly
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (03/20/85)
*** Welcome Back Milo!! Glad to see you are as misinformed as ever!! *** > Are From Milo ("Mad Bomber") Medin of course: Is it true that arms control treaties cannot be verified? Well, that depends on what you mean by "verified". Certainly it is impossible to track every possible minor infraction. But then, it is also impossible to track everyone violating speed limit controls on our highways. Does that mean speed limits should be abolished? I hardly think so. Even tho almost everyone consistently violates speed limits at the edges (i.e. going 5 to 10 miles over the posted speed limit) they still keep the vast majority of people from going 100 miles per hour. To this degree then speed limits accomplish their objective: they keep the average speed on the highways lower than it would be without speed limits and consequently increase the safety of the highways for everyone. I think this was seen in the reduction of fatalities after the 55 mile speed limit was imposed. Even tho almost everyone actually drives over 55 miles per hour the average speed was reduced from the previous state in which everyone actually drove over 65 or 70 miles per hour. Consequently we also saw a decrease in the number of fatalities. For this reason, even if speed limits cannot be totally verified and are consistently ignored at the margins, they *do* succeed in limiting people's speed on the highways. Arms control is no different than speed control. There is no doubt whatsoever that both sides will try (and *have* tried) to violate arms control agreements at the margins. Moreover it is also true that certain minor infractions cannot be verified. For example as the March, 85 Scientific American article on verification points out a total nuclear test ban could only be verified for tests over one kiloton. Perhaps both sides might actually be able to get away with tests of two kilotons and not be detected. But even if either side wanted to conduct such tests (rather doubtful when the smallest nuclear weapons either side has deployed is over 20 kilotons) isn't such a limit better than allowing totally unlimited testing? The same argument applies to ballistic missile tests. The Scientific American article points out that just one ballistic missile test could be detected with over 90% accuracy from all the various satellites, infrared detectors, radar facilities and so forth that both sides have. So perhaps one side or the other might get away with conducting one or even several ballistic missile tests and get away with it without being detected. But first off, would just one test be enough to tell them anything meaningful? And secondly is not some sort of limit that is over 90% verifiable better than no limit at all? Reason suggests that it obviously is preferable to limit Soviet arms development even if such limits are not 100% verifiable. > An even if we suspected them of it, what would we do, yell at them > at the SCC? Big deal. > Yes, the SCC *used* to be a big deal. It has been used by Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter to stop activities that the US considered in possible violation of arms treaties. Unfortunately President Reagan has not used the SCC but instead has shouted his accusations to the world. In the 70's the Soviets were accused of using an SA-5 radar in a mode that violated the ABM treaty. Eventually after the matter was brought before the SCC and examined they stopped such use. If the Krasnoryk radar facility was brought before the SCC in a reaonable manner then ways in which it may violate the ABM treaty could probably be resolved. Once again, this is no different than controlling highway speeds: enforcement does not just involve telling somebody's neighbors that somebody is a speeder, and publishing such accusations in all the local newspapers. It involves legal recourse to courts in which the accused can defend her/himself and the evidence on both sides can be examined as dispassionately as possible. This is the function of the SCC in arms control: both sides can bring their grievances and negotiate over whether such grievances are justified. What is worse about Reagan's and militarists approach is that not only do they shout to the world that their neighbor is cheating on speed limits: they then go on to argue that therefore there should be no speed limits and they should be allowed to go as fast as they please irrespective of everybody else's safety and security. Is this the way we expect a civilized society to operate? I think not. tim sevener whuxl!orb p.s. rebuttals to other of Milo's misconceptions are forthcoming....
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (03/20/85)
Well, the fact that noone can enforce treaties is the inherent downfall of arms control agreements. You say that a treaty is valid as long as both parties agree to it, and if one side didn't, that would abbrogate the treaty. You are assuming that both sides are symmetric. The USSR can violate trre4aties and the press calls it an 'ambiguity in the treaty', we propose to do something similar, and they want Reagan's head on a platter... I want 100% verifiablity, because treaties shouldn't be based on trust and the good will of the other side. Because 100% verifiability is impossible for us, I reject arms control treaties. And what's so great about arms control treaties? b We wouldn't have this first strike problem without MIRV's, and because SALT treaties count launchers not warheads, its a great encouragement for everyone to MIRV! Now you say, you see, its folks like you and other hawks who refused to ban MIRV back in SALT I. And I admit to that, because you can't verify things like numbers of warheads. So what's my point? Its simple, arms control treaties haven't slowed things down, what they have done is make things LESS stable. Even if I grant you that SALT has restrained the number of warheads (which I don't), I'd much rather have more missiles and more stability than fewer missiles and less stability. Its stability that's important here, something that arms control advocates seemed to have forgotten... Milo
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (03/21/85)
> More inaccuracies from Milo "the Mad Bomber" Milo!!: > > I want 100% verifiablity, because treaties shouldn't be based > on trust and the good will of the other side. Because 100% > verifiability is impossible for us, I reject arms control treaties. Unfortunately our survival to this point is based on a certain degree of trust in the rationality of the Soviets. If they wanted they could have launched a nuclear attack years ago. And we would all be dead. And given an allout attack by the Soviets (which involves over 5,000 megatons) even if we did not counterattack with a single weapon they would all be dead or in very poor condition themselves. Because 5,000 megatons is the point estimated to provoke a Nuclear Winter. We have no choice but to trust the Soviets are rational enough not to commit mutual suicide. If we assume the Soviets are mad enough to desire mutual suicide then simply adding certainty to the mutual suicide will not help whatsoever. We may as well start preserving the artifacts of our civilization now to prepare for the holocaust. > > And what's so great about arms control treaties? b We wouldn't have this > first strike problem without MIRV's, and because SALT treaties > count launchers not warheads, its a great encouragement for > everyone to MIRV! Now you say, you see, its folks like you > and other hawks who refused to ban MIRV back in SALT I. And > I admit to that, because you can't verify things like numbers > of warheads. Your conclusion is right: if Nixon and Kissinger would have negotiated limits on MIRVed weapons in SALT I we *would* be better off. Your premise is faulty however; there are ways to verify numbers of warheads by simply multiplying the number of launchers by the number of warheads possible on a given missile. More on this later, tim sevener whuxl!orb
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (03/21/85)
>From: medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) >The USSR can violate trre4aties >and the press calls it an 'ambiguity in the treaty', we propose >to do something similar, and they want Reagan's head on a platter... Most of the so-called violations are simply rehashing old U.S. charges that Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter dealt with to their satisfaction in the SCC. For some reason, President Reagan refuses to use the SCC and prefers to spread propaganda in the press. I'll repeat this because it is very relevant here. In 1980, the Departments of Defense and State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency issued a joint statement that said, "Soviet compliance performance under 14 arms control agreements signed since 1959 has been good." The only substantive new charge since then has been the Soviet radar installation at Krasnoyarsk. Similar problems have been dealt with in the SCC; Reagan refuses to do so. The Soviets will not be embarassed by the U.S. press and Reagan Administration propaganda to dismantle the radar. If the charge is serious -- and it appears to be -- it should be addressed in the forum the treaty establishes to handle such charges. The Defense Department pointed out that both sides have raised questions about each other's compliance with SALT I, and that "in each case the U.S. has raised, the activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed our concern." ("SALT and American Security: Questions Americans are Asking", GPO, November, 1979.) To me, it is suspect when an Administration: (a) hires into ACDA people who have spent their political careers fighting *every* arms control treaty that has been negotiated; (b) spreads warmed-over rehashes of old charges through the press without pointing out that previous Administrations have had the charges resolved to their satisfaction; (c) goes into arms control negotiations talking about a "long process" that might not yield results for years; (d) uses those negotiations to pressure Congress into approving more and more weapons systems to use as "bargaining chips" (e.g. MX -- watch for SDI to be next); I seriously wonder whether such an Administration is not simply staging a large public relations facade. I seriously wonder whether such an Administration is not trying to dupe the American people, the majority of whom support arms control, into thinking it does as well. In the rest of his article, which I won't reproduce here, Milo offers a convoluted argument about how SALT I is responsible for MIRVing of missiles. This contradicts the record. The U.S. MIRVed its missiles because Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor, thought he could achieve a quick advantage. The Soviets followed suit. Kissinger later said: "I wish I had thought through the consequences of MIRVing." (paraphrase of a quote in Seymour Hirsch's excellent book, "The Price of Power"). Like most of the arms race, MIRVs were the result of a unilateral U.S. action. The Soviets followed suit to keep pace. That, after all, is what it's all about. That is what Milo offers us for the rest of our lives, and our children for their lives. That is his vision of the future. Mike Kelly
esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (03/23/85)
In article <5650@ucbvax.ARPA> medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) writes: >Well, the fact that noone can enforce treaties is the inherent >downfall of arms control agreements. The enforcement mechanism is simple: if the other side stops adhering to the treaty, so do you. As for verifiability and the potential for arms control treaties to create incentives for destabilizing things like MIRVs, that is something that needs to be addressed during negotiations. One simply does not accept a destabilizing treaty. Does that limit the number of acceptable treaties down to zero? I think not. I read an interesting article the other day in the library. I was paging through an old issue of *Current* (1980?) and I saw an arms control expert discussing the MX. He said (not an exact quote): "I think the mobile feature will eventually be found to be unworkable. Of course, that should kill the idea right there, since the mobile feature is what makes it a good second-strike weapon, and was the whole idea behind it. But the inertia of the military procurement process will keep it going, and they'll wind up putting it right into the Minuteman[-type] silos where it will be just as vulnerable and a more attractive target ..." Sound familiar? Ah, the irony of it... -- The developing iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (03/25/85)
Lets see here, my vision of the future... Well, my vision of the future isn't quite decided on. As I see it, we face 3 alternatives: 1) Conceed inferiority to the Soviets. This means knuckling under as they squeeze U.S. interests one by one until we are no longer a major opposing power. This means the spread of 'godless communism' across the globe, and the enslavement of millions of peoples into a tyrannical system which deprives them of their liberity and their rights. We would be the last to go under, but we would go nonetheless. This vision I do not care for. 2) Attempt co-existance with the Soviets by fostering detente and nonverifible inequitable arms control treaties. This degenerates into the first case, though its spread out more over time. I see arms control as the opium of the intellectuals, who want to believe, even though it may be false, that we can co-exist peacefully with an imperialist, militaristic, ruthless, Soviet state. Our interests are in direct opposition, and such co-existance can only occur if a major policy shift in the Soviet governmental system occurs. I do not think it will, and I think history bears me out. Thus, I see this path leading to ruin as well. 3) Attempt to maintain parity and achieve superiority if possible, and oppose Soviet actions throughout the world. This method is expensive, and requires much patience. If we maintain such pressure, not only military but economic, we can force the Soviet state to divert more and more money to the military, causing more and more internal strife. The Soviet leadership will see that they cannot maintain control and superiority at the same time, and thus conceed inferiority to us. Or if they do not, the people will revolt causing the downfall of the state and we will be rid of the USSR as we know it. The last 2 possibilities may take a long time, but we will have peace in the meantime. The key point to remember is that the Soviets are extremely conservative, and if they look at the books and see a given action has a low chance of success, they will not move. Thus, by attaining superiority we also attain peace, not cheaply, but peace nonetheless. This is one reason why I see a BMD system as being important, if we can show them their attack would have only 5-15% effectiveness, or even if they only worried about it, any hopes of a successful first strike would vanish. If they tried to overwhelm it, this would result in huge expenditures, expenditures they cannot afford. The key point is whether its more cost-effective to defend or overwhelm. I believe such a BMD system can be produced. So I favor the 3rd approach. Now of course, many will differ with my assumptions, which lead them to different conclusions. But I aim to be a realist, and sometimes, there isn't a nice answer around. No matter how much we want one to exist. Milo
orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (03/25/85)
> Once again a simple switch: > From commissar Milo Medvedek: Lets see here, my vision of the future... Well, my vision of the future isn't quite decided on. As I see it, we face 3 alternatives: 1) Conceed inferiority to the Americans. This means knuckling under as they squeeze U.S. interests one by one until we are no longer a major opposing power. This means the spread of 'Christian Capitalism' across the globe, and the enslavement of millions of peoples into a tyrannical system which deprives them of their liberity and their rights. We would be the last to go under, but we would go nonetheless. This vision I do not care for. 2) Attempt co-existance with the Americans by fostering detente and nonverifible inequitable arms control treaties. This degenerates into the first case, though its spread out more over time. I see arms control as the opium of the intellectuals, who want to believe, even though it may be false, that we can co-exist peacefully with an imperialist, militaristic, ruthless, American state. Our interests are in direct opposition, and such co-existance can only occur if a major policy shift in the American governmental system occurs. I do not think it will, and I think history bears me out. Thus, I see this path leading to ruin as well. 3) Attempt to maintain parity and achieve superiority if possible, and oppose American actions throughout the world. This method is expensive, and requires much patience. If we maintain such pressure, not only military but economic, we can force the American state to divert more and more money to the military, causing more and more internal strife. The American leadership will see that they cannot maintain control and superiority at the same time, and thus conceed inferiority to us. Or if they do not, the people will revolt causing the downfall of the state and we will be rid of the US as we know it. The last 2 possibilities may take a long time, but we will have peace in the meantime. The key point to remember is that the Americans are extremely conservative, and if they look at the books and see a given action has a low chance of success, they will not move. Thus, by attaining superiority we also attain peace, not cheaply, but peace nonetheless. This is one reason why I see a BMD system as being important, if we can show them their attack would have only 5-15% effectiveness, or even if they only worried about it, any hopes of a successful first strike would vanish. If they tried to overwhelm it, this would result in huge expenditures, expenditures they cannot afford. The key point is whether its more cost-effective to defend or overwhelm. I believe such a BMD system can be produced. So I favor the 3rd approach. Now of course, many will differ with my assumptions, which lead them to different conclusions. But I aim to be a realist, and sometimes, there isn't a nice answer around. No matter how much we want one to exist. Milo Medvedek
medinev@kremvax.UUCP (Milos Medinev) (03/26/85)
Comrades, as I see it, we face 3 alternatives: 1) Conceed inferiority to the Americans. This means knuckling under as they squeeze socialist interests one by one until we are no longer a major opposing power. This means the spread of 'capitalist imperialism' across the globe, and the enslavement of millions of peoples into a tyrannical system which deprives them of their liberity and their rights. We would be the last to go under, but we would go nonetheless. This vision I do not care for. 2) Attempt co-existance with the Americans by fostering detente and nonverifible inequitable arms control treaties. This degenerates into the first case, though its spread out more over time. I see arms control as the opium of the intellectuals, who want to believe, even though it may be false, that we can co-exist peacefully with an imperialist, militaristic, ruthless American state. Our interests are in direct opposition, and such co-existance can only occur if a major policy shift in the American governmental system occurs. I do not think it will, and I think history bears me out. Thus, I see this path leading to ruin as well. 3) Attempt to maintain parity and achieve superiority if possible, and oppose American actions throughout the world. This method is expensive, and requires much patience. If we maintain such pressure, not only military but economic, we can force the American state to divert more and more money to the military, causing more and more internal strife. The American leadership will see that they cannot maintain control and superiority at the same time, and thus conceed inferiority to us. Or if they do not, the people will revolt causing the downfall of the state and we will be rid of the USA as we know it. The last 2 possibilities may take a long time, but we will have peace in the meantime. The key point to remember is that the American leaders are extremely conservative, and if they look at the books and see a given action has a low chance of success, they will not move. Thus, by attaining superiority we also attain peace, not cheaply, but peace nonetheless. This is one reason why I see a BMD system as being important, if we can show them their attack would have only 5-15% effectiveness, or even if they only worried about it, any hopes of a successful first strike would vanish. If they tried to overwhelm it, this would result in huge expenditures, expenditures they cannot afford. The key point is whether its more cost-effective to defend or overwhelm. I believe such a BMD system can be produced. So I favor the 3rd approach. Now of course, many will differ with my assumptions, which lead them to different conclusions. But I aim to be a realist, and sometimes, there isn't a nice answer around. No matter how much we want one to exist. Milos Medinev kgbvax!kremvax!medinev
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (03/26/85)
Lets see here, my vision of the future... Well, my vision of the future isn't quite decided on. As I see it, we face 3 alternatives: 1) Conceed inferiority to the Americans. This means knuckling under as they squeeze socialist interests one by one until we are no longer a major opposing power. This means the spread of 'capitalist imperialism' across the globe, and the enslavement of millions of peoples into a tyrannical system which deprives them of their liberity and their rights. We would be the last to go under, but we would go nonetheless. This vision I do not care for. 2) Attempt co-existance with the Americans by fostering detente and nonverifible inequitable arms control treaties. This degenerates into the first case, though its spread out more over time. I see arms control as the opium of the intellectuals, who want to believe, even though it may be false, that we can co-exist peacefully with an imperialist, militaristic, ruthless, American state. Our interests are in direct opposition, and such co-existance can only occur if a major policy shift in the American governmental system occurs. I do not think it will, and I think history bears me out. Thus, I see this path leading to ruin as well. 3) Attempt to maintain parity and achieve superiority if possible, and oppose American actions throughout the world. This method is expensive, and requires much patience. If we maintain such pressure, not only military but economic, we can force the American state to divert more and more money to the military, causing more and more internal strife. The American leadership will see that they cannot maintain control and superiority at the same time, and thus conceed inferiority to us. Or if they do not, the people will revolt causing the downfall of the state and we will be rid of the USA as we know it. The last 2 possibilities may take a long time, but we will have peace in the meantime. The key point to remember is that the American leaders are extremely conservative, and if they look at the books and see a given action has a low chance of success, they will not move. Thus, by attaining superiority we also attain peace, not cheaply, but peace nonetheless. This is one reason why I see a BMD system as being important, if we can show them their attack would have only 5-15% effectiveness, or even if they only worried about it, any hopes of a successful first strike would vanish. If they tried to overwhelm it, this would result in huge expenditures, expenditures they cannot afford. The key point is whether its more cost-effective to defend or overwhelm. I believe such a BMD system can be produced. So I favor the 3rd approach. Now of course, many will differ with my assumptions, which lead them to different conclusions. But I aim to be a realist, and sometimes, there isn't a nice answer around. No matter how much we want one to exist. Milos Medinev kgbvax!kremvax!medinev
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (04/03/85)
> > 3) Attempt to maintain parity and achieve superiority if possible, > and oppose Soviet actions throughout the world. This method > is expensive, and requires much patience. If we maintain > such pressure, not only military but economic, we can force the > Soviet state to divert more and more money to the military, > causing more and more internal strife. There is not a shread of evidence to support the contention that diverting energy to the military increases internal strife. It does produce extremely powerful military establishments though. On the contrary, revolutions seem to occur after a population has experienced improved conditions and then recieves a sharp, if small set back. There are some cases, such as the Russian revolution, where military defeat caused the revolution. Building weapons doesn't cause military defeat, combat does. Combat between the US and USSR is suicidal. No one else is strong enough to take the Soviets. I.e., we cannot solve the fundimental problem militarily. I suspect that defeat in Afganistan combined with A REDUCTION in pressure on the Soviet Union might work wonders. Simultaneously disgrace the military on the field of battle and reduce the very real need for it (Russia has been invaded by Western Europe three times in the last two hundred years) and we might get somewhere.