gabor@qantel.UUCP (Gabor Fencsik@ex2642) (04/10/85)
[I guess it is my turn at Sevener-bashing ...]
Tim Sevener seems to be so delighted to play the village idiot on
the net that worrying about facts and figures would really be out of
character. His latest is to repeat the Soviet line about allied
intervention in 1918-1921. This particular piece of demonology
paints a picture of massive armies sent by imperialist powers descending
on Russia in an effort to strangle the young Soviet Republic. This
myth is in fact a crucial piece of Soviet 'historiography', both
as a legitimation of Soviet power and as a convenient reference for
Western leftists to explain away Soviet suspicions toward the outside
world.
Now there is nothing particularly glorious about the intervention:
it was the usual mixture of bungling, hazy objectives, incompetence,
decisionmakers being hopelessly uninformed about the situation on
the ground, - very much like the Beirut debacle in more recent
times. The problem with the version propounded by Soviet
apologists is the context, motivation and scale of these events.
In early 1918, when the decision to send troops was first considered, the
situation was as follows: a) there was a world war going on (need references,
Tim?); b) the Russian front collapsed; c) negotiations for a separate peace
between the Bolshevik regime and the Kaiser were in progress; d) enormous
stores of weapons and ammunition, supplied by the allies on credit, were
lying around the harbors of Murmansk and Archangelsk near the Finnish
border, within striking distance of advancing German troops (or so it
was thought in Washington). At that point the Western general
staffs considered the Bolsheviks simply German agents. There was
a great deal of fretting about these supplies falling into German
hands.
Now comes the 'intervention' part. Under a great deal of British
pressure, President Wilson decided, after long hesitation, to send
in a military force of 600 (yes, six hundred) barely trained recruits
led by British officers to guard these supplies. All these men were
unsuitable for service in the Western front. When they disembarked, they
found themselves in the middle of a civil war with armed groups of all
shapes and sizes milling around, changing sides, executing undesirables,
that sort of thing. The American unit dug in around the harbor
and tried to figure out what was going on, shooting when shot at.
At one point they ended up controlling an important rail line
due to a Red armored train commander with slow reflexes whose
troops were disarmed before he cound figure out who these guys with
the strange uniforms were (apparently he was dead drunk).
When the Armistice was signed and the danger of the Germans seizing
these supplies gone, it was too late to evacuate the troops: the
harbor at Archangelsk is frozen for 7 months in a year. So they
had to shiver through the winter in the Russian North under miserable
conditions. There were minor squirmishes but the Spanish flu caused
more casualties than any armed action. As soon as the harbor could
be reopened in the spring of 1919, the troops were shipped out.
To indicate the relative scale of these shenanigans, the offensives
on the Western front involved millions, with DAILY casualty rates of
up to 50,000. The idea of these particular troops playing any
kind of decisive role or attempting to overthrow the Bolshevik
regime is quite far-fetched.
There was another American intervention in Siberia but you will have
to find out about that one yourself. I don't know what advice to
give you about that, Tim: perhaps the best way to start would be
the Yellow Pages. Check under 'Libraries'. You'll be surprised ...
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Gabor Fencsik {dual,nsc,intelca,proper}!qantel!gabor myers@uwmacc.UUCP (Jeff Myers) (04/12/85)
> [I guess it is my turn at Sevener-bashing ...] > > In early 1918, when the decision to send troops was first considered, the > situation was as follows: a) there was a world war going on (need references, > Tim?); b) the Russian front collapsed; c) negotiations for a separate peace > between the Bolshevik regime and the Kaiser were in progress; d) enormous > stores of weapons and ammunition, supplied by the allies on credit, were > lying around the harbors of Murmansk and Archangelsk near the Finnish > border, within striking distance of advancing German troops (or so it > was thought in Washington). At that point the Western general > staffs considered the Bolsheviks simply German agents. There was > a great deal of fretting about these supplies falling into German > hands. > > ----- > Gabor Fencsik {dual,nsc,intelca,proper}!qantel!gabor Why don't you give some sources? Why should we believe YOU? You have no distinguishable pedigree. Your contentions are largely supported by George F. Kennan (somebody earlier in this discussion has been mentioning George Keenan; is this who you meant?), ex-ambassador to the USSR, in *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*. Gabor is lucky to have me around to support his contentions. Didn't you ever have a debate class, Gabor? jeff m