[fa.tcp-ip] TCP-IP Digest, Vol 2 #12

TCP-IP%brl@brl-bmd.UUCP (06/30/83)

TCP/IP Digest          Thursday, 30 June 1983      Volume 2 : Issue 12

Today's Topics:
                 IBM VM TCP/IP Implementation Now Exists
               Contacts within IBM for TCP/IP Information
                      Hooking IBMs to an Ethernet?
    Gateways: When should I ping, When should I purge, Who should I have?
                  Program to print TOPS20's Ping Table
               Security Problem with Mail?  Probably not.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
                  TCP/IP Digest --- The InterNet Digest
                         LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
          For Research Use Only --- Not for Public Distribution
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 22 Jun 1983 13:22:04-CDT
From: L.H. Landweber <lhl@uwisc>
Reply-to: ibm-project@uwisc
To: tcp-ip@brl
Subject:  IBM VM TCP/IP IMPLEMENTATION

                  TCP/IP IBM VM IMPLEMENTATION


We are implementating of the Internet protocols (FTP/SMTP/Telnet/TCP/IP) for
IBM VM Systems under contract with IBM.  The TCP and IP have been running for
some time now under VM/SP on an IBM 4331 at Wisconsin and we are currently
putting the finishing touches on the higher-level protocols.  In addition, a
software interface between IP and an X.25 implementation running on a
Series/1 (RPS operating system) has been completed.  The complete package
will enable CSNET IBM VM hosts to connect to the Darpa Internet via Telenet.

The 4300 software is written almost entirely in Pascal, with a small amount
of assembler-language support.  Some assembler code running on the Series/1
interfaces with the X.25 code, which is a standard IBM product.  Standard IBM
released software is used throughout (i.e., no modified or unreleased system
software has been employed).

The software will be ready for initial distribution to test sites in mid-July.
We hope to have production versions available by the end of August.
Distribution will be controlled by IBM.  We encourage interested parties to
contact:

          Mr. Carl VanWinter
          IBM  Corporation
          Rochester, MN
          507-286-3378

to express an interest or request information on distribution
plans.


ADDITIONAL DETAILS

TCP/IP runs in a separate disconnected virtual machine.  Similarly, SMTP,
server FTP, and server Telnet each occupies a dedicated virtual machine.
User FTP and user Telnet run within a user's virtual machine under CMS.
Communication between virtual machines is done through the IBM Virtual
Machine Communication Facility (VMCF).  A detailed preliminary design
document is available by contacting one of the individuals listed below.
(Some details have changed since it was written, but it is still mostly
accurate.)

Over the Summer we expect to implement a Pronet driver to enable
our IP/TCP to use the PRONET 10 megabit/sec token ring LAN.  The hardware
interface will be via a DACU (Device Access Control Unit) provided by IBM.
The DACU enables connection of UNIBUS devices to an IBM channel.  We expect
other university groups to provide a driver for Ethernet.  We estimate that
each of these projects will take 2-4 man-months to complete.

Direct connection to a C/30 IMP will require implementation of a software
driver in conjunction with a suitable hardware interface (e.g., DACU--LH/DH
or Series/1--HDH).

For further technical information contact:

          David DeWitt, Larry Landweber, or Marvin Solomon
          Computer Science Department
          University of Wisconsin
          1210 W. Dayton St.
          Madison, WI 53706
          608-262-1204

		  ibm-project@uwisc

------------------------------

Date: Thu 23 Jun 83 09:08:37-PDT
From: Suzanne Johnson <JOHNSON@SUMEX-AIM.ARPA>
Subject: tcp/ip ibm info
To: tcp-ip@BRL.ARPA

It turns out that if you give your IBM rep VERY specific information on
WHO and WHERE within IBM the tcp/ip work goes on, they can follow up for
you.

The tcp/ip work is evidently being done by IBM's Federal Systems Division
in Gaithersburg, Maryland.  The person doing the work is Doug McKay.

Our rep was able to confirm this, given the above info.  Since he is
somewhat up-to-date on status, you might have your rep contact
our IBM rep.  His name is Waymon Lee, and phone # is 415-855-0519.

Let us know what you find out.

Suzanne Johnson

------------------------------

Date: 23 Jun 1983 at 1527-PDT
From: dan@sri-tsc
To: Suzanne Johnson <JOHNSON@SUMEX-AIM.ARPA>
cc: tcp-ip@brl
Subject: Re: ibm tcp/ip

Doug McKay is indeed working on TCP/IP for the Series I.  He is porting
the SRI TCP/IP for PDP11/44's (which is itself a port of the 4.1b BSD
VAX UNIX TCP/IP).  It was my understanding that it is being integrated
into the version of UNIX they have running on the Series I and whatever
other IBM systems are running UNIX.  I don't know if his group is also
working on TCP/IP for non-unix operating systems, but I got the
impression from talking to him that they were not.

	-Dan Chernikoff (dan@sri-tsc)
	SRI International

------------------------------

Date: 23 Jun 1983 0:57-EDT
From: Lee.Moore@Rochester.ARPA
Subject: Re: TCP-IP Digest, Vol 2 #11
To: tcp-ip@brl-vgr.ARPA
Origin: Filter-Queen

RE: hooking IBM's to an ethernet

I recently got a glossy brochure describing an IBM channel interface
for ethernet from ACC.  Does anybody know anything about this?

=lee

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jun 1983 0209-PDT
Sender: GEOFF@sri-csl
Subject: Gateways- When should I ping, When should I purge, Who should I have?
From: the tty of Geoffrey S. Goodfellow
Reply-To: Geoff@sri-csl
To: POSTEL@usc-isif, HEDRICK@rutgers, MRC@su-score
To: snelson@office-1, bhitson@bbn-unix, tcp-ip@brl

So far we have heard that pinging gateways in a hosts gateway
cache every 37 seconds is too often and that very likely every
TENEX and TOPS-20 site on the ARPANET is currently doing this.
We had a suggestion that it might not be necessary to ping
gateways at all.  However, it was also suggested pinging gateways
periodically might be a good idea.

It was suggested that entries in a hosts dynamic gateway table
should be aged and deleted after about an hours time.

A number of informed parties suggested that each site configure
the contents of their INTERNET.GATEWAYS file very carefully and
some very helpful guidelines for choosing the initial contents of
your INTERNET.GATEWAYS file was given.

What I would like to see explored, discussed and hopefully
resolved by this group is:

1) What is the ideal interval with which to PING and under what
circumstances should I PING?

2) What is the ideal time a gateway entry should remain in a
given hosts gateway table before it is aged and flushed?

I think how one should configure the contents of their initial
INTERNET.GATEWAYS file was pretty well explained by Charlie Lynn,
but I still have not heard anything concrete enough on the
subject of when to PING and when to purge to make me dash to my
TENEX sources and stick the code in.

Could we hear from other operating system wizards on how
FUZZBALLS, TAC's, UNIX, Multics, VMS, IBM hosts, TIU's and so
forth have done it and from the Internet Holy Water Sprinklers on
what the ideal values would be?

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jun 1983 0329-PDT
From: Henry W. Miller <Miller@sri-nic>
Subject: Re: Gateways- When should I ping, When should I purge, Who should I have?
To: Geoff@sri-csl, POSTEL@usc-isif, HEDRICK@rutgers, MRC@su-score,
    tcp-ip@brl, tcp-ip@sri-nic, tcp-ip-tops20@sri-nic, tops-20@su-score
cc: Miller@sri-nic

1)	Jon sez that it is not necessary to ping; that ICMP
redirects will handle it.  OK, seems reasonable, depending
on your net traffic.  Knowing a probable path, and trying
it first, and recovering from it in case of error seems
more efficient than probing J. Random Prime Gateway, hoping
for a win.  (This is why I'm in favor of rich gateway tables;
it gives you more initial options.)

2)	If you choose to ping, to keep up with the state of the
network, 37 seconds is clearly too short of a period to get a
snapshot of the net.  A couple of un-ACKED probes could lead one
to believe that a gate is down, when in fact, it might not be.
If pinging is desired, then an interval that is suffcently long
should be used, say 5-10 minutes.  (Personal opinion: A ping
from a host coming back on the air COULD/SHOULD be interpreted
as an "I'm Alive" message.  The gateways, in their infinte
wisdom, could spread the good news across the networks, so the
various hosts could update their routing tables.  Likewise, the
hosts should be able to poll the gateway of their dreams on
occaision and receive, in return, the latest routing poop.
A maxi ping, fer surre, but would help eliminate senseless
probings...)

3)	Updating routing tables: again, depending upon your
internet needs, 30 minutes at the max.  (Smallest interval...)
The current default, I believe is 6 hours.


4)	Another thot:  put a timer block in for each gateway:
when to ping next.  This would allow pinging on a selective
basis.

-HWM

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jun 1983  9:08:55 EDT (Wednesday)
From: Dennis Rockwell <drockwel@bbn-vax>
Subject: Re: Gateways- When should I ping, When should I purge, Who should I have?
To: Geoff@sri-csl
Cc: POSTEL@usc-isif, HEDRICK@rutgers, MRC@su-score, RLL.TYM@office-2,
    DAB2.GVT@office-2, snelson@office-1, bhitson@bbn-unix, tcp-ip@brl

BBN UNIX hosts ping all gateways that are currently in use (defined as
having an open connection which has as its local-net destination a
gateway) constantly, at a rate of once every few seconds.

We have thought about fancy schemes involving only pinging when TCP
has to retransmit, but this leaves users of non-TCP services out
in the cold.  The rapid rate of pinging is for detection of a dead
first-hop gateway.  Unless one assumes an 1822 net, there is very likely
no feedback as to whether a packet is delivered or not (as was previously
noted, ethernet in particular has no such feedback).

Since we only ping active gateways, our hosts' gateway table contains
all the gateways we can find out about that are connected to whatever
local net(s) we are connected to.

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jun 1983 1433-EDT
From: Geoffrey H. Cooper <GEOF@mit-xx>
Subject: RE: Sending Pings to Gateways
To: TCP-IP@brl
cc: clynn@bbnc, geof@mit-xx

CLYNN's message describing the way in which TOPS-20 uses its list of
internet gateways brings up a more general problem with ICMP.  As
mentioned by Postel (in the last digest), every host implementation of
internet routing maintains a cache of <net,gateway_to_use> pairs, and a
list of "prime" internet gateways.  When a packet is routed the Internet
implementation first searches the cache for an appropriate gateway to
use.  If this search fails, the packet is sent to a "default intelligent
(prime) gateway" which will send a redirect back to the host IF A BETTER
GATEWAY EXISTS FOR THAT NET, so that subsequent packets to the same net
will hit the host's cache.  Note that the prime gateway can not be
relied upon to send a packet back (this is a necessary part of the way
internet routing works, since otherwise a prime gateway would have to
send back a redirect to itself for EVERY packet it forwards).

The question that arises is to which of the default gateways that are
known to the host should a "defaulted" packet be sent?  The answer is,
of course, to the least-loaded, working (up), closest default gateway.
Unfortunately, none of those attributes is determinable by the host.

If the host is on the Arpanet, it would be possible to make use of the
arpanet's "host dead" messages to determine that a particular prime
gateway doesn't seem to be working (either because it is too busy or
crashed).  Thus, it would be possible to order the prime gateways that a
host knows about in order of "usefulness to the host" (or perhaps
closeness on the network is the best static measure to use).  The best
gateway (earliest on the list) is always used, and the network status
messages are used to declare that gateway's entry temporarily invalid
when packets sent to it result in "host dead" messages.

If the host is on a network other than the Arpanet, the problem is more
severe, since the network will generally not take the responsibility to
tell the host that a packet it sent was not received by the gateway to
which it was sent (the Ethernet is the best example of such a network).
If all packets are sent by default to a single "best" gateway and that
gateway is down, then all the packets will fall into a "black hole" and
a section of the internet will become inaccessible to the host.

One way to deal with this situation is what is done by Tops-20:
Explicitly and regularly find out what prime gateways are up, and always
send your packets to the best prime gateway that is up.  The last issue
of the digest described some of the problems with this approach.

Another approach is to use the telephone company's ''linefinder''
algorithm: Keep the N prime gateways that a host knows about in an
ordered table, and cycle through the table (i.e., always use the
''next''
gateway after the one that you last used).  The host maintains no
information on the state of the prime gateways in its tables.  Some
packets will indeed be sent to the "black hole" of a crashed prime
gateway; higher level protocols can be counted upon to retransmit these
packets, and will hit other gateways on the retransmissions.

One advantage of this scheme is that it ``load shares'' the burden of
sending redirects among all of the prime gateways that a host knows
about, rather than placing undue burden on one particular gateway that
it considers to be the "best."

Another advantage is that it leaves a host implementation open to the
add the identities of new prime gateways to its tables.  Consider the
following algorithm: when a host receives a redirect to a gateway, it
place a ``dubious'' entry for that gateway into its prime gateway table.
The entry is dubious because the host knows that the gateway exists, but
does not know if it is a prime gateway.  A count is kept of the number
of times a packet is sent to that gateway.  If, say, five packets are
sent to the gateway, and no redirect is ever seen from it, then the
gateway is deleted from the host's prime gateway table.  If a redirect
is seen from the gateway in question, the gateway's entry may be
upgraded from "dubious" to "certain." In this way, a host can slowly
accumulate information about the gateways that are of most use to it in
the internet.

Although I am biased (since the above scheme is of my own design), I
believe that the idea of cycling through the list of known gateways is
the "way to go." The advantages I see are, once more:

	1. Solves "black hole" disease
	2. Shares the "redirect" load among many gateways
	3. Allows a host to dynamically learn about new prime gateways

- Geof Cooper
  MIT

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jun 1983 1132-PDT
Subject: Re: Warning, TCP-4 problems
From: Craig Milo Rogers <ROGERS@usc-isib>
To: David Roode <ROODE@sri-nic>, HEDRICK@rutgers, MRC@su-score
cc: RLL.TYM@office-2, tharris@ddn1, jmayersohn@bbn-unix, ddnsr@bbn-unix,
    tcp-ip@brl, tcp-ip@sri-nic, tcp-ip-tops20@sri-nic, tops-20@su-score

	The programs <PRVSYS>IGGSTS.EXE and <PRVSYS>IGWSTS.EXE on ISIA,B,D-F
will print TOPS20's Ping table and network routing table, respectively.
(The names are holdovers from the GGP days).  However, I don't expect
these programs to work outside ISI, because they use an ISI-specific (I
think) JSYS to map monitor pages (GTMPG).  The sources are in BLISS-10.
There are help files in <PRVSYS>.  You need the Wheel privelege to run
the programs.
					Craig Milo Rogers

------------------------------

Date:     Tue, 28 Jun 83 21:45:37 EDT
From:     Ron Natalie <ron@brl-bmd>
To:       tcp-ip@brl-bmd, unix-wizards@brl-bmd
cc:       msggroup@brl-bmd
Subject:  Security Problem?

I have noticed that many sites have taken the precaution of
having their login programs (and their FTP servers) not make
a distinction between an invalid user name and an invalid
password.  The reasoning behind this is that if a user could
tell, he could sit there hacking a user name until he got a
valid one and then start hacking its password.  While trying
to figure out a user name that I had written down rather illegibly,
I found this is a rather effective deterrent to those guessing
at user name.

Until I got the following idea.  I connected to the site's
SMTP server and did the following:

	220 HOST-OF-HOSTS SERVER SMTP
	HELO HACKER
	250 HOST-OF-HOSTS
	MAIL FROM: <HACKER@ARPALAND>
	250 OK
	RCPT TO: <ROT@HOST-OF-HOSTS>
	550 We have no "ROT" here.
	RCPT TO: <ROOT@HOST-OF-HOSTS>
	250 Recipient accepted.

Since most machines have mailboxes that are the same as the valid
login names, this may prove an effective way of hacking the names.
In addition, the easiest way to get user names at valid hosts is
to just subscribe to one of the busy mailing lists and use the ones
of those sending mail.

-Ron

------------------------------

Date: 29 Jun 1983 09:10-PDT
Sender: GEOFF@sri-csl
Subject: Re:  Security Problem?
From: the tty of Geoffrey S. Goodfellow
Reply-To: Geoff@sri-csl
To: ron@brl-bmd
Cc: tcp-ip@brl-bmd, unix-wizards@brl-bmd
Cc: msggroup@brl-bmd

A real easy way of "hacking names" on a host is to just connect
up with TELNET and do a SYSTAT or FINGER.  Big Deal.

A gourmet "name hacker" would use the NIC's informative "WHOIS"
Server.  Just give the name of your favorite host preceded with a
star `*' (i.e.  try `*brl' for example) and a nicely formatted
list, replete with full name, initials(nic id), mailbox and phone
number will promptly be displayed.

Happy Hacking.

------------------------------

Date: Wednesday, 29 Jun 1983 12:41-PDT
To: Ron Natalie <ron@brl-bmd>
Cc: tcp-ip@brl-bmd, unix-wizards@brl-bmd, msggroup@brl-bmd
Subject: Re:  Security Problem?
From: greep@su-dsn

Other tactics include looking in the Arpanet directory or just trying
common names.  In addition, many Unix sites have a "who" login that
runs the "who" or "finger" program, and most tops-20 sites let you
run "finger" or "systat" without being logged in.  In fact, you can
(at least with some dec-20's) run finger with a null argument and
get a list of every user (not just those logged in).  It is generally
agreed that keeping user names secret is not a reasonable thing to
do -- that's what passwords are for.

------------------------------

Date: Tue 28 Jun 83 23:17:08-PDT
From: Mark Crispin <MRC@SU-SCORE.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Security Problem?
To: ron@BRL-BMD.ARPA
cc: tcp-ip@BRL-BMD.ARPA, unix-wizards@BRL-BMD.ARPA, msggroup@BRL-BMD.ARPA

     One thing you could do would be to not validate mailboxes in the
SMTP server, but that only delays the error message unless you "black
hole" mail to invalid mailboxes.  It's a trade-off between security and
friendliness.

------------------------------

Date: 28 Jun 1983 2357-PDT
Subject: Re: Security Problem?
From: Einar Stefferud <msggroup-request@brl>
To: ron@brl-bmd
Cc: tcp-ip@brl-bmd, unix-wizards@brl-bmd
Cc: msggroup@brl-bmd

[ Comments to MSGGROUP readers deleted here -Mike ]

Rather than trying to shut down the ability to extract login names
from mail servers, I think attention should be focused on other
security techniques.

Like, making the penalty higher for failing to login correctly, and
making the user start over at the beginning of the whole process when
an error occurs before completion.  One thing to do is force a delay
following any failure, like an extra 5 or 10 seconds, which slows down
the hacking rate to less than 6 tries per minute.  Then, I think that
too many failures in a row should cause a disconnect, which further
slows down serious password hackers.

Seems to me that it is too easy to put obstacles in the way to let
ourselves get sidetracked into trying to conceal names.  Whither goest
the whole idea of name-servers if we try to close the mail gap?

So, lets just chase this issue back to the other lists, unless a more
genuine mail connection can be conjured up.

Cheers - Stef

------------------------------

END OF TCP-IP DIGEST
********************