mck@ratex.UUCP (Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan) (04/19/85)
Lines marked '>' are those of Richard Carnes's; lines marked '>>' are those of Adam Reed and Barry Fagin; lines marked ']' are from an posting that I made some time ago. I do not have the time or desire to involve myself in all aspects of the debate on the net between Libertarians and non-Libertarians, but I am going to make a few points here. >In article <> adam@npois.UUCP (Adam V. Reed) writes: >>Actually, a libertarian's notion of Liberty is even more "perverse" than >>that: it includes a junkie's right to mainline heroin, and a masochist's >>right to get beaten to bloody shit by a consenting sadist. It would be >>difficult to locate a tyrant who denies his subjects the freedom to do >>things he approves of. You don't qualify as a defender of freedom until >>you stand up for the right of all people, not just to actions you can >>empathize with, but even to actions you hate, as long they do not >>infringe the equal freedom of others. > >It's still more perverse than that, Adam. Libertarians hold that the >only kind of freedom worth defending is freedom from direct coercion >by individuals. That's NOT the Libertarian position (albeit that SOME Libertarians could conceivably hold it). There are MANY things worth defending; at issue is HOW they are to be defended. > They further maintain that the highest good, or >perhaps the only ethical good, is the maximizing of this particular >kind of freedom. That's NOT the Libertarian position either (I might find these discussions useful if those opposed to Libertarianism would argue against Libertarianism instead of straw-men). There is no system of weightings whereby one could MAXIMIZE negative liberty; the negative liberty of one cannot simply be traded away for the negative liberty of another. There IS a group of philosophers who think that negative liberty can somehow be maximized, but they call themselves 'neo-libertarian', and are careful to distinguish themselves from us. > If this isn't perverse it is at least arbitrary; I >haven't yet come across a persuasive or plausible defense of this >view. To some extent, all ethical theories that I'm familiar with are arbitrary. In the face of this, we should employ Ockham's Razor (Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.); the system making the least number of assumptions is least at risk. Libertarianism does quite well when subjected to this test. There ARE other systems which do equally well (the Anarchism of Lysander Spooner comes immediately to mind), but none of the systems commonly thought of as Socialism do. >Thus when libertarians describe anti-discrimination laws as >"anti-liberty," we must understand "liberty" in this particular >sense, and that such laws are *eo ipso* unjustified according to the >libertarian philosophy. One one think that a Marxist would refrain from this sort of attack, in that so many of his brethren seek to redefine words with sociological implications, and confuse everybody (including themselves) by equivocation. This is especially pernicious in the case of a collectivist ethical system, in that, by the stroke of a pen or manipulation of a tongue, people can suddenly find themselves defined in or out of the exploiter class. >As Barry Fagin writes: > >>It seems to me that if people have the right to think their own >>thoughts, to own property, and to form voluntary associations, then >>they may not be prevented from discriminating against anyone in any >>manner they please....In any case, since non-coercive techniques are >>available to combat the perceived evils of discrimination, why use >>coercive ones? > >This is written in the standard libertarian question-begging mode. >The question being begged is whether the only standard for judgment >should be the minimizing of coercion by individuals. While Fagin's assertions are far from the sort needed to convince one who does not value negative liberty, they do not altogether beg the question. There are those for whom negative liberty and non-discrimination are goals, such that said people subscribe to mutually-defeating practices. Some of these people, when shown the inconsistency of their priorities, will adopt a more Libertarian approach (I am a case in point; I used to be an ACLU- type Liberal). And, again, Libertarians *per se* do not hold negative Liberty to be `the only standard for judgment'; they hold it to be the only standard for judgment ABOUT INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS. Further, Carnes's reference to 'the minimizing of coercion' is the other side of his cupro-nickle coin about maximizing negative liberty. >>It is the Free Economy that will benefit victims of discrimination >>the most, and not more coercive legislation. > >The attribution of apparently magical powers to free market systems >leads some of us to suspect libertarians of dogmatic habits of >thought. With the exception of Sraffian economics (I'm still trying to find time to read *PC*), since I've been reading the net, the anti-Libertarians seem to always end-up doing the Sevener Shuffle whenever there's been an argument on economics. (By the way, I HAVE read enough of *PC* to note that Sraffa's theories are incompatible with the labour theory of value, which you earlier defended -- but, then, An intelligent consistency is the hobgoblin of Libertarian minds.) > I think that markets can do some important things but not >others. Let us have some demonstrations of claims such as the one >quoted above; Case in point: the Ford Motor Company has fought the South African government for the right to hire Negroes instead of Caucasions (and, by the way, won). Victims of market discrimination are, ex vi termini, underpaid for the work that they do. This makes it in the employers interest to hire this (comparatively) cheap labor; but as employers bid-away workers from each other, they BID-UP the wage rate, and it is in their economic interest to do so until no Racist (or Genderist) differential remains. Here in the United States, the problem is not so much market discrimination as it is PRE-market discrimination; that is, people are victimized BEFORE they enter the labor-market, and as a result of this discrimination are less desirable as workers. For example, girls are discouraged in any attempts at mastering mathematics, physics, and whatnot, and are encouraged to develop the skills needed by receptionists. > let us first have a definition of a "Free Economy," >since I am not sure I understand exactly what this is. Some time ago (a matter of months, I think), Carnes asked that I define a Free Economy; this is the definition that I posted: ]In a Free Economy, the following rules are observed: ] Each person is initially sole owner of himself. ] Unowned resources may be acquired by taking possession of them and ] putting them to productive use. ] Property may be transferred the following ways: ] Abandonment and reacquistion -- the owner abandons his claim, ] then someone takes possession and puts it into productive use. ] Unilateral transfer -- the owner gives the claim to another. ] Trade -- the owner gives the claim to another, contingent upon ] the other making a transfer in response. ] Violation -- a person takes possession of owned resources without ] a corresponding obligation of the owners, and thereby forfeits ] claim to some of what was h(is|er) property. ] Reproduction -- a person creates another person, and thereby ] creates obligations to that person. As I noted (or implied -- I don't remember which) in the orginal posting, the term 'Violation' was adopted as a matter of convenience; it represents violation of the other rules. (The position on Reproduction that I gave would be contested by Murray Newton Rothbard and many of his followers, but they are, quite simply, LOUSY philosophers, and easily shown to be inconsistent on this matter; some day, in fact, I plan to generate a definitive Libertarian response to various philosophical and economic positions of Rothbard.) Back later (I hope), DKMcK
mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) (04/20/85)
>/* acf4:net.politics / mck@ratex.UUCP (Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan) / 5:57 pm Apr 18, 1985 */ > >] Reproduction -- a person creates another person, and thereby >] creates obligations to that person. Would you mind elaborating on what precisely these obligations are, and why they are in fact obligations?