JMUNGLE@ADA20.ISI.EDU (Jerry Mungle) (07/10/86)
I was reading the july/august issue of SIGAda, and noticed the letter by Anthony Gargaro (pg. vi.4-5). In it he states "...Ada-related technology is catagorized as unclassified information that is subject to Government control. The disclosure of such information at conferences, seminars, and symposia where there is foreign participation should therefore comply with the appropriate Government procedures." A couple of questions: 1) How can the government control nonclassified information? 2) What exactly is meant by Ada-related technology? Can I teach Ada to foreign graduate students, for example? Exactly what is going on here.... -------
LINNIG@ti-eg.CSNET (Mike Linnig) (07/10/86)
IN%"JMUNGLE%ada20.isi.edu@CSNET-RELAY" asks: > A couple of questions: 1) How can the government control nonclassified > information? 2) What exactly is meant by Ada-related technology? Can I > teach Ada to foreign graduate students, for example? Exactly what is going > on here.... Sitting on my desk is a copy of the final report for CAMP (Common Ada Missile Packages). On its cover page is the following: WARNING: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C. 2751 et seq) or Executive Order 12470. Violation of these export-control laws is subject to severe criminal penalities. Dissemination of this document is controlled under DoD directive 5230.25 It also says "Distribution Limited to DoD and DoD Contractors Only". IT IS TOTALLY UNCLASSIFIED. Now, just glancing through this document, I can see nothing that merits this warning. Nothing that would make it classified, or anything that would really help an enemy (other than helping them to write better Ada code). I'm sure the authors were forced by the government to include this notice. I've noticed this trend for sometime now (marking documents with unneeded restrictions), and find it quite upsetting [just try finding an unrestricted VHSIC related document]. This kind of stuff is just causes wasted time (and research dollars)! -- Mike Linnig (std-opinion-disclaimer: what's mine is mine, theirs is theirs, sometime the same, most times different)
pb@PIPE.WISC.EDU.UUCP (07/11/86)
>> A couple of questions: 1) How can the government control nonclassified >> information? 2) What exactly is meant by Ada-related technology? Can I >> teach Ada to foreign graduate students, for example? Exactly what is going >> on here.... >Sitting on my desk is a copy of the final report for CAMP (Common Ada >Missile Packages). >On its cover page is the following: > WARNING: This document contains technical data whose export is > restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C. 2751 et > seq) or Executive Order 12470. Violation of these export-control laws > is subject to severe criminal penalities. Dissemination of this > document is controlled under DoD directive 5230.25 >It also says "Distribution Limited to DoD and DoD Contractors Only". >IT IS TOTALLY UNCLASSIFIED. >Now, just glancing through this document, I can see nothing that merits >this warning. Nothing that would make it classified, or anything that would >really help an enemy (other than helping them to write better Ada code). >I'm sure the authors were forced by the government to include this notice. >I've noticed this trend for sometime now (marking documents with unneeded >restrictions), and find it quite upsetting [just try finding an >unrestricted VHSIC related document]. >This kind of stuff is just causes wasted time (and research dollars)! > -- Mike Linnig Unfortunately, this is a trend that's been going on for some time. Do you remember the case of the U.S. Government's (first ever) prior restraint order against The Progressive, preventing them from distributing an issue in which they published material on the H-bomb, ALL of which was gotten by their reporter from unclassified materials, in libraries open to the public? (This was in 1979 or 1980, I think.) It's hard to understand what "national interest" such behavior furthers; cynics (who are not necessarily therefore wrong) suspect that it's part of an attempt to present numerous topics that should be subject to civilian control as overly technical (and, therefore, secret) for any but military or high government official knowledge and decision. --pb schechter
LINNIG@ti-eg.CSNET.UUCP (07/16/86)
Forwarded by request of the author: ...................................................................... From: Mats_Ohlin_FOA2%qzcom.mailnet%MIT-MULTICS.ARPA 15-JUL-1986 00:36 To: "Mike Linnig" <LINNIG@TI-EG.CSNET> Subj: RE: Government Control of Ada Yes, I agree. I am working for the Swedish Defence, we are encountering these kind of problems more and more now. I could sympatize with the general concern in USDoD to control the transfer of sensitive information out of the US. However, when it concerns general things (general software, but also hardware /TEMPEST/) it gives us some problems. Naturally, we want to make the Swedish Defence as effective as possible, with each Swedish crown invested in the best possible way. US export regulations actually makes it less effective also for neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden. Even if it often is possible to get export permission it requires a lot of paper work and takes a lot of time. It concerns also workstations containing 68020... and even the crypt program in UNIX (which, in the latter case, may be a good thing... but not as DoC thinks). It concerns our possibilities to buy TEMPEST approved equipment when we want to create secure systems; giving us higher cost (and great motivation to arrange national development and production, which in the long run may be fruitful for us though). (Standard disclaimer: opinions are my own, not necessarily different from my employer /Sw Nat'l Def Research Inst/). -- Mats Ohlin (Please forward this to the Ada Mailing List, my system seems to have lost the proper net address.)