cramer@sun.uucp (Sam Cramer) (03/19/86)
In a previous posting I summarized part of an article concerning
the attack on the USS Liberty. The article, by Goodman and Schiff,
appeared in the "Atlantic Monthly" of September 1984.
In this posting I'll pick up where I left off.
On June 8, 1967 an Israeli air force Nord aircraft took off at 4 AM
with a Navy spotter on board. It was charged with patrolling the
Israeli coast to make sure that no enemy ships has entered Israeli
waters. At 5:45 AM the duty officer in the Israeli naval war room
recieved a report from the Nord that a ship, evidently a destroyer,
was spotted west of Gaza. The duty officer put a red marker
(signifying an unidentified target) on the battle control table in the
war room.
At 6:03 AM the Nord filed a supplementary report which identified
the ship as an "American naval supply vessel". Although the ship
was now identified as a neutral vessel, the color of the marker on
the battle control board was not changed to signify neutrality. The
duty officer later testified that he did not change the color because
"identification had been vague and uncertain."
Between the hours of 6:00 AM to 9:00 AM, a hunt for an enemy
submarine west of the town of Atlit preoccupied the naval
command. During this hunt, Israeli Admiral Erel entered the war
room to take command. He questioned the duty officer about the
red marker. After he was told that it was an American ship, he
ordered the marker changed to green to signify a neutral vessel.
At 9:29 AM the war room recieved a cable saying that an Israeli
pilot reported being shot at by an "unidentified ship off the Sinai
coast." When the pilot landed, he said he had not been shot at,
but he did report seeing a ship which was "grey, wider than usual,
and with a bridge in the middle."
Just before 10 AM the Nord observation plane returned to base.
The navy spotter reported seeing the marking "GTR-5" on the side
of the vessel. This information was referred to a Major Pinhassi at
Naval Headquarters, who identified the ship as the Liberty after
consulting "Jane's Fighting Ships." This identification was
double-checked by naval intelligence officers, and was then
communicated to the naval operations center.
However, (here quoting Goodman and Schiff)
"This correct idenfication, however, came to naught. At 11:00 AM duty
commanders in the navy war room changed shifts. Lt. Col. 'L'
(his name remains classified), who took over temporary command,
made a decision that proved fatal for the Liberty: he ordered the
green marker designating its position removed from the
battle-control table. 'I wanted the battle-control table as
uncluttered as possible,' he explained later.
Though consistent with standard naval operating procedure -
whereby officers were under instruction to keep the battle-control
table as simple as possible - L's decision wiped out all reference to
the presence of the Liberty off the Sinai coast. ... the Liberty was
no longer a known quantity for those operationally responsible for
conducting the fast-moving three-front war from their
underground bunker."
At 11:24 the Israeli Air Force reported the naval chief of operations,
Col. Issy Rahav, that the Sinai coastal city of El Arish (which had
been captured by Israel the day before) was being shelled from the
sea. At 11:27 a second report came in from Southern Command
headquarters, stating that El Arish was being bombarded.
Explosions in El Arish were noticed by the crew of the Liberty.
Ennes (duty officer on bridge) wrote in his book that a few minutes
after the Liberty executed a right turn (at 11:30 AM) "a huge
explosion rocked the town of El Arish." Although it was discovered
after the war that an Egyptian ammo depot had exploded, it
appeared to the Israeli general command that El Arish was under
attack from the sea.
Quoting Goodman and Schiff:
"This assumption was the second error sealing the Liberty's fate.
In response to the presumed attack, Col. Rahav, at 12:05 PM,
ordered 3 torpedo boats from the 914 Squadron to depart the port
of Ashdod and proceed in the general direction of El Arish. At 12:15
PM the captain of the flagship, Lt. Col. Moshe Oren, was ordered to
sail to a point twenty miles north of El Arish and patrol the area.
At 1:07 he was informed that upon sighting the target he was to
call for an immediate air strike.
At 1:41 2nd Lt. Aharon Yfraeh, the radar operator aboard the T204,
the flagship, reported that he had picked up a 'target' on his scope,
and that the ship was 20 nautical miles northwest of El Arish, 14
miles off the Bardawil shore, and moving west at a speed of 30
knots.
The target's speed was a crucial factor in determining whether or
not it was a ship of war. Standard operating procedure for the
Israeli navy in 1967 decreed that any ship moving faster than 20
knots in a battle area was to be presumed hostile. A second radar
check was ordered. Now the target's speed was given as 28 knots.
This was the third Israeli mistake. Both radar readings were
incorrect, but those speeds were sent back by T-204 to Naval
Headquarters, and both were registered in the command's log
book."
At 1:45 PM Rahav ordered an air strike against the vessel (the
torpedo boats were 20 knots away and only capable of a top speed
of 28 knots - the same as the percieved speed of the Liberty). The
request reached the Israeli Air Force command at 1:48 PM. Two
Mirage III C fighters were diverted from an air patrol to the target,
reaching it a few seconds before 2:00. Circling the target, the lead
plane reported to the Air Force Headquarters that the ship was not
Israeli. Major Gen. Mordecai Hod, commander of the air force,
asked the pilot if any flag was visible.
Quoting the article:
"The pilot reported back, 'I see no flag or other signs of
identification.' (The question of whether or not the Liberty was
flying a flag remains a major point of contention. The point,
however, is moot: the pilot's report left those assessing the target's
status with the impression that no flag was being flown - a key
factor in their decision that the ship was hostile.)"
The order to attack was given.
By 2:06 PM the two pilots had strafed the Liberty four times and
reported good hits. At this point, the Air Force command ordered 2
more fighters to the scene. They made two bombing runs each,
with a single bomb hitting the ship.
The fact that there was no return fire from the target puzzled the
lead pilot. He swooped in twice, and reported seeing markings on
the hull, saying "The ship's identification is Charlie-Tango-Romeo-5.
I see no flag." Soon afterwards two Air Force helicopters were
dispatched to the scene to pick up survivors.
At 2:18 PM the commander of the torpedo-boat squadron ordered
his crew to prepare for an attack. At 2:20 he was ordered to hold
off "pending further clarification."
Quoting from the article:
"At 2:27 PM Lt. Col. Oren ordered the signalman aboard T-204 to
flash the message 'What ship?' to the stricken vessel. The Liberty
replied 'AA', meaning 'identify yourselves first.'
The Liberty's captain could not have chosen a more unfortunate
answer. Eleven years before, during the Sinai campaign, exactly
the same exchange had taken place between an Israeli destroyer,
the MV Yaffo, and an Egyptian ship, the Ibrahim-el-Awal. Oren,
who was a young officer on the Yaffo's bridge at the time,
remembered the incident well. If he still had any doubts that the
burning vessel ahead of him was Egyptian, they were now
dispelled.
While he was deciding whether to attack, a burst of machine-gun
fire erupted from the ship's forecastle. That shots were fired has
been confirmed by American seamen aboard the Liberty. It seems
that one of the crew, Seaman Apprentice Dale Larkins, did not hear
Capt. McGonagle's 'hold fire' order, issued minutes before, and fired
several volleys in the direction of the torpedo boats until he was
told to stop.
Oren still hesitated. He consulted the Israeli navy's book identifying
the ships of the Arab navies, and concluded that the ship in
question was the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir. An independent
check by the captain of one of the other torpedo boats came up
with the same identification."
At 2:37 Lt. Col. Oren gave the order to attack. Five torpedos were
launched from the boats, which were speeding forward which
covering their advance with cannon fire. Ten minutes later, as the
T-204 was crossing the bow of the Liberty, an officer noticed the
letters GTR on the hull of the ship. Oren issued a 'hold' fire order.
With this order came an end to the attack on the Liberty.
--
Sam Cramer uucp: {cbosgd,decwrl,hplabs,seismo,ucbvax}!sun!cramer
arpanet: cramer@sun.arpatedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu (Tom Tedrick) (03/21/86)
In article <3381@sun.uucp> cramer@sun.UUCP (Sam Cramer) writes:
[a very interesting article about the Liberty incident.]
I don't know much about this particular incident, but in war time
such incidents are almost invariably due to mistakes rather than
intention. Anytime something like this happens you can almost
bank on the fact that someone has screwed up somewhere.
If the history of war were rewritten with a view to the role
played by mistakes and miscalculations a lot of things would
be clearer. For example the real danger of nuclear war is not from
an intentional, calculated first strike but a series of blunders.
Both WW1 and WW2 resulted from mistakes, miscalculations, and
misunderstandings, for example.weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (03/22/86)
I'd like to thank Sam for posting his long summary of the article on the Liberty. He did not, however, tell us where the article got its sources from, so I am somewhat dubious. In particular, a lot of detailed information comes from somewhere. Is it from reality or an official cover up? I am not throwing strange paranoia claims out. It is certainly in Israel's best interests to maintain the accident story. Why, it would not surprise me to learn that the ammo dump explosion was deliberate and not one more coincidence. I am struck by the large number of little coincidences all adding up. Is there no independent way of verifying them? One or two I'll believe, but after a while I wonder. The business of the flag bothers me a lot. Why would the Americans take it down in the first place? That makes no sense. It is certainly NOT a moot point in trying to find out whether the attack was deliberate or accidental. If it really was flying, then your sources are lying on that one point, and are oh so conveniently uncheckable on all the remaining points. In my article I cited the major source of Bamford in his book. He also cited a late 1967 CIA document, which I repeat here: > [The sources] commented on the sinking [sic] of the US Communications > ship *Liberty*. They said that Dayan personally ordered the attack > on the ship and that one of his generals adamantly opposed the action > and said, "This is pure murder." One of the admirals who was present > also disapproved the action, and it was he who ordered it stopped and > not Dayan. Thus you not only have to accept all the unverifiable coincidences, but explain how the CIA came up with this false analysis. The CIA certainly is not noted for being anti-Israel. And then you have to overlook the immense convenience the attack did have for the Israeli war effort, whether intended or not. The superpower spy ship, whoops, sorry about that. From Sam Cramer's article: >"The pilot reported back, 'I see no flag or other signs of >identification.' (The question of whether or not the Liberty was >flying a flag remains a major point of contention. The point, >however, is moot: the pilot's report left those assessing the target's >status with the impression that no flag was being flown - a key >factor in their decision that the ship was hostile.)" >The fact that there was no return fire from the target puzzled the >lead pilot. He swooped in twice, and reported seeing markings on >the hull, saying "The ship's identification is Charlie-Tango-Romeo-5. >I see no flag." It had been blown off in the first wave. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) (03/22/86)
In article <12530@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) writes: >In article <3381@sun.uucp> cramer@sun.UUCP (Sam Cramer) writes: >[a very interesting article about the Liberty incident.] > >I don't know much about this particular incident, but in war time >such incidents are almost invariably due to mistakes rather than >intention. Come on Tom. Accidents are due to mistakes, and deliberate attacks are due to intentions. War has both. Until we know which the Liberty was, it is both impossible and unethical to write it off on mere probabilility grounds. It deserves its own impartial investigation. > Anytime something like this happens you can almost >bank on the fact that someone has screwed up somewhere. How many times has something like the Liberty incident happened? Exactly once. What relevance is the fact that other incidents have occurred and have usually been do to horrible misunderstandings? None at all. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720