ar@duke.UUCP (Andrew L. Reibman) (08/04/85)
ALBION AARDVARK - 1985-???? Headlines: Im Westen ist Nichts (Im Osten, wie auch) Orders for Spring '01: Russia: F StP -> GoB A Mos -> Ukr A War -> Liv F Sev -> Blk France: A Mar -> Spa F Bre -> MiA A Par -> Bur Italy: A Ven -> Pie A Rom -> Apu F Nap -> Ion Austria-Hungary: A Bud -> Ser A Vie -> Bud F Tri - Alb England: F Lon -> Nth F Edi -> Nor A Liv -> Wal Turkey: A Con -> Bul F Ank -> Con A Smy H Germany: A Mun - Ruh A Ber - Kie F Kie - Hol Fall Moves are due August 16th. Fall '01 Moves are due August 16th. Kibbitzers are cordially invited! Andrew Reibman ...{allegra,decvax,ihnp4}!duke!ar
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (08/06/85)
> Russia: F StP -> GoB A Mos -> Ukr A War -> Liv F Sev -> Blk > France: A Mar -> Spa F Bre -> MiA A Par -> Bur > Italy: A Ven -> Pie A Rom -> Apu F Nap -> Ion > Austria: A Bud -> Ser A Vie -> Bud F Tri - Alb > England: F Lon -> Nth F Edi -> Nor A Liv -> Wal > Turkey: A Con -> Bul F Ank -> Con A Smy H > Germany: A Mun - Ruh A Ber - Kie F Kie - Hol Comments: All standard stuff, with only one truly unusual (and mistaken) move. Russia opens cautiously and neutrally, trusting no one and offending no one; France begins flexibly, threatening both Italy and Germany without committing against either; Italy appears pro-Austrian and anti-Turkish, wise considering the implications of the Turkish move; Austria appears pro-Italian and unsure of the East; England flubs its army order (what's it going to do in Wales?) in pursuing the same sort of policy as Russia, albeit less expertly; Turkey is pro-Russian and therefore immediately anti-Austrian and inevitably anti-Italian; Germany temporizes in the Anglo-Russian style. My guess is that France has emerged as the swing power, and can use that position to maximize her prospects. In the East, unless Russia has totally deluded the Turks, a Russo-Turkish alliance seems likely to come to grips with an Austro-Italian one; In the North, the Germans ought to be quite jumpy about the prospects of A Lvn -> Swe, and would like a free hand in the West, while England has so bolluxed up its opening as to damage its ability to exploit the likely bidding by Berlin and St. Petersburg for her services. France will likely be given a free hand, as all of her neighbors are most anxious to have her go the other way. If she heads for the Mediterranean, the Italians will be unable to support the Austrians, and Turkish fleets will flood the Mediterranean -- an unappetizing prospect. France should try to make the best deal in the North, which she will likely get only if if England and Germany are kept apart. Russia, too, is a swing power. She has promised to support Turkey, but if she can persuade France to pressure Italy, she will begin receiving love letters from Vienna. Russia may then use Italian distraction westwards to either stab Turkey or rapidly dismember Austria in cooperation with Turkey. Austria, Turkey, and Italy are committed in their courses. They cannot change their strategies without having wasted valuable time. They will exert their efforts diplomatically in well-determined ways reflecting, not their greater sense of purpose, but their limited options in the near future. Italy will concentrate on placating France, Turkey will seek to insure Russian fidelity, and Austria will seek both Russian friendship (or at least neutrality) and other distractions for Russia in the North to encourage the granting of that friendship. Germany is in the most uncomfortable position, as there are distinct threats from both the East (A Lvn) and West (A Bur). A stalwart German player would attempt to play for three builds anyway, and seek to secure those builds diverting France away by any diplomatic means available (some possible dishonest) and by offering England support into Sweden in 1902. A cautious player will concede Denmark to England in order to divert Russia and concentrate German forces against the French threat. Berlin's neighbors will not hesitate to offer their advice: Vienna and London will lobby for the cautious course, while St. Petersburg and Paris will seek to encourage German optimism. Rome and Constantinople are probably unsure which they will prefer, with Rome leaning towards German caution and Constantinople towards German aggressiveness. Finally, England will probably try to persuade the Germans to yield Denmark. If that fails, England will threaten to support France in Belgium and raise the spectre of an Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance. It will probably succeed, as Germany is very much aware that all three countries possess the necessary diplomatic latitude to engage in such a campaign. If not done with an overly heavy hand, Germany can likely be persuaded to throw herself into the arms of the power that least threatens her. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
speegle@ut-ngp.UTEXAS (Charles R. Speegle) (08/09/85)
*** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE *** In reference to fisher's analysis of the game, sounds good except for one thing Russia and Turkey can't talk. My opening move was intended to aggravate no one since I can't seem to get a two way path going except with England and France. Turkey(maybe now I feel like one) Charles R. Speegle (Charlie) -)------ ------(- Let's argue over a point ;-) speegle@ut-ngp.ARPA {allegra,ihnp4}!ut-ngp!speegle