al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (10/01/85)
THESIS: Soviet conventional offensive capability is very small DATA: 1. After six years of failure the Soviets have not significantly increased their force in Afganistan from about 100,000. 2. When the Wermacht invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941 the Red Army was vastly superior in numbers of men, tanks, and aircraft. The Germans went through the Red Army like a hot knife through butter. 3. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the vast majority of Russia's military budget is spent on defense. Interestingly, the same article stated that only 3% of DOD's budget is spent on defense of the US. 4. There is some evidence that Russia did not invade Poland because mobilization of the reserves failed. So many soldier went AWOL that the regime was unable to punish them or put an invasion together. Note that this occured (assuming it did in fact happen) while Soviet forces were engaged in Afganistan. 5. The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces that cannot support each other. This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century. RESONING: We are all familiar with the enormous physical resources of the Red Army. As data point 2 above indicates, this does not necessarily imply a strong military. This brings us to data point 1. Why doesn't Russia simply send a couple million soldier into Afganstan and win? Perhaps they are not capable of such an effort. They must keep large forces on the Chinese boarder and more forces in Eastern Europe to protect against NATO. Please don't give me a rap about NATO never attacking. Russia has suffered three major invasions from Western Europe in the last two centuries, Napoleon once and Germany twice. To leave that boarder weakly defended would be idiotic. Data point 4 suggests that, with the Afgan invasion in progress, even Poland could not be subdued. Data point 3 suggests that the Soviet military is primarily defensive. Data point 5 indicates that, if push came to shove, the shiny new Russian Navy is mostly an expensive mass grave. This evidence and logic suggests that the USSR has about 100,000 men available for offensive operations; alternately, they can only supply that many beyond their boarders. Contrast this to the half million we supported in Vietnam. If this data and logic are correct, the bogeyman of Soviet conventional might DOD has used to get billions out of our pockets doesn't seem quite so scary. Their ICBM fleet can, of course, kill us all. Sweet dreams.
usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration) (10/04/85)
The article was interesting. A few comments: >2. When the Wermacht invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941 the Red Army was >vastly superior in numbers of men, tanks, and aircraft. The Germans >went through the Red Army like a hot knife through butter. At that time the Red Army had been weakened by a purge of its military leadership (which may have been inspired by a German plot, I forget what the latest conclusion on that matter is). The German army at that time was better trained, led and equipped than any previous army in history. It particularly excelled in mobile mechanized warfare, which noone had been able to defend against up to that time. Stalin was hoping to avoid war and was not fully prepared. The Soviets later proved to be extremely tenacious, ruthless, brutal, almost inhumanly difficult opponents, particularly excelling in close combat. While Germany probably should have been able to achieve at least a stalemate in the east (were it not for their insecure cryptosystems), the Soviets should not be taken lightly. >5. The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces >that cannot support each other. This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy >to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century. I seem to recall that an intelligence leak played a role there. >Please don't give me a rap about NATO never attacking. Russia has >suffered three major invasions from Western Europe in the last two centuries, >Napoleon once and Germany twice. To leave that boarder weakly defended >would be idiotic. To be fair, in WW1 it was Russia that invaded Germany first. My conclusion: You can't be too careful or too strong when dealing with the Soviets. Also I would expect they would have an easier time overunning Western Europe (were it not for tactical nukes, etc.) than they have had in Afghanistan. The Soviets are very shrewd, patient and careful. They seem to pick on the weakest points where they can achieve maximal gains with minimal risks. I do admit I don't quite understand their Afghanistan strategy yet. But I would not conclude that they couldn't do much more if they wanted to.
ray@rochester.UUCP (Ray Frank) (10/04/85)
> THESIS: Soviet conventional offensive capability is very small > > > > We are all familiar with the enormous physical resources of the Red Army. > As data point 2 above indicates, this does not necessarily imply a strong > military. > > This brings us to data point 1. Why doesn't Russia simply > send a couple million soldier into Afganstan and win? Perhaps they > are not capable of such an effort. They must keep large forces on the > Chinese boarder and more forces in Eastern Europe to protect against NATO. > Please don't give me a rap about NATO never attacking. Russia has > suffered three major invasions from Western Europe in the last two centuries, > Napoleon once and Germany twice. To leave that boarder weakly defended > would be idiotic. > Poland suffered a major invasion from Russia during WW2. Finland suffered through several invasions from the imperialistic Russians also during WW2. So don't give me that rap that Russia will not attack toward the West. Nato has never attacked towards the east. Germany did, so did Napoleon, but what do they have to do with Nato? The same governments are no longer in power, unlike the government of Russia which is the same government that exhibited imperialistic tendencies during WW2. I won't mention the harsh realities heaped on the Czech and Poles at the hands of the Russians after WW2. Oops I guess I did mention it. > Data point 4 suggests that, with the Afgan invasion > in progress, even Poland could not be subdued. > Huh? > Data point 3 suggests that the Soviet military is primarily defensive. > One hundred thousand tanks, and over 50,000 jets is defensive, who are they expecting to attack them, some imperialistic planet from outer space? > Data point 5 indicates that, if push came to shove, the shiny new > Russian Navy is mostly an expensive mass grave. > That's true of all navies now days. > This evidence and logic suggests that the USSR has about 100,000 men > available for offensive operations; alternately, they can only supply > that many beyond their boarders. Contrast this to the half million we > supported in Vietnam. > Why should they end the war quickly? They get to try out all their newest weapons. > If this data and logic are correct, the bogeyman of Soviet conventional > might DOD has used to get billions out of our pockets doesn't seem > quite so scary. Their ICBM fleet can, of course, kill us all. Sweet > dreams. If this data and logic are correct? Are you kidding? What LOGIC? What DATA? It is correct only if you are pro-commy or are a distorter of facts or both.
todd@scirtp.UUCP (Todd Jones) (10/07/85)
Interesting thesis. I would like to make a few observations. > THESIS: Soviet conventional offensive capability is very small > > DATA: > > 1. After six years of failure the Soviets have not significantly increased > their force in Afganistan from about 100,000. I have read different reports that run the gamut from the Soviets efficiently crushing all Afgan "rebels" to the Soviets not being able to make any headway at all. I suspect the latter is closer to the truth since the Soviets could use the propaganda boost of their army being more than a match for Rambo. > 2. When the Wermacht invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941 the Red Army was > vastly superior in numbers of men, tanks, and aircraft. The Germans > went through the Red Army like a hot knife through butter. That was loooooong ago considering the advances in war technology. > 3. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the vast majority > of Russia's military budget is spent on defense. Interestingly, the > same article stated that only 3% of DOD's budget is spent on defense > of the US. Maybe so, but there is a huge grey line between defense and offense, especially when you consider the USSR spans the largest continental mass. The USSR, being motivated by paranoia more than anything, conceives of all offense as defense. > 4. There is some evidence that Russia did not invade Poland because mobilization > of the reserves failed. So many soldier went AWOL that the regime was > unable to punish them or put an invasion together. Note that this occured > (assuming it did in fact happen) while Soviet forces were engaged in > Afganistan. This seems dubious. What are your sources? Poland seemed to do a pretty good job of crushing dissent without Soviet assistance. Why should the Soviets appear like bullies if they don't have to? > 5. The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces > that cannot support each other. This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy > to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century. Again, war technology is so different now, how can we compare events 45 years ago to capabilities of today? > RESONING: > > We are all familiar with the enormous physical resources of the Red Army. > As data point 2 above indicates, this does not necessarily imply a strong > military. > > This brings us to data point 1. Why doesn't Russia simply > send a couple million soldier into Afganstan and win? Perhaps they > are not capable of such an effort. They must keep large forces on the > Chinese boarder and more forces in Eastern Europe to protect against NATO. > Please don't give me a rap about NATO never attacking. Russia has > suffered three major invasions from Western Europe in the last two centuries, > Napoleon once and Germany twice. To leave that boarder weakly defended > would be idiotic. I doubt NATO would ever attack, but I concede the Soviets assume it's very possible. > Data point 4 suggests that, with the Afgan invasion > in progress, even Poland could not be subdued. Poland, under Soviet domination has enjoyed much greater freedom than citizens in the USSR have. It is bad press for the Soviets to invade, so why bother when they have to? I know, world opinion hasn't always detered them, but they seem more concerned with it now. > Data point 3 suggests that the Soviet military is primarily defensive. > > Data point 5 indicates that, if push came to shove, the shiny new > Russian Navy is mostly an expensive mass grave. If push comes to shove, the Soviets would be able to use non-conventional arms. > This evidence and logic suggests that the USSR has about 100,000 men > available for offensive operations; alternately, they can only supply > that many beyond their boarders. Contrast this to the half million we > supported in Vietnam. This suggests (loosely at best) that the Soviets are WILLING to deploy 100,000 troops offensively, beyond however many troops are poised on the border of whatever country they would hypothetically invade. If they have half a million troops (I think this might be near the range of pseudo-accuracy) on the Western edge of the Warsaw Pact, this would mean an offensive force of 600,000 could be mustered for an invasion. > If this data and logic are correct, the bogeyman of Soviet conventional > might DOD has used to get billions out of our pockets doesn't seem > quite so scary. Their ICBM fleet can, of course, kill us all. Sweet > dreams. This last paragraph is largely true, but for somewhat different reasons. If we can overkill the Soviets by a factor of 20 and they can overkill us by a factor of 30 (or whatever) who cares what their conventional forces can do? We'll all melt into little puddles in the end. ||||||| || || [ x-x ] Todd Jones \ L / {decvax,akgua}!mcnc!rti-sel!scirtp!todd | ^ | |___| SCI Systems Inc. doesn't necessarily agree with Todd.
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (10/09/85)
> > >5. The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces > >that cannot support each other. This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy > >to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century. > > I seem to recall that an intelligence leak played a role there. A role perhaps, although the book I read on the conflict recently did not mention any leak. A look at any map will illustrait my point quite well, geography gives Russia an incredible disadvantage in a naval conflict. > > To be fair, in WW1 it was Russia that invaded Germany first. Mostly 'cause the German war plan called for defeating France and England first. I wasn't trying to make a moral point, just that invading armies come into Russia from the west alot, not that Russia doesn't earn the invasions. > > My conclusion: You can't be too careful or too strong when > dealing with the Soviets. Also I would expect > they would have an easier time overunning > Western Europe (were it not for tactical nukes, > etc.) than they have had in Afghanistan. However it is unwise to double your national debt, become a debtor nation, and run out of money in part because of $300 billion plus defense budgets unless there is a real threat. We have done all these things and they weaken us. things > > The Soviets are very shrewd, patient and careful. They seem to > pick on the weakest points where they can achieve maximal gains > with minimal risks. They also are very inefficient and fairly corrupt. Their people do not speak a common language and there is widespread disaffection with the regime. All of this reduces their offensive military ability. Thank you for a very thoughtful, interesting response. Al Globus
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (10/09/85)
> > THESIS: Soviet conventional offensive capability is very small > > > > To leave that (the Russian western) boarder weakly defended > > would be idiotic. > > > Poland suffered a major invasion from Russia during WW2. Finland suffered > through several invasions from the imperialistic Russians also during WW2. > So don't give me that rap that Russia will not attack toward the West. Russia, of course, has been expanding for centuries. This expansion is accomplished by military force. So what. The point is that the western boarder requires a strong defense which, in turn, saps resources that otherwise might be available for offensive operations. > Nato has never attacked towards the east. Germany did, so did Napoleon, but > what do they have to do with Nato? Nato consist of France and Germany, among other countries. Just for tidbits, the US, France, England, and Japan invaded Russia just after WWI. Looking at that list you will notice most of our current major allies. Again, the point is that Russia cannot assume that we won't attack and must divert resources that might otherwise be available in Afganistan or on the Chinese boarder. > I won't mention the harsh realities heaped on the Czech and Poles at the hands > of the Russians after WW2. Oops I guess I did mention it. Morally important, but irrelevant to Russia's offensive capabilities. > > > Data point 3 suggests that the Soviet military is primarily defensive. > > > One hundred thousand tanks, and over 50,000 jets is defensive, who are they > expecting to attack them, some imperialistic planet from outer space? > Repeating data point 3. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, not exactly a liberal rag, the bulk of Soviet military spending is for defense of the USSR. I'm afraid I can't give the exact issue, but it was a couple of months ago. Repeating data point 1, although the Red Army was much larger by most measures than the Wermacht in WWI the Germans did very well for the first two years. We have seen similar effects in the wars between Israel and the Arabs. Large numbers of jets and tanks do not necessary a powerful offensive military force make. > > > If this data and logic are correct, the bogeyman of Soviet conventional > > might DOD has used to get billions out of our pockets doesn't seem > > quite so scary. Their ICBM fleet can, of course, kill us all. Sweet > > dreams. > > If this data and logic are correct? Are you kidding? What LOGIC? What DATA? > It is correct only if you are pro-commy or are a distorter of facts or both. I'm not a commy and all of the facts I mentioned are true, except one which was carefully labeled as being on the shaky side. You can verify any of my facts in a good history book, or in one case, Aviation Week and Space Technology. I think you should read my posting without your ideological blinders. The piece made no moral point as to the quality of the Soviet system, which I feel is quite low, but rather looked at their military capacity. Military capacity can only be truely measured by combat. By that measure the modern Soviet military machine does not appear to rate highly in the offense. This is important since we are driving our country into bankrupcy to pay for our own military. If we have over-rated the Russian conventional threat, we may be weakening ourselves economical for no good purpose.
usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration) (10/11/85)
I can agree with most of what was said. A couple of points seemed worth further discussion. >>>The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces >>>that cannot support each other. This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy >>>to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century. >> I seem to recall that an intelligence leak played a role there. >A role perhaps, although the book I read on the conflict recently did >not mention any leak. A look at any map will illustrait my point quite >well, geography gives Russia an incredible disadvantage in a naval conflict. I would be interested in the name of the book you read (so I can read it also). I have done a lot of studying of intelligence leaks in WW1/WW2. (an article should appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 85 when they are finally published). Many authors have apparently underestimated the significance of intelligence leaks. The role of such leaks in the Russo-Japanese war might be worth investigating further. I only recall 2 references to this, both of which I encountered pretty much at random. Usually it takes a lot of reading to dig up information on such things (a 500 page book for a 1 paragraph reference or so ...) >However it is unwise to double your national debt, become a debtor nation, >and run out of money in part because of $300 billion plus defense budgets >unless there is a real threat. We have done all these things and they >weaken us. This is a very interesting point. It might seem true on the face of it, but I wonder if money isn't essentially a convenient fiction, and if the "real" power gained from budget busting "defense" spending more than offsets any paper debts incurred. I think that the relation between "real power" and nominal wealth isn't fully understood. (However, don't say I didn't warn anyone if 4 or 5 years from now the whole economic house of cards collapses. But I bet it will be due to incompetent leaders who won't know how to handle massive debt, inflation, etc. rather than an inevitable consequence of current fiscal policies.) >> The Soviets are very shrewd, patient and careful. They seem to >> pick on the weakest points where they can achieve maximal gains >> with minimal risks. >They also are very inefficient and fairly corrupt. Their people do >not speak a common language and there is widespread disaffection with >the regime. All of this reduces their offensive military ability. Yes (although the Soviet capacity to mobilize resources in case of a threat should not be underestimated). This brings up an interesting question. How does one deal with such a regime? Obviously it is too risky to attack them. My speculation is that we should try to de-escalate surface tensions as much as possible, at the same time being as strong as possible underneath, while emphasizing that we are not a direct threat to them. This in the hope that by not "poking the bear with a stick", it will "go into hibernation", and eventually evolve into a country we can relate to with less conflict (i.e. let them sink into inefficiency, corruption and inertia without arousing them from their slumber by threatening them).
usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration) (10/11/85)
>Repeating data point 1, although the Red Army was much larger >by most measures than the Wermacht in WWI the Germans did very well for the >first two years. OK, you have hit upon one of my favorite topics. (Why were the Germans defeated in the east?) Often they were outnumbered on the order of 10 to 1 (very roughly) on the eastern front during the latter part of the war. Still, they had chances for a stalemate. The reasons they failed to achieve this are many. Hitler took away tactical and operational freedom from local commanders (the commander on the battlefield has direct perception of local conditions and should be free to react accordingly, in order to make optimal use of temporary opportunities, etc. Also lack of freedom to take initiative is demoralizing.) Hitler refused to allow construction of defensive positions in rear areas for unsound reasons. He forced the German forces to fight a static war instead of a war of movement (this despite the fact the Germany's strength was in mobile warfare, while the Soviets were strongest in the more brutal and primitive kinds of combat). Hitler was often too remote from the battlefield to make correct judgements. Defensive weapons (i.e. anti-tank guns) were neglected in favor of offensive weapons (tanks), in contradiction to the advice of Rommel, etc. But the real joker in the deck was the fact that the Soviets were given access (by the Western powers) to a great deal of the encrypted information that the Germans were transmitting, including nearly everything important such as orders, plans, troop strength, etc. Without this intelligence leak Germany might well have stalemated or beaten the Soviets. From the point of view of military theory, insufficient recognition of the value and correctness of the German methods of conducting mobile warfare has been one of the results. Also the ability of a numerically smaller force which is skilled in mobile mechanized warfare to defeat a much larger force not so skilled has been partially overlooked. (All this may be academic since the advent of Atomic weapons though.) 2 examples: at Stalingrad the Soviet plan of encirclement was created and executed with full knowledge of German plans, etc. Von Manstein's relief attempt was cut off due to Soviet knowledge of his orders. at Kursk, knowing the German plan for the attack months in advance, the Soviets constructed an extremely thorough defensive system a hundred miles deep, to break the force of the attack (this was the largest tank battle in history, and the last German attempt to take the initiative in the east).