[net.politics] The Sandinista Problem: Introduction

bcb@hhb.UUCP (Field) (02/13/86)

There comes a time in the life of a political discussion when new
avenues of debate must open in order to progress toward the desired
goal.  Now is such a time.  This and subsequent postings attempt to
expand the discussion of the Sandinista Problem.  This posting states
our objective and outlines some of the problems we must overcome to
achieve it.  Subsequent postings will deal in more detail with these
topics.

Stated in general terms, our goal is to excise the Sandinistas from
Nicaragua in order to establish a stable government that will work in
American interests remaining aloof of Soviet-bloc countries.  We must
restore our hegemony in Nicaragua in order to open it for American
corporate investment unfettered by taxation, regulation, or labor
organization.  We must not lose sight of this objective in spite of
the way we steep our rhetoric in such abstractions as Democracy,
National Security, Freedom, etc.

Military action stands as the only means to this end.  There exists
no political way to purge Nicaragua of Sandinistas and other leftists.
We cannot simply purchase an election as we did for Duarte in
El Salvador.  The Sandinistas are too well entrenched, too popular for
a successful political overthrow.  Like Ho Chi Minh and his cadres,
they enjoy strong support from peasants, industrial workers, and other
poor people.  Since their military men are all leftists, we cannot nudge
their soldiers into conducting a coup as we did to install Pinochet
in Chile.  Success in Nicaragua demands military action.  At the same
time, this popular support makes such action difficult and costly.
It encumbers the establishment of the kind of stability needed to
attract American investors after the leftists have been removed.

I have serious doubts that the CIA and the Nicaraguan counter-
revolutionaries alone will succeed in this military endeavor.
I recognize that their military activity has done a lot of good.  By
destroying granaries and industrial facilities, they increased
economic pressure beyond the bounds of sanctions.  By destroying such
leftist institutions as state-run medical and educational facilities
and Basic Christian Churches, they damaged the Sandinistas' support
infrastructure.  By killing foreign health and education workers
during these actions, they made such foreigners wary of working for
the Sandinistas.  By placing such pressure on the Sandinistas, they
induced militarism, suppression of dissent, suspension of civil
liberties, and dependence on Soviet-bloc countries.  This makes the
Sandinistas look bad internationally and provides us with leverage
in Congress and among Americans.

Unfortunately, these actions have been limited to border regions.
The Sandinista military has grown too strong for the contras to sweep
through the Nicaraguan heartland.  This requires much greater military
support from us.  We must be willing to send our boys into battle.
To do this, we must convince the American people and Congress that
such action is necessary and just.  Although we must act soon to
reduce costs, if we act before we achieve this consensus, we could easily
become bogged down as we were in Vietnam.  Just as Congress constricted
our efforts to squelch leftists there, they will constrict our efforts
in Nicaragua unless we obtain and maintain popular support.

Finally, we must start considering a plan of action for the critical
period following the overthrow.  As we have seen, Central American
leftists are resilient die-hards.  This demands a quick extermination
campaign while preventing the leftists from fleeing the country.  If
we are not vigilant, we will wind up with a variety of Abu-Nidal-type
bands causing great headaches and threatening the stability of the
entire region.  We will have to deal with the various labor unions that
cropped up under the Sandinistas' pro-union policies.  Pacifying this
movement is essential to maximizing the profitability of American
investments.  We will have to dismantle the Basic Christian Churches
that would hinder our efforts to create an apolitical and passive
work force.

We face these problems, but we shall overcome them.  We are stronger
now with greater resolve to halt this leftist tide that threatens our
interests throughout the world.  Overcoming this hurdle will strengthen
us further.  We will be able to restore pro-American/anti-Soviet
governments to Cuba, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa,
and Eastern Europe.

					Optimistically,
					F. B. Esdalib


Next Posting:  A plan of action for the home front.

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The views expressed above are not those of my employer, my colleagues, or
myself.

					    _
					Bob B-Field