carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (01/16/86)
Thanks to those who have posted bibliographies on Central America. However, so far no one has mentioned one of the most useful books for understanding events in Central America, and perhaps the first book you should read to understand the region unless you are already well versed in its history (another recommended introduction is R.L. Woodward's *Central America*). This is Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, expanded edition; contains annotated bibliography. Available in paper for $8. It is futile to try to understand Central American events without a knowledge of the region's history, which consists to a large extent in the sordid story of the United States' relations with the region. It was Ronald Reagan's monumental ignorance of history, of Central America as well as every other region of the globe, that allowed him to declare that "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on." When George Shultz told Congress in 1983 that the US would not tolerate "people shooting their way into power," he seemed unaware that he was announcing a startling reversal of US policy toward the region, since the US had certainly not opposed, in El Salvador in 1932, Nicaragua in 1934-36, Guatemala in 1954, and Honduras in 1963, generals and oligarchs who were shooting their way into power. (LaFeber is also the author of *The Panama Canal*, recommended for understanding the issues surrounding the Panama Canal treaty, one of the finest accomplishments of the Carter administration, and which Reagan naturally opposed.) Following is a sample quote from *Inevitable Revolutions*. Read the book and find out why LaFeber terms the revolutions "inevitable," with or without Soviet or Cuban help. ________________ [Michael] Novak [in *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*] missed the main theme in post-1900 Central American history. The United States, which he believed served as an example for Latin Americans, repeatedly used its political, economic, and military power to fix the marketplace, and so the "magic of the marketplace" never worked. US officials and business executives believed in Realpolitik, not magic. Novak, moreover, failed to mention that Central and South Americans repeatedly tried to break free of this system so they indeed could, in his words, "creatively ... check clerical and military power" and overcome "state tyranny." But each time they tried -- in Nicaragua during the twenties or after 1977, in Guatemala during the early fifties, in El Salvador during the early eighties, they ran up against the power of the United States government. One cannot use force to prevent a people from controlling their own resources and political processes, then condemn that people for failing to do so. Novak emphasized that "liberty" was the "key" to having enough "bread." Neoconservatives in the United States raised that formula into an article of faith. But the formula had not worked in Central America. The people had the "liberty" only to starve until many concluded that control over "bread" might give them some "liberty." ... Novak's analysis did not recognize the huge role government would have to play in Central America before US business virtues could be safely installed. But recognizing that problem would only have led Reagan and Novak into another sticky issue for free-marketeers: who would control the government? If the Central American conservatives so favored by the Reagan administration held power, the status quo would surely continue. But to remove those conservatives could require revolutionary tactics. Reaganomics could believe that the larger capitalists deserve favor because they create wealth, but in Central America that view continued to be a prescription for economic and political disaster. Reagan, Novak, and other neoconservatives cannot have both a freer market in the Caribbean and also more equal distribution of wealth. Such a feat is impossible until a fundamental restructuring occurs, a change that will take decades and require revolutionary tactics. No one around Reagan advocated such change. Novak did not even discuss the problem.... By the eighties the US system in Central America had turned full circle. It had opened the twentieth century by using military force to fix North American control over the area.... By the 1930s such kowtowing [e.g., the Salvadoran police kneeling down when the US Minister passed], not to mention landing the US Marines, had become too costly. Nor were such blatantly imperialist gestures any longer needed. The blunt instruments were replaced with the Good Neighbor's economic leverage.... By the fifties the Good Neighbor had lost its power.... Having helped create a fertile ground for revolution, the United States helped it grow with military confrontation. Such a policy was logical only if North Americans were willing to massively intervene in, and perhaps occupy, Central America (much as they did between 1911 and 1933), or if their local allies in the area were trustworthy and stable. Neither condition existed. Nor could US officials square their policies with Jefferson's theory of self-determination. The contradiction between Jefferson's ideals and North American actions in Central America appeared in his lifetime; by the time of Theodore Roosevelt the United States explicitly defined such self-determination unilaterally and in its own interest.... Unable to deal with the products of its own system, reconcile the contradiction between its professed ideals and its century-old foreign policy, or work with other powers to resolve these dilemmas, the United States, from Eisenhower to Reagan, resorted to force. The result was more revolution. ---Walter LaFeber -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes