[net.politics] Soviet Conventional Offensive Capability...

slb@drutx.UUCP (Sue Brezden) (10/05/85)

 al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) writes:
>2. When the Wermacht invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941 the Red Army was
>vastly superior in numbers of men, tanks, and aircraft.  The Germans
>went through the Red Army like a hot knife through butter.

I had always heard that the Germans penetrated Russia so quickly
partially as a maneuver on the Russian's part.  The usual tactic
if you are a country with so much open space is to fall back, burning your
fields as you go.  The enemy is left with long supply lines (which
they must use--since you have left them nothing useful in the 
burned over areas)  You then wait until they slow down and start
to starve and freeze to death (something which always comes eventually
in the Russian winter).

I know that the Russians used this technique effectively in the 
Napoleanic and First World Wars.  I had thought that WWII saw them
use the same technique.  The eastern front was horrible for the
German army.

When the Russian army did stand, i.e. Stalingrad, they did well--Hitler 
was reportedly foaming at the mouth.  And Hitler actually did worse
than Napolean did--he never took Moscow.

All this should not be taken as a reflection on your basic premise,
which sounds quite possible, but which I do not have the information
to judge for myself.

-- 

                                     Sue Brezden
                                     
Real World: Room 1B17                Net World: ihnp4!drutx!slb
            AT&T Information Systems
            11900 North Pecos
            Westminster, Co. 80234
            (303)538-3829 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
        Your god may be dead, but mine aren't.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration) (10/06/85)

>I had always heard that the Germans penetrated Russia so quickly
>partially as a maneuver on the Russian's part.

Not during WW2. In WW2 the Soviets (a more accurate word than
Russians, I'm told by emigres) simply were unable to stop the
Germans until the weather turned bad.

>The usual tactic if you are a country with so much open space
>is to fall back, burning your fields as you go.  

I think "usual" may be too strong a word.

>The enemy is left with long supply lines (which
>they must use--since you have left them nothing useful in the 
>burned over areas)

Long supply lines are certainly a problem.

>You then wait until they slow down and start
>to starve and freeze to death (something which always comes eventually
>in the Russian winter).

The starvation and freezing was due to Hitler's usual irrationality.
He thought he was going to win the campaign in the east in 6 weeks
or so, therefore made no preparations for a winter campaign, until
disaster had overtaken him (even then he often failed to deal
with local conditions in an appropriate manner).

>I know that the Russians used this technique effectively in the 
>Napoleanic and First World Wars. 

I think not so much in WW1, at least not on the same scale as
during Napoleon's campaign. 

>I had thought that WWII saw them use the same technique. 

Not so much intentionally as by necessity.

>The eastern front was horrible for the German army.

Certainly true. But it could have been different.

>When the Russian army did stand, i.e. Stalingrad, they did well

Things are a little more complicated. The Soviets excelled in
close combat, as in street fighting within a city. They
were extremely tenacious in defense when given proper
leadership. Hitler's obsession with taking Stalingrad
directly was probably a misuse of German forces,
whose superiority lay more in mobile warfare. The German
failure at Stalingrad was also partially due to Hitler
taking tactical command away from his generals to a certain
extent (Paulus was not allowed by Hitler to break out of the
ring, etc.), and due to information leaked through insecure
encryption methods. The Soviet plan for encirclement of
German forces at Stalingrad was based on knowledge of
German plans gained from such sources. Goring's scheme
for supplying Stalingrad from the air was another of the
pipe dreams that contributed to the end of the 3rd Reich.

>--Hitler was reportedly foaming at the mouth.  And Hitler
>actually did worse than Napolean did--he never took Moscow.

Hitler was an amateur when it came to military affairs.
He should also probably be classified as insane.
His failure to take Moscow was not due to the Soviets
so much as to his own bad judgement. The issue of doing
better or worse than Napoleon doesn't seem to me to have
much to do with whether Moscow was taken. The main thing
is not taking certain geographic locations, but destroying
the enemy miltary forces and war potential. I don't really
think saying one or the other did "better or worse" makes much
sense in the first place. They both lost in a disastrous manner.