weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/11/86)
>>>I claim cryptography was the key factor. >>We were discussing the Eastern Front. As far as I've heard, >>cryptography played no role there. Since I think the Western >How about the fact that information which was gained vi ULTRA >and passed to the Soviets (without their knowing it came through >cryptography of course) played a key role in the Soviet plan for >encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad? And in allowing >the Soviets to block von Manstein's relief attempt? What about >the fact that plans for the German offensive at Kursk were >known to the Soviets (due to intercepts which were passed >to them again), which allowed them to prepare a defensive >zone a hundred miles deep, which broke the force of the >German attack, and to prepare a counterblow from which >the Germans never recovered? > >You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed >to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. >And played a vital role in many respects ... Well, Tom, you may win yet. Just give us some references! I must admit I am *very* surprised. I find it hard to believe the US/UK would want Stalin to know how good our intelligence was. It was a delicate issue just sharing Enigma intercepts with the US! ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (02/11/86)
>>>>I claim cryptography was the key factor. >>>We were discussing the Eastern Front. As far as I've heard, >>>cryptography played no role there. Since I think the Western >>How about the fact that information which was gained vi ULTRA >>and passed to the Soviets (without their knowing it came through >>cryptography of course) played a key role in the Soviet plan for >>encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad? And in allowing >>the Soviets to block von Manstein's relief attempt? What about >>the fact that plans for the German offensive at Kursk were >>known to the Soviets (due to intercepts which were passed >>to them again), which allowed them to prepare a defensive >>zone a hundred miles deep, which broke the force of the >>German attack, and to prepare a counterblow from which >>the Germans never recovered? >> >>You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed >>to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. >>And played a vital role in many respects ... > >Well, Tom, you may win yet. Just give us some references! I had to piece this together from some of the hundreds of books in this area that I have read. For example, it was well known that the plans for the Kursk offensive had been compromised, but not until recently how. I wrote an article which should appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 85, whenever it comes out, but the field seems to be open for a lot more historical analysis if anyone cares to give it a shot. I think if one reads some of the books on Enigma, like the "Ultra Secret" and the new book on Alan Turing, then rereads the books about the war with an eye towards picking out the influence of ULTRA, a lot that was unclear in the past becomes clear. I can give you a list of things I read if you like, most of them are in the UCB main library. A few that come to mind are books by von Manstein, Kesselring, Paulus, Guderian, "The Rommel Papers", Zhukov, etc. As I said there are hundreds more ... >I must admit I am *very* surprised. I find it hard to believe the >US/UK would want Stalin to know how good our intelligence was. It >was a delicate issue just sharing Enigma intercepts with the US! Quite right. It was evidently a very difficult job deciding what information to give the Soviets, and to disguise the source. I certainly don't know every detail as to what passed to them. The Soviets aren't too cooperative about discussing such things :-)
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (02/11/86)
In article <11796@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >>>You know of course that information from ULTRA was passed >>>to the Soviets throughout the campaign on the Eastern Front. >I had to piece this together from some of the hundreds of books I knew, of course, while you had to piece this together? Be fair! >in this area that I have read. For example, it was well known >that the plans for the Kursk offensive had been compromised, >but not until recently how. I wrote an article which should >appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 85, whenever it comes >out, but the field seems to be open for a lot more historical >analysis if anyone cares to give it a shot. I was under the impression that Soviet penetration of OKW was rather high--"the Red Orchestra". The only reason we know more about their penetration of Japan is because their spy Sorge was caught. This, I think, is a more natural explanation of Soviet intelligence. >I think if one reads some of the books on Enigma, like the >"Ultra Secret" and the new book on Alan Turing, then rereads >the books about the war with an eye towards picking out >the influence of ULTRA, a lot that was unclear in the past >becomes clear. I can give you a list of things I read if you >like, most of them are in the UCB main library. A few that come >to mind are books by von Manstein, Kesselring, Paulus, Guderian, >"The Rommel Papers", Zhukov, etc. As I said there are hundreds more ... Concerning Enigma, the book by Winterbotham, _The Ultra Secret_, is not very good. He passes on many false stories, including the famous one that Churchill let Coventry get bombed to keep Ultra secure. R Lewin, _Ultra goes to War_, is quite good, with an emphasis on the Western front, not on the mental wizardry. At least one book using declassified Purple sources has come out, detailing Purple's role in the Pacific theatre. You have me beat for WWII memoirs by a long shot. But as I said, I think there is another, more plausible piecing together of the clues you have found. >>I must admit I am *very* surprised. I find it hard to believe the >>US/UK would want Stalin to know how good our intelligence was. It >>was a delicate issue just sharing Enigma intercepts with the US! > >Quite right. It was evidently a very difficult job deciding what >information to give the Soviets, and to disguise the source. >I certainly don't know every detail as to what passed to them. >The Soviets aren't too cooperative about discussing such things :-) I'm not convinced. I thought you were going to tell me about all the now declassified Bletchley Park reports you read, etc. Aegean Press is publishing as many of them as they can. There are several flaws in your theory. Where did the British listen in on to encrypted transmissions about Eastern front troop movements and dispositions? By asking the Soviets? Remember, intelligence was gained not by one or two key messages, but a slow putting together of all sorts of clues, including correlation of German statements about Allied troops and terrain with known facts about the Allies. Except there weren't known facts about Soviet troops and terrain! And the physical process of decryption wasn't free either. Given a choice between another dozen submarine intercepts or a dozen Eastern front army intercepts, I think the British would have gone unhesitatingly for the submarine messages. Their food supply depended on it. Tom, I think you lose. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720