matthews@harvard.ARPA (Jim Matthews) (04/13/85)
> As far as whether the Bolshevik Revolution was a good thing for the rest > of the world is concerned, I think that can only be answered by looking at > the alternatives given the failure of that revolution. I think Nazism would > have arisen whether the Bolsheviks succeeded or not. I'm also sure that the > USSR's role in WWII was the decisive one. Could it have been decisive > had the Bolsheviks not succeeded (i.e. would forced industrialization > and tank development, etc. have taken place)? I'm not sure, I doubt it. > But that's one important question. It is true, and often overlooked, that Russia played the pivotal role in stopping the Nazis. The Communist party itself, however, played a more ambivalent role. One reason the Germans were so successful at the outset of WWII is the fact that in 1937-38 Stalin purged his top officers. This purge *concentrated* on the advocates of mechanization of the Red Army. It is often cited as proof of the contention that Stalin wasn't all that afraid of Hitler -- otherwise he wouldn't have sacrificed his own strength so. Also, the limited Nazi success at "winning hearts and minds" rested on the brutality that Stalin had inflicted in collectivization. Also, it didn't help the war effort to send huge numbers of loyal soldiers to the Gulag (Solzhenitsen most notably). Russia prevailed on the endurance and patriotism of her people. I would say that this happened despite Communism, and not because of it. > > Another important question is if democracy would have survived in the > lively forms it takes today in the Western democracies if the Bolshevik > example had not warned the West of the costs of abandoning its > ideological ideals? Given the choice between an unenlightening bliss and an educational threat, I'd always pick the former. > > A third question is if the Third World would be better off if they lacked > the opportunity to play economic systems off against each other for their > own advantage, as they can (in a limited sense) do now. Would richer > nations listen to the pleas of poorer nations if the poorer nations > couldn't threaten a revolutionary alternative? I'd guess that any improvement in the West's treatment of poor nations has been a drop in the bucket compared to the suffering brought on by revolutionary change in Cambodia, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. > > A fifth question is if those of a more leftist persuasion such as myself > would not be in prison or otherwise restrained if the Bolsheviks had not > won? I've seen the argument made that suppression of domestic unrest > could have become normal state policy throughout the West if all cases > of domestic unrest, like the Bolsheviks, had been successfully repulsed > by means of state repression. The failure of state repression in the > USSR cautioned the West against its use when faced by similar movements > or individuals. Norman Thomas was imprisoned for pacifism in WWI; he > would not have been in WWII. I don't think that the sucess of Bolshevism brought this on, but that good sense did. For one thing, there wasn't much state repression to fail in Russia. The Soviet Encyclopedia cites some 90 executions between 1860 and 1903 (or so), a period of incredible revolutionary ferment. And some of those executed were actual or would-be regicides. When literally hundreds of government officials were being assasinated by revolutionary terrorists, you'd think that an autocracy would take more brutal counter- measures. For the most part, they didn't. > > Tony Wuersch Jim Matthews matthews@harvard