janw@inmet.UUCP (01/29/86)
[Radford Neal radford@calgary] >Some may say that the command economy of the USSR can divert a larger >proportion of the GNP to arms than NATO countries can (without provoking >adverse politcal reactions). Maybe, but several times more? I doubt it. I believe it *is* several times more. GNP estimates don't make much sense, in the absence of a common market where prices of goods would level off. But in *real* terms: what percentage of workers work in war plants; percentage of machine tools there, or of energy, steel, transistors etc. - "several times" is certainly true. >I think it's more likely that there is no great conventional imbalance, or >at least needn't be by the time the nuclear weapons are gone. I'll agree with the last statement (after "or"). Conventional weapons are high-tech now, and the West has every opportunity to outgrow the USSR. In fact, the opportunity may be *better* in conventional weapons because the technology is so diversified. In one field like ballistic missiles they can concentrate, steal our data and outdo us. A broad technical spectrum is different. It all depends on the way Western technology in general develops. When it stagnates or slows down, they can narrow the gap, and, in selected military fields, reverse it. When the West forges ahead, a society like the Soviet has no chance to compete. So, unleash technical innovation, let old industries die and new ones mushroom, and you get the defence problem solved as a by-broduct. Jan Wasilewsky
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (01/30/86)
>> This is surely going to ignite someone's ire, but I would even >>go so far as to say that the only reasons the USSR didn't lose WWII were: >>1) Russian Winter 2) US Aid (lend/lease) 3) Physical expanse of territory >>and 4) Hitler's arrogant incompetence. > >Not the only reasons, but I'll agree that without even one of these >Stalin would have lost the war. US Lend/lease was a minuscule influence in the Soviet theatre. If anything, I'd call it bait for German subs, distracted from the Atlantic convoys. Not that that was the intention! Missing in the list of major reasons is: 5) the month long delay in the start of Barbarossa, caused by Mussolini's defeats in Greece/Albania and the suddenly new anti-Nazi Yugoslavian government, thereby guaranteeing point 1) would occur before victory. 6) the knowledge that Japan would stay out, allowing crack Siberian troops to be brought to defend Moscow in time for December 1941, and 7) the dropping of Sovietism/Communism in favor of Mother Russia by Stalin. This last point was immensely aided by point 4), which includes not only the military incompetence Hitler now developed, but also his brutal treatment of the indigenous populations. The Germans were quite often greeted as welcome liberators throughout the first month of Barbarossa, and could easily have turned whole nations (Ukraine, Byelorussia, etc.) to their side. Indeed, more than any of the other points, I feel this is where Hitler missed his greatest chances for conquering the Soviet Union. ---Sorry for going on so long on this tangent, but I find Americans' ignorance (I don't mean > and >> above!!) on WWII and the Soviet Union horrifying.--- ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (01/30/86)
>That proposal is phony as a 4-dollar bill. Give up SDI now, >denuke by year 2000 ! IF they meant what they say about abolish- >ing nuclear weapons, why would they object to SDI so much? SDI >is only important (if at all) in the *presence* of strategic nu- >clear weapons. If Gorbachev meant one half of his proposal, he >could drop the other half. Why would they object? I'll tell you why. The number one personality problem Russians have is paranoia! (I'm not joking.) If a satellite can shoot down a missile in flight, how much easier it would be to blow it up in the silo. And why aim at the silos? Cities are bigger targets. And don't say, but the technology can't do that, because .... etc. Just because your president has said that SDI is only defensive doesn't mean it won't develop offensive uses ten years from now. Nobody REALLY knows what SDI could lead to--certainly not the Russians! If they believe that SDI will lead to new US offensive capabilities, if they believe that we could destroy their country in milliseconds (radio signal up, laser beam down), and if they believe the new American patriotism will continue to grow more militaristic (eg, SDI's very existence!), then I think they have reasons to fear SDI, having nothing to do with nuclear weapons. And then throw in their native paranoia, and yes, their objection seems quite natural. Notice that it does not matter whether the above SDI scenario is plausible or possible! If they THINK it could occur, they will of course object. Gorbachev's denuke proposal may or may not be phony, but I don't see how anyone can decide one way or the other from their SDI fears. ---------I find Americans' ignorance of the Soviet Union horrifying.--------- ---(This includes everyone from > above to the great Star Warrior himself.)-- ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
al@vger.UUCP ( Informatix) (01/31/86)
In article <11620@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) writes: > >IF they (the Russians) meant what they say about abolish- > >ing nuclear weapons, why would they object to SDI so much? As far as I can tell, for two basic reasons. First, SDI extends the arms race enormously. Not only will this put an unwanted strain on the Soviet economy (ours as well I might add), but there is some possibility the Soviets would 'lose' the race, which brings up the second reason. It is hard to believe that SDI can really protect the American people from a determined attack, but using SDI to support a first strike is probably do-able. Once the MX, Tridents, Minutemen and Pershings get done working over Soviet missiles and command and control, it might be possible to stop the counter attack with SDI. Thus, SDI may make a first strike feasible - or at least you might be able to convince a President during a crisis to attack. Not unnaturally, the Soviets don't want to be the recipients of a US first strike. > Why would they object? I'll tell you why. The number one personality > problem Russians have is paranoia! (I'm not joking.) You may not be joking, but you're wrong. The dictionary defines paranoia as UNREASONABLE fear. Russia has suffered three major invasions in the last two centuries - every time from Western Europe. In addition, she was beaten by the Japanese in 1905. America, Canada, England, France, and Japan launched small invasions of Russia just after World War I. England and France attacked Crimea in the Crimean war. Now maybe Russia deserved these attacks - but in any case the Russian fear of military invasion is firmly based in reality.
tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) (01/31/86)
In article <11619@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) writes: >This last point was immensely aided by point 4), which includes not only the >military incompetence Hitler now developed, but also his brutal treatment of >the indigenous populations. The Germans were quite often greeted as welcome >liberators throughout the first month of Barbarossa, and could easily have >turned whole nations (Ukraine, Byelorussia, etc.) to their side. Indeed, >more than any of the other points, I feel this is where Hitler missed his >greatest chances for conquering the Soviet Union. > >---Sorry for going on so long on this tangent, but I find Americans' ignorance > (I don't mean > and >> above!!) on WWII and the Soviet Union horrifying.--- > >ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720 Hitler would have lost anyhow. I'm surprised that Matt's focus here is on Soviet morale and Russian patriotism as why the USSR defeated Hitler. What morale and patriotism there was wasn't sufficient in the least. The technological/strategic side gets overlooked. First, in the 30's, many factories were moved deep into the Caucasus and Urals, and these factories continued to produce. Second, the tank technology of the USSR was superior to the Germans. Third, the USSR was the first nation to develop massed rocket and missile installations (the ?Katyushkas?) as anti-tank weapons, to enormous effect. Fourth, the army was immensely strengthened by the command economy structure. This was because deserters and others who wouldn't follow orders could be kept track of and punished after the war with a reasonable certainty that if they didn't do what they were told, the inevitable would take place. Also, the army could get resources from established command channels without great reorganization of the economy. Since Hitler was defeated in Stalingrad and Kursk, not Byelorussia or the Ukraine, and since both those republics were stripped of economic resources in the great retreat, I fail to see how a better relationship between Hitler's army and the people of these republics could have changed the war. The Soviet Army would have retaken these territories, in a manner similar to the taking of Eastern Europe. Morale is more often the consequence of a superior or inferior balance of forces than a cause. For the military side of WWII, I'd recommend you look at some wargames and wargame magazines. A series which recently appeared on US public TV, "War: a commentary by Gwynne Dyer", was also very good as to the general context of military conflict, and its relation to technology. Tony Wuersch {amd,amdcad!cae780}!ubvax!tonyw
radford@calgary.UUCP (Radford Neal) (02/02/86)
> [Radford Neal radford@calgary] > >Some may say that the command economy of the USSR can divert a larger > >proportion of the GNP to arms than NATO countries can (without provoking > >adverse politcal reactions). Maybe, but several times more? I doubt it. > > I believe it *is* several times more. GNP estimates don't make > much sense, in the absence of a common market where prices of > goods would level off. But in *real* terms: what percentage of > workers work in war plants; percentage of machine tools there, or > of energy, steel, transistors etc. - "several times" is certainly > true. As you point out, this is probably impossible to really figure, due to the lack of free trade between the USSR and the West to establish valid GNP figures. But another point working against the USSR is that with a lower per-capita GNP they *must* devote a larger portion to subsistence of the population. Radford Neal
janw@inmet.UUCP (02/02/86)
[ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720] >>> This is surely going to ignite someone's ire, but I would even >>>go so far as to say that the only reasons the USSR didn't lose WWII were: >>>1) Russian Winter 2) US Aid (lend/lease) 3) Physical expanse of territory >>>and 4) Hitler's arrogant incompetence. >> >>Not the only reasons, but I'll agree that without even one of these >>Stalin would have lost the war. >US Lend/lease was a minuscule influence in the Soviet theatre. If anything, >I'd call it bait for German subs, distracted from the Atlantic convoys. >Not that that was the intention! I agree with the most of your article. I'm not sure you are right on the above, though I didn't read any special studies on lend- lease, and you apparently have. (On the other hand, I don't be- lieve all the studies I read). But its effects were *felt* in Russia; especially the food supplies were gratefully recalled many years after, even when propaganda had more or less convinced the population that Americans had been really on Hitler's side in the war. But the *spam* couldn't be erased from hungry people's memory. Also, American jeeps were seen around Russia long after the war. I conjecture that of more directly military stuff the same may be true. Even the money value of the supplies, as origi- nally estimated, was, I seem to recall, considerable - though of course the Soviets never paid up. >Missing in the list of major reasons is: > >5) the month long delay in the start of Barbarossa, caused by Mussolini's > defeats in Greece/Albania and the suddenly new anti-Nazi Yugoslavian > government, thereby guaranteeing point 1) would occur before victory. >6) the knowledge that Japan would stay out, allowing crack Siberian troops > to be brought to defend Moscow in time for December 1941, and >7) the dropping of Sovietism/Communism in favor of Mother Russia by Stalin. > >This last point was immensely aided by point 4), which includes not only the >military incompetence Hitler now developed, but also his brutal treatment of >the indigenous populations. The Germans were quite often greeted as welcome >liberators throughout the first month of Barbarossa, and could easily have >turned whole nations (Ukraine, Byelorussia, etc.) to their side. Indeed, >more than any of the other points, I feel this is where Hitler missed his >greatest chances for conquering the Soviet Union. All very true ! Let me add to this last observation: Hitler did not dissolve the kolkhozes (collective farms) as the farmers had hoped. The Germans saw them as a ready-made structure for pump- ing grain away (which is what Stalin used them for). In the few areas where land *was* privatized, the Germans were remembered with nostalgia years after the war. Jan Wasilewsky
janw@inmet.UUCP (02/02/86)
[ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720] [me] >>That proposal is phony as a 4-dollar bill. Give up SDI now, >>denuke by year 2000 ! IF they meant what they say about abolish- >>ing nuclear weapons, why would they object to SDI so much? SDI >>is only important (if at all) in the *presence* of strategic nu- >>clear weapons. If Gorbachev meant one half of his proposal, he >>could drop the other half. >Why would they object? I'll tell you why. The number one personality >problem Russians have is paranoia! (I'm not joking.) > [paranoia theme developed with respect to completely new, unexpected, > offensive uses of SDI, unrelated to nuclear weapons] >Notice that it does not matter whether the above SDI scenario is plausible >or possible! If they THINK it could occur, they will of course object. I don't buy this: (1) this could equally apply to any defense research (anything may grow offshoots) ; but their objections to SDI are in a class apart; (2) they've spent many, many years and enormous sums of money on SDI: by now, they are much more likely to fear something known or estimated than something quite unk- nown; (3) their decision-making process is very rational, it has no place for psychotic complexes; (4) they know American inten- tions and plans very well, through their intelligence: if Ameri- can first strike has never been in the cards (as I believe is true), they know it; (5) Russians are no more paranoid than other people. This is a myth, like most ethnic stereotypes. If you are looking for paranoia, listen to talk, on the right, of Trilatral commission; on the left, of Reagan and Falwell. In any case, pro- perties of Russians in general have little bearing on the mental- ity of the tiny, select and ethnically diverse group making these decisions. Why invoke far-fetched exotic psychology when there is an obvious reason for Soviet opposition to Star Wars: (1) They believe (rightly or wrongly) that it may work - this is confirmed by their own long-term commitment to it; (2) they know US space technology and electronics is better; (3) If it worked, it would drastically change the correlation of forces. >--------I find Americans' ignorance of the Soviet Union horrifying.--------- >--(This includes everyone from > above to the great Star Warrior himself.)-- I'll take that as a compliment to my English :-) Jan Wasilewsky
afb@pucc-i (Michael Lewis) (02/07/86)
In article <7800958@inmet.UUCP>, janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > > > (1) this could equally apply to any defense > research (anything may grow offshoots) ; but their objections to > SDI are in a class apart; The REAL promise of SDI (let's not kid ourselves) is domination of near Earth space. There are just too many ways to deliver nuclear weapons for them to EVER be made obsolete. Thermonuclear weapons are the ultimate in mass destruction, never to be matched (unless they find some way to put antimatter in a bomb...). As an ASAT system, or an Anti-ASAT system, SDI will be next to unstoppable. In today's world, he who can shoot down the other guy's satellites has a huge advantage. This is why they object so vehemently. > (2) they've spent many, many years and > enormous sums of money on SDI: by now, they are much more likely > to fear something known or estimated than something quite unk- > nown; Therefore, they know that it is beyond their technology for the foreseeable future. They suspect that it is not beyond ours. They know enough to know that it is possible, but not enough to actually do it. Do you think that they are comforted by this thought? > (3) their decision-making process is very rational, it has > no place for psychotic complexes; Of course not; Hitler was psychotic, Idi Amin was psychotic. The Russians are *neurotic* (but then, so are we). > (4) they know American inten- > tions and plans very well, through their intelligence: if Ameri- > can first strike has never been in the cards (as I believe is > true), they know it; I hope the Russians aren't as knowledgable about are intentions as all that...remember the classic Reagan Gaff of all time? The famous "Congress has outlawed Russia...we start bombing in 10 minutes" remark. I bet that gave Reaganologists in the Kremlin some food for thought. > (5) Russians are no more paranoid than other > people. This is a myth, like most ethnic stereotypes. If you are > looking for paranoia, listen to talk, on the right, of Trilatral > commission; on the left, of Reagan and Falwell. In any case, pro- > perties of Russians in general have little bearing on the mental- > ity of the tiny, select and ethnically diverse group making these > decisions. I think that America would be (rightfully) paranoid if we had been invaded *three* times in the century, losing about 30 million people in the process. We would be even more paranoid or Russia if we had been invaded by them during our Civil War. I also think that the current conservative trend worries them. > Why invoke far-fetched exotic psychology when there is an obvious > reason for Soviet opposition to Star Wars: (1) They believe > (rightly or wrongly) that it may work - this is confirmed by > their own long-term commitment to it; This, I agree with. Michael Lewis @ Purdue University
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/08/86)
In article <7800958@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > >[ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720] > [me] >>>That proposal is phony as a 4-dollar bill. Give up SDI now, >>>denuke by year 2000 ! IF they meant what they say about abolish- >>>ing nuclear weapons, why would they object to SDI so much? SDI >>>is only important (if at all) in the *presence* of strategic nu- >>>clear weapons. If Gorbachev meant one half of his proposal, he >>>could drop the other half. > >>Why would they object? I'll tell you why. The number one personality >>problem Russians have is paranoia! (I'm not joking.) >> [paranoia theme developed with respect to completely new, unexpected, >> offensive uses of SDI, unrelated to nuclear weapons] >>Notice that it does not matter whether the above SDI scenario is plausible >>or possible! If they THINK it could occur, they will of course object. > >I don't buy this: (1) this could equally apply to any defense >research (anything may grow offshoots) ; but their objections to >SDI are in a class apart; A successful SDI defensive shield would make the Soviet nuclear weaponry obsolete, but have no effect on American nuclear weaponry. SDI offensive laser weapons would allow a disabling attack to occur in milliseconds. Neither of these scenarios is like anything before, so the strength of their objections does not seem surprising. > (2) they've spent many, many years and >enormous sums of money on SDI: by now, they are much more likely >to fear something known or estimated than something quite unk- >nown; How about the fact that with the right electronic skill, it makes for a very powerful offensive weapon????? Who knows? > (3) their decision-making process is very rational, it has >no place for psychotic complexes; The Brezhnev doctrine, including the invasion of Afghanistan, is rational? > (4) they know American inten- >tions and plans very well, through their intelligence: if Ameri- >can first strike has never been in the cards (as I believe is >true), they know it; Do WE know our intentions and plans? Even if we did, they can change every four years anyway! Besides, events can happen whether or not they are planned for. WWI occurred even though everyone knew everyone else's intentions. > (5) Russians are no more paranoid than other >people. This is a myth, like most ethnic stereotypes. A lot of these national mentality stereotypes seem rather accurate to me. Regarding Russians, I have always been aware of the myth, but have over the years known many emigres to confirm it, either by their actions or by their own assertions concerning Russians. > If you are >looking for paranoia, listen to talk, on the right, of Trilatral >commission; on the left, of Reagan and Falwell. I agree. > In any case, pro- >perties of Russians in general have little bearing on the mental- >ity of the tiny, select and ethnically diverse group making these >decisions. I reluctantly agree. (By the way, is there a word for "Soviet citizen" or the like? "Russian" is used interchangeably for the whole nation and the ethnic group, and many people don't know the difference. "Soviet" doesn't work, it seems to refer to Party members only.) >Why invoke far-fetched exotic psychology when Stripped of my dramatizations (you helped :-)), the psychology I am assuming is just so much fear. That does not seem far-fetched. >Why invoke far-fetched exotic psychology when there is an obvious >reason for Soviet opposition to Star Wars: (1) They believe >(rightly or wrongly) that it may work - this is confirmed by >their own long-term commitment to it; (2) they know US space >technology and electronics is better; (3) If it worked, it would >drastically change the correlation of forces. Why? Because the discussion I was replying to was whether Gorbachev's offer to reduce/eliminate most nuclear weaponry was believable. You claimed it was not, because the tie-in to SDI would then be redundant. But perhaps the tie-in is not redundant. Perhaps it is based on their own past research, and they don't want us to go too far. Who knows? I am dubious about the offer, but not because of SDI. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/09/86)
Noone in this discussion has mentioned the role of
cryptography in the defeat of Germany in WW2 ...
I claim cryptography was the key factor.
Waiting for the flames ...
-Tom
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.eduweemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/09/86)
In article <11754@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >Noone in this discussion has mentioned the role of >cryptography in the defeat of Germany in WW2 ... >I claim cryptography was the key factor. > >Waiting for the flames ... We were discussing the Eastern Front. As far as I've heard, cryptography played no role there. Since I think the Western Front had just a small part in the defeat of Germany (although it did have a major role in the liberation of France), I think cryptography played a minor part in the defeat of Germany. Not that cryptography wasn't important for other reasons. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/09/86)
In article <11757@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) writes: >In article <11754@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >>Noone in this discussion has mentioned the role of >>cryptography in the defeat of Germany in WW2 ... >>I claim cryptography was the key factor. >> >>Waiting for the flames ... > >We were discussing the Eastern Front. As far as I've heard, >cryptography played no role there. Since I think the Western >Front had just a small part in the defeat of Germany (although >it did have a major role in the liberation of France), I think >cryptography played a minor part in the defeat of Germany. > >Not that cryptography wasn't important for other reasons. Matt, you have made me very happy. After having been convinced that you have me hopelessly outclassed as a mathematician by your previous postings, my self respect has been restored by finding I know something you don't :-) How about the fact that information which was gained vi ULTRA and passed to the Soviets (without their knowing it came through cryptography of course) played a key role in the Soviet plan for encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad? And in allowing the Soviets to block von Manstein's relief attempt? What about the fact that plans for the German offensive at Kursk were known to the Soviets (due to intercepts which were passed to them again), which allowed them to prepare a defensive zone a hundred miles deep, which broke the force of the German attack, and to prepare a counterblow from which the Germans never recovered? You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. And played a vital role in many respects ... -Tom