[net.politics] The libertarian solution to probs. of occup. safety

fagin@ucbvax.ARPA (Barry Steven Fagin) (05/28/85)

>... what
>about the problems of worker safety and health that OSHA was intended
>to address?  ...
>
>Let us have [trumpets, please] the Libertarian Solution to the
>problems of occupational risk.  And make sure it's a simple one.
>
>Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes

(Ta-rum-ta-ta-tum!)
Try this one: enforce laws that guarantee sanctity of contract, individual
rights, property rights, and establish standards of negligence.  When
an employee has foreign substances introduced into his body, a violation
of rights (i.e. a crime) has occurred, and those responsible owe him
compensation.  If, in our desire for occupational safety, we focused
not on the "public good" but on individual rights, employers might
just find that unsafe workplaces cost money; an awful lot of money.

This solution is NOT simple (sorry, Richard, but I did my best (:-)).  
It isn't perfect, of course,
and even in Libertaria one must deal with elusive concepts like
negligence, what exactly is contracted when employers higher employees,
and so on.  However, this approach would still be MORE effective than
our current policy of giving employers specific rules and standards to hide
behind.  Don't forget that OSHA, as a political agency, can be lobbied.
Employers can (and do!) influence it and get standards passed leaving
workers LESS protected than they would be in Libertaria.  So often,
proponents of regulating employer/employee relations ignore this.

An individual-rights oriented approach to worker safety has other
advantages.  How should we balance the consumer's desire for
cheap chemical products with the safety of those who produce them?
Currently, because this balance is deemed to be a "social goal",
we attempt to achieve it through an agency with coercive power
(OSHA), which establishes by fiat what is permissible and what
is not.  This is like fine tuning your TV set with a sledgehammer.
If widgets can be produced more cheaply with no
additional risk to those who manufacture them, OSHA has no
incentive to lower expensive safety standards for widget manufacturers.
If people are dying due to inhaling widget-grease
fumes, OSHA will conduct a 2-year study,
appropriate legislation wil get stuck in some congressional commitee,
and nothing will happen until Jane Fonda wins an Oscar for her heartbreaking 
portrayal of the wife of a widget maker with terminal cancer.
By contrast, if employers know that getting a jury convinced that
their company poisons its employees will cost them money, 
they've got incentive to develop cheap, effective safety measures.
Likewise, if they can get rid of unnecessary protective gear,
their powerful drive to cut costs and make more money will lead
them to do it, quickly.

So often, there's no conflict at all between the things that most
of you out there want (safe workplaces, cheap necesseties, clean
air and water), and individual rights.  The libertarian solution
to occupational safety problems illustrates this quite well.

--Barry
-- 
Barry Fagin @ University of California, Berkeley

robg@mmintl.UUCP (Robert Goldman) (06/05/85)

	In his article (second ref.) Barry Fagin suggests that the libertation
solution to problems of occupational safety is an expansion of the current
negligence laws.  I understand that to mean:  If someone shoves asbestos
into your lungs, sue them.
	I'm afraid that contrary to his advertisement, this is a typical
libertarian "simple solution."  There are a number of things to be taken
into account in this discussion that have not been addressed by this
solution:

1.  In Libertaria, who is going to do the research to determine which
chemicals, etc. are dangerous?  Would it be in the interests of anyone but
the government?
	One might suggest freelance firms that get a cut of the returns from
suits.  This `free market' solution has two flaws:  1)  it would make
scientists into the position of advocates for parties, damaging science's
pursuit of truth (c.f., lawyers' pursuit of truth, the Tobacco Institute);
2) It is unlikely that this free market method could support the kind of
long duration studies necessary in some cases (esp. detailed investigation
of genetic damage).

2.  If we stuck to negligence suits, we would lose the protection of
substance screening -- the kind of protection that saved the United States
from the thalidomide nightmare.

3.  It is my personal belief that some situations cannot be adequately
compensated by ANY amount of money.  E.g., the above-mentioned thalidomide
children, people who are killed in industrial accidents (their families need
the money, but it doesn't do the actual victims any good).

4.  It seems to me that it would be difficult to prove someone negligent for
not protecting his/her employees from a substance not known to be harmful.
This is related to point #2, and suggests (but does not prove) that in
Libertaria, each new generation would be unwitting guinea pigs for substance
x, and would not be eligible for compensation since "Substance x was not
known to be dangerous when we started using it in our plant.  Of course, now
that we see that all your children have been born with fins and gills, we'll
discontinue its use, but you can't expect US to accept responsibility. . ."

	Any answers?

						Robert Goldman
						MultiMate International
opinions above entirely my own.

mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) (06/07/85)

>/* robg@mmintl.UUCP (Robert Goldman) / 11:14 am  Jun  5, 1985 */

>1.  In Libertaria, who is going to do the research to determine which
>chemicals, etc. are dangerous?  Would it be in the interests of anyone but
>the government?
>	One might suggest freelance firms that get a cut of the returns from
>suits.

Not a cut of the law suits, but a cut of the profits from the sale of the
product.  And of course, if they sell incorrect information, they will
be liable as in the case of selling any faulty product.

Alternatively, they can be independent companies selling their
information.  The profit motive would provide an incentive for them
to be accurate (what's the incentive for governement to be accurate).
Also, it is possible that such an industry would develop on more than
one level, so that there might be firms publishing ratings of
firms that sell product and occupational safety information.

>  This `free market' solution has two flaws:  1)  it would make
>scientists into the position of advocates for parties, damaging science's
>pursuit of truth (c.f., lawyers' pursuit of truth, the Tobacco Institute);

Are gov't. scientists not now advocates for parties, e.g., the EPA.

>2) It is unlikely that this free market method could support the kind of
>long duration studies necessary in some cases (esp. detailed investigation
>of genetic damage).

If the studies are too expensive for the market to support them then
perhaps those who wish to use a product will have to make a decision
regarding whether or not they are willing to take the chance.

>3.  It is my personal belief that some situations cannot be adequately
>compensated by ANY amount of money.  E.g., the above-mentioned thalidomide
>children, people who are killed in industrial accidents (their families need
>the money, but it doesn't do the actual victims any good).

There is no doubt that some damage cannot be compensated for by any amount
of money.  However, the question is how to best avoid such damages without
strangling the economy.

>4.  It seems to me that it would be difficult to prove someone negligent for
>not protecting his/her employees from a substance not known to be harmful.

If employers tell their employees that a substance is not dangerous
and it is, then they are responsible for any damages that result.
If they tell their employees that they don't know whether or not the
substance is harmful, it will be up to the individual employee to
decide whether to take the risk, or, perhaps, get fired.

>						Robert Goldman

			Mike Sykora