hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed) (11/13/85)
In several postings, carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) objected to the Libertarian (or should I say "Propertarian"?) position that (as I put it) "the conversion into individual property (through use or trade) of things not previously owned by anyone is an instance of productive creation of wealth (rather than 'theft')." As I noted previously, this position hinges on the nature of value, and on the specific process through which things acquire value, i.e. become wealth. I would like to thank Richard Carnes for stimulating me to think about these issues. I believe a version of the Propertarian argument can be made as follows: A RIGHT to do something is the condition of not being subject to (morally or politically) legitimate coercion in consequence of having done it. OWNERSHIP is simply the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of another. (Note that in a free society, ownership cannot be terminated except by mutually agreed upon transfer to another, or by use that invades or threatens to invade another's person or property. A body or property alienated from ownership by such use is subject to legitimate self-defense.) FREEDOM is the right to do anything one can physically do, as long as this does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of another. Under this definition, freedom implies the right to use or trade any thing that was never owned by anyone else: since no one else has ever owned it, using it cannot possibly be an invasion of another individual's person or property in and of itself. But having the right to use it in any way that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of another, means OWNING it. Thus, the above definitions of freedom and of ownership imply that freedom subsumes the right to establish ownership over any previously unowned object. To establish ownership over a previously unowned object cannot be a case of "stealing the pre-existing inherent value" of the object. In general, a VALUE is a condition that a person wishes to attain or preserve. An object is said to be valuable if its availability is believed by someone to increase the likelihood of attaining or preserving a value. Because only people can value, it is not possible for a thing to have an "inherent value" (that is, a value independent of any person who finds that thing useful in his or her own pursuit of happiness). Making a previously unvalued object available for use or trade is no less a case of creation of wealth than the creation of a new object. WEALTH is the ensemble of all things a person believes contribute to his or her happiness, or are available to enhance it. Thus, a thing cannot constitute wealth unless it is either being used, in the sense of contributing directly or indirectly to some person's happiness, or available for use or trade. Of course, a person who creates a thing thereby also makes it available for use or trade, thus creating wealth. But so does a person who discovers a thing, and establishes its usefulness, and, if necessary, brings it to a place where it can be used or traded. I suspect that Carnes will disagree with my argument at the level of the definitions on which it is based (of right, ownership, freedom, value, and wealth). Those definitions seem reasonable to me, but I shall be grateful to anyone who can help me improve them. Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)