hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed) (11/27/85)
In earlier articles, I proposed the following definitions: OWNERSHIP is simply the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of another. A person's PROPERTY is the ensemble of things over which the person exercises ownership. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes, claims: > These two definitions are mutually circular, i.e., they include each > other in their definitions, and therefore tell us nothing except the > relation between the two concepts. If we put the two definitions > together, we have (condensed): > OWNERSHIP is the right to use an entity in any way that does > not invade the aggregate of things over which another person > exercises OWNERSHIP. The above definition of ownership is not circular, merely generative, that is, it is a recursive definition whose first step is subsumed in its second step. The recursion may be laid out as follows: 1. When exercised for the first time in human history, OWNERSHIP is the right to use an owned entity in any way that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person of another. 2. Once it has been exercised by somebody, OWNERSHIP becomes the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of another; where PROPERTY is the ensemble of things over which a person exercises ownership. The claim made in my round 1 and round 2 articles is that at least one important attribute of ownership (namely, that a previously unowned entity becomes the property of the first person to use it) is implied by any reasonable (that is, valid and usable) definition of the terms defined in those articles. Hence, if Carnes is to challenge the argument presented in those articles, he will have to challenge the reasonableness of my definitions. On the other hand, I would be surprised by a claim that generative or recursive definitions are inherently either not valid or impossible to understand. Adam Reed (ihnp4!mtuxo!hfavr)
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/06/85)
> In earlier articles, I proposed the following definitions: > OWNERSHIP is simply the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way > that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of > another. > A person's PROPERTY is the ensemble of things over which the person > exercises ownership. > > Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes, claims: > > > These two definitions are mutually circular, i.e., they include each > > other in their definitions, and therefore tell us nothing except the > > relation between the two concepts. If we put the two definitions > > together, we have (condensed): > > OWNERSHIP is the right to use an entity in any way that does > > not invade the aggregate of things over which another person > > exercises OWNERSHIP. > > The above definition of ownership is not circular, merely generative, > that is, it is a recursive definition whose first step is subsumed in > its second step. The recursion may be laid out as follows: > > 1. When exercised for the first time in human history, OWNERSHIP > is the right to use an owned entity in any way that does not invade, > or threaten to invade, the person of another. > 2. Once it has been exercised by somebody, OWNERSHIP becomes the > right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade, > or threaten to invade, the person or property of another; where PROPERTY > is the ensemble of things over which a person exercises ownership. > > The claim made in my round 1 and round 2 articles is that at least one > important attribute of ownership (namely, that a previously unowned > entity becomes the property of the first person to use it) is implied by > any reasonable (that is, valid and usable) definition of the terms > defined in those articles. Hence, if Carnes is to challenge the argument > presented in those articles, he will have to challenge the > reasonableness of my definitions. On the other hand, I would be > surprised by a claim that generative or recursive definitions are > inherently either not valid or impossible to understand. > > Adam Reed (ihnp4!mtuxo!hfavr) The chalenge to reasonableness of the definition: WHAT does it mean to "invade a property of another"? For example, if your neighbor would produce substances which create a bad smell on your property, is it an invasion? But what about "someones barbeque is sombody else's polution". I claim that under a weak definition of "invasion" we all are an easy pray of the careless ones, under a strong definition no economical activity is feasible, at least not in a large scale, finally, to find a right limit of the definition of "invasion", one needs a complicated web of rules, not unlike of what we have now. Example: eminent domain. The owner of some land may block the use of another, by denying access, power supply etc. Thus to enable some people to use their property we must limit the scope of ownership rights of another.