tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (07/31/85)
[] From postnews Tue Jul 30 16:04:31 1985 > In article <9161@ucbvax.ARPA> rimey@ucbmiro.UUCP (Ken rimey) writes: > > > >The term meta-physics does not mean what you think it does. Usually > >written without the hyphen, it refers to a particular school of (non-modern) > >philosophy that has no particular relationship to physics. Perhaps > >someone else can give us an authoritative definition. > > > You are essentially right. A little history is usefull here. > The term means "after physics" and is due to the fact that when (I > believe) Aristotle wrote his treatise on All Knowledge(I forget the > actual title) he couldn't think of a name for this subject and since > it was the chapter following the chapter on physics he calle the > chapter "After Physics" = Metaphysics. The closest "modern" field is > probably Parapsychology(which likewise has nothing to do with > Psychology). It is the 'study" of the supernatural/divine world. The etymology of "metaphysics" is correct, but the claim that the closest "modern" equivalent is parapsychology is false. Metaphysics is alive and well, and it is not linked to the occult. "metaphysics" is notoriously difficult to define, but then so is "science". One possible definition would be: metaphysics is the inquiry into the logic, presuppositions, and entailments of our most general categories for describing reality. Some philosophers like to think of metaphysics as conceptual topography. Here are some examples of important metaphysical questions that are of interest to philosophers these days: (1) What are the logically necessary and sufficient conditions of something's being the *cause* of something else? Can all causal interactions be captured by a single definition? (2) Are mathematical and abstract entities in any significant sense *real*, mind-independent aspects of reality. (Note that many mathematicians answer 'yes' to this question) (3) What are mental phenomena? Is there any clear set of constraints upon the kind of systems that might manifest them? Are they simply emergent properties of complex physical systems? If so, *which* physical systems? (4) Is probability objective or subjective? When a probability is assigned to an event, is that an objective fact about it, or a measure of the ignorance of the observer? > > > >It would be nice to have a term for speculation on questions like > > > > 1. Does there exist a finite theory that completely describes the > > fundamental behavior of matter in the universe? > > > > 2. Is there a simple and elegant mathematical formulation of this > > theory? Why should there be? > > > > 3. Can we guess constraints on what this theory must be like? > > (Many general relativity enthusiasts would say yes.) > > > >Maybe the interesting observation is that there just isn't much written > >on questions like mine above. People who actually know physics seem to > >find that their time is better spent actually doing physics. > > Ken Rimey These are metaphysical questions, too, and there is a great deal written on them, by both philosophers and physicists. In fact, there is no sharp line of demarcation between physics and metaphysics, although most of what goes on in both does not overlap. It is certainly correct, though, that most physicists are not engaged in metaphysics (although metaphysical questions may have something to do with their getting into physics in the first place). This is as it should be. Therefore, I conclude this article and offer, to anyone who is interested, to resume the discussion in net.philosophy, where it probably belongs. Todd Moody Philosophy Department St. Joseph's U. Philadelphia, PA 19131