rrizzo@bbncca.ARPA (Ron Rizzo) (02/07/86)
<followup to Jan Wasilewsky> Medvedevs: I included them out of the possibility that the "whole truth" about the USSR may be more complicated than what Solzhenitsyn presents, and that others not affected by the kinds of severe deci- sions his life has compelled him to make, including even some members of the Soviet establishment, may have different and somewhat correc- tive perceptions, despite their affiliations or less dangerous lives. Solzhenitsyn personally is a notoriously difficult person to deal with: in her NYReview article on Michael Scammell's biography of the great Russian (a few years ago), slavicist Aileen Kelley describes how Solzhenitsyn has isolated himself intellectually and socially in the US. She also alluded to charges that, though his accounts of public matters are very accurate and reliable (quite amazing considering the repressive and secretive conditions under which he was forced to work), his characterizations of his personal relations with other intellectuals and dissidents in the USSR is highly colored; at least one book, SOLZHENITSYN, TVARDOVSKY & NOVY MIR (MIT Press, 1970s), written by a member of the Soviet literary establishment whose name escapes me, details such charges. The book was apparently well received in the West. Now this last fact may be worthless, and the book may be a half-covert Soviet attempt to discredit Solzhenitsyn through half- truths or worse; I'm not in a position to determine this. I also have read nothing by the Medvedevs except a couple of articles, and these had rather large and labored reaffirmations of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in them (in typical Soviet academic fashion), among some- times sharp criticisms. I'm aware of the kind of camouflaged intel- lectual cadre the Soviets sometimes deploy: while seeming very critical, they never challenge the assumption of perpetual Party rule or the basic tenets of the ideology. However, I didn't keep this in mind when I read Roy Medvedev's few pieces. I'll defer to your greater acquain- tance with the phenomenon; the Medvedevs may well be Soviet sleazebags. Solzhenitsyn certainly refers to them in withering terms in GULAG ARCHIPELAGO and THE OAK AND THE CALF; it was this latter fact that initially made me include the brothers. Kristol wants to frustrate Soviet ambitions abroad: a worthy desire and goal, but if it's confused with toppling the Soviet regime (an even worthier goal), it means that Westerners continue to be deluded about the nature of Communist power, and to that extent will never even address, nevermind offer solutions to, the real problem of how to defeat Communism. Kristol's delusion resembles that of pre-Solzhe- nitsyn American anti-Communism: its conservative wing thought a "big stick" foreign policy was sufficient and seemed at times more interested in anti-Communism's value as an ideological weapon against domestic political opponents; its liberal wing hoped that despite the "Stalinist hell" the USSR would evolve or that at least circumstances would force its top ranks to be "realistic." Liberals & moderates, along with most leftists, seem to assume the difference between Communism and non-Communism is a matter of degree, however great, and not kind; and I suspect that conservatives also do, though they may not believe they do. Neither Nixon, Ford, or Reagan (or Kemp, et al.) understands the kind of opponent a Communist system represents, as far as I can see; none of them seemed to comprehend or even notice, eg, Solzhenitsyn's warnings about detente -- ie, that it went hand-in-hand with increased internal repression in the USSR and lessened Western leverage over the Soviets. So how DO you defeat the USSR? This is an extremely tough question to answer. There probably is no adequate answer. But you must at least recognize the enormous difficulties, which Kristol doesn't. The goal is clearly to ultimately topple the Soviet system; given the system's crimes quite literally against humanity, it's nearly a moral imperative, like resistance to Nazism. But societies like the USSR have no representative institutions or a public opinion. The USSR is almost economically self-sufficient, and can sustain heavy penalties inflicted on it by simply passing all of the costs onto its population. The state is upheld by coercion; legitimacy really is expendable. The USSR can seal itself off from the rest of the world, and has the means to closely monitor its population. Never- theless, malaise, dissent, and disintegration apparently can happen & to serious effect: eg, official corruption and unbelief, decline of living standards since the early 60s (especially in medicine and agriculture), etc. A strategy must be multiple and long-range: to foster greater internal disintegration (we may have indirect access to some of the factors involved), to seek novel ways of affecting Soviet life (hi tech bombardment of information far exceeding any- thing yet attempted?), plus firmer, more consistent, more intelligent and UNRELENTING opposition around the world; we must think in the very long term, and if necessary create institutions capable of con- tinuing the battle over a century or more WITHOUT flagging. Have we even considered the problem in these terms? I wonder. I can't say I've thought about it at all, except here. The above probably sounds pathetic or like bad sci-fi. Yet we must acknowledge the scale of the problem in order to have any hope of solving it. Loquaciously yours, Ron Rizzo